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INTRODUCTION
As zealous supporters of First Amendment rights are all too
well aware, William J. Brennan, Jr. retired as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court in 1990, following 34
years of memorable service. Few would disagree that Justice
Brennan's tenure on the Court coincided with an unprecedented
blossoming of judicial protection of freedom of speech in this
country, and that he had as much to do with that evolution as
any other Justice. His special and important contributions to the
law of freedom of speech have been explored elsewhere, 1 and are
undeniable. Justice Brennan's colleague, Thurgood Marshall, ended 24 years of service as an Associate Justice in 1991. Together,
Brennan and Marshall supported challenges to governmental
authority under the First Amendment with a consistency and
fervor matched only by their former brethren, Hugo Black and
William O. Douglas. Now that Justices Brennan and Marshall
are gone, and ~specially considering the fact that a majority of
the present Justices - O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas - were appointed by conservative presidents determined to select judges who are not "judicial activists," the time
seems right to inquire: Whither freedom of speech?
This article will explore the positions taken in a number of
the most important areas of the law of freedom of speech by
each of the Justices presently on the Court,2 and will attempt to
suggest the extent to which protection of speech has been, or
likely will be, diminished in the post-Brennan era. Obviously,
not every aspect of the law of freedom of speech could be, or is,
covered in this article. To that extent, any picture that emerges
from the ensuing discussion may not be fully representative; the
selected topics are, however, by their nature, highly indicative of
the depth of a Justice's commitment to the protection of speech.
The law of freedom of speech - unlike some other prominent aspects of constitutional laws - is not an arena of ideologi1. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Brennan and The Freedom of Speech: A
First Amendment Odyssey, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1333 (1991).
2. Thus, references to Justices no longer on the Court are frequently omitted in the
discussion of a given case.
3. Compare the topics of affirmative action based upon race, City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and the right to an abortion, Planned Parenthood
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cal warfare among the Justices. With few exceptions, the Justices do not bring an "agenda" to their evaluation of arguments
in the realm of freedom of expression. No sitting Justice is hostile to core values of freedom of expression, nor is any of them
grossly insensitive to such values. The inquiry at hand, however,
is a comparative one: To what extent, if any, are the present
Justices (or some of them) less committed to the protection of
speech than were Brennan and Marshall? The standard of measurement is, admittedly, a high one.
Because the assessment herein of the Justices is essentially
comparative in nature, this article does not evaluate each of
their rulings and doctrinal positions in terms of their ultimate
persuasiveness or desirability.
. Finally, this article assumes a fair amount of knowledge of
First Amendment law on the part of the reader; space limitations simply do not permit elaborate explanation of every underlying concept in an article of this scope. 4
I. FACIAL OVERBREADTH

The application of the First Amendment facial overbreadth
doctrine by the Supreme Court over the past two decades has
been marked by sharp disagreement and a fair amount of unpredictability. The Justices have frequently differed on the questions of whether, and when, to utilize this highly speech-protective procedural tool. They have also differed significantly in
their readiness to find statutes facially overbroad. Clearly, the
doctrine has survived, but the extent of the Court's enthusiasm
for it is open to question.
Antipathy to the facial overbreadth device was expressed as
long ago as 1971, in Justice White's dissenting opinion, joined by
Justice Blackmun, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati." A turning
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
4. Fo~ the same reasons, the abundant literature analyzing and critiquing the decisions referred to are not reviewed in this article.
5. 402 U.S. 611, 617 (1971). Justice Blackmun dissented from Brennan's vigilant application of the overbreadth doctrine in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), but
Justice White did not. Brennan rested his finding of facial overbreadth heavily on the
Georgia courts' past construction of the Georgia statute at issue, a practice that Black-
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point was Broadrick u. State of Oklahoma,6 in 1973, in which
White, writing for a bare majority of the Court that included
Blackmun and Rehnquist, imposed the requirement of "substantial" overbreadth as a necessary condition to facial invalidation
of a statute on First Amendment grounds. "[W]e believe",
White wrote, "that the overbreadth of a statute must not only
be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."7 Brennan's dissent, joined by
Marshall, was quite reflective of their inclination to give great
protection to freedom of speech. Their hypothesized examples of
speech which appeared to be punishable under the Oklahoma
civil service regulations (limiting political activities by civil servants) were indeed minimal in relation to the statute's "plainly
legitimate sweep." Yet, for Brennan and Marshall, these examples sufficed. To Brennan, the majority assumed,
not only that the ban on the wearing of badges
and buttons may be "impermissible," but also
that the Act "may be susceptible of some other
improper applications" ... Under principles that
I had thought were established beyond dispute,
that assumption requires a finding that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. 8

The adoption of the substantiality ·requirement did not, of
course, mark the end of the Court's use of the facial overbreadth
device to invalidate statutes. One such holding occurred the very
next year, in Lewis u. City of New Orleans. 9 As in Gooding u.
Wilson 1o two years earlier, the case involved a "fighting-words"type ordinance, although this time more narrowly focused upon
speech directed to ("or with reference to") police officers. Again,
Brennan wrote for the majority. The ordinance in Lewis was, on
its face, considerably more restrictive than the acceptable
mun found inappropriate and unfair, at least in that case.
6. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
7. Id. at 615. White did, in Broadrick, suggest that this principle applied "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved." Id. Later cases, notably New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), made clear that the requirement of substantial
overbreadth is not limited to cases involving expressive conduct.
8. 413 U.S. at 628 (citations omitted). Brennan agreed, however, with the finding of
insubstantial overbreadth in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
9. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
10. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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Chaplinsky concept of "fighting words,"ll and had not been
meaningfully parrowed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Yet
Justice Blackmun, joined by Rehnquist, dissented. Their antipathy to the use of the facial overbreadth device as a tool for striking down "chilling" laws, even though the challenger before the
court could be constitutionally punished, seemed clear. The doctrine, in Blackmun's words, was
being invoked indiscriminately without regard to
the nature of the speech in question, the possible
effect the statute or ordinance has upon such
speech, the importance of the speech in relation
to the exposition of ide~s, or the purported or asserted community interest in preventing that
speech. And it is no happenstance that in each
- case the facts are relegated to footnote status,
conveniently distant and in a less disturbing focus. This is the compulsion of a doctrine that
reduces our function to parsing words in the context of imaginary events. l !

Blackmun went on to contend that Mrs. Lewis' speech was
"plainly" within the category of fighting words. IS But to the
Brennan majority (which included White), the point was irrelevant. It is on such occasions, of course, when the facial overbreadth doctrine affords the challenger her only basis for vic- .
tory, that the doctrine has real meaning and significance.
The Court has continued to find statutes facially overbroad,
but, at least during the early 1980's, dissenting Justices continued to articulate apparently categorical objections to the practice. In 1981, in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,14 the Court
struck down a zoning ordinance which, in effect, prohibited all
live entertainment in a municipality. Justice White wrote for the
majority and, along with the concurring Justices (including
Blackmun), focused entirely upon the challenged ordinance,
rather than upon the nature of the challenger - an "adult"
bookstore which featured "a live dancer, usually nude.,,!11 Rehnquist, in contrast, joined a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
415 U.S. at 136-37.
[d. at 141. But see Justice Powell's concurrence, arguing the contrary. [d. at 135.
452 U.S. 61 (1981).
[d. at 62.
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Burger which chose to focus only on the nature of the challenger. "I would hold," wrote Burger, "that, as applied, the ordinance is valid. . . . An overconcern about draftsmanship and
overbreadth should not be allowed to obscure the central question before us. "16
A 1984 decision, Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H.
Munson Co., Inc./ 7 was another case in which the doctrine was
applied, but with notable resistance. Justice Blackmun wrote for
the (bare) majority, thus revealing his willingness to embrace the
doctrine at least some of the time. Following its 1980 ruling in
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment/ 6
the Court struck down a state law which, similar to the ordinance invalidated in Schaumburg, imposed serious limitations
on organized charitable solicitations. What made the case particularly interesting was the fact that the plaintiff, Munson, was
not itself a charitable organization, but rather a professional
fundraiser. Munson was injured by the statute, which barred
charitable organizations from paying more than 25% of its receipts for expenses, but Munson had no First Amendment rights
of its own to raise in opposition to the Maryland law; rather, the
First Amendment interests recognized (in Schaumburg, initially)
were those of the charities with whom Munson dealt. To the majority (which included White and Stevens, along with Brennan
and Marshall), this was of no consequence, gIven the First
Amendment facial overbreadth doctrine:
The fact that, because Munson is not a charity, there might not be a possibility that the challenged statute could restrict Munson's own First
Amendment rights does not alter the analysis. Facial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the litigant,
but for the benefit of society - to prevent the
statute from chilling the First Amendment rights
of other parties not before the court. Munson's
ability to serve that function has nothing to do
with whether or not its own First Amendment
16. [d. at 85, 86.

17. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
18. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
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rights are at stake. 19
But Justice Rehnquist, joined in dissent by O'Connor,
bemoaned the Court's use of the overbreadth doctrine, "not at
the behest of any affected charity, but at the behest of a professional fundraising organization."20 Comparing the more conventional "as-applied" challenge to a facial attack, he went on to
assert, more generally:
The advantages of the first approach are obvious. It is less intrusive on the legislative prerogative and less disruptive of state policy to limit
the permitted reach of a statute only on a caseby-case basis. Such restraint also allows State
courts the opportunity to construe a law to avoid
constitutional infirmities .... Finally, the decision itself is likely to be more sound when based
on data relevant and adequate to an informed
judgment. The facts of the case focus and give
meaning to the otherwise abstract and amorphous
issues the court must decide . . . .
One might as a matter of original inquiry
question whether an overbreadth challenge
should ever be allowed, given that the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the availability of preliminary
injunctive relief will usually permit a litigant to
discover the scope of constitutional protection afforded his activity without subjecting himself to
criminal prosecution. Be that as it may, however,
our cases at least indicate that the doctrine is to
be used sparingly. Z1
Rehnquist's dissent concluded with words of similar import,
describing the majority's "misunderstanding" of, and "ungrounded speculation" about, the Maryland statute as "the natural hazards of overbreadth analysis."22 "When the Court's
sights are not focused on the actual application of a statute to a
specific set of ~acts," Rehnquist warned, "its vision proves sadly
19.
20.
21.
22.

467 U.S. at 958.
[d. at 975.
[d. at 977-78 (citations omitted).
[d. at 985.
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deficient."z3 These are strong words, indeed - and suggestive of
a profound disinclination to use the facial overbreadth tool. To
these Justices, the policy concerns that underlie the facial overbreadth doctrine - namely, the desire to dispel quickly the
"chilling effects" of statutes that violate the First Amendment
much of the time - are apparently outweighed by the interest
in maximizing the chances of reaching "correct" results in individual cases.
Although the use of facial overbreadth in Munson itself was
critical to the resolution of an issue of standing, Justice Blackmun, in a footnote, pointed out that the concept of "overbreadth" transcends that particular category of case:
The dissenters appear to overlook the fact
that "overbreadth" is not used only to describe
the doctrine that allows a litigant whose own conduct is unprotected to assert the rights of third
parties to challenge a statute, even though "as applied" to him the statute would be constitutional
. . . . "Overbreadth" has also been used to describe a challenge to a statute that in all its applications directly restricts protected First
Amendment
activity and does not employ means narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest . . . .
Whether that challenge should be called
"overbreadth" or simply a "facial" challenge, the
point is that there is no reason to limit challenges
to case-by-case "as applied" challenges when the
statute on its face and therefore in all its applications falls short of constitutional demands.24

The footnote may help explain Blackmun's own willingness to
accept a facial challenge to a statute, notwithstanding his own
previously expressed reservations about the facial overbreadth
tool.
23. [d.
24. [d. at 965-66 n.13 (citations omitted). See also the Blackmun majority opinion
in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975), in which he appeared to view the facial
overbreadth doctrine more favorably than he had in earlier decisions.
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Along the way, other indications of a disinclination to apply
facial overbreadth - probably for more particularized reasons
- have surfaced. In the 1978 ruling in FCC v. Pacifica Found.,25
Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality that included Justice
Rehnquist, declined to engage in a facial review of the section of
the Federal Communications Act that authorized the FCC order
in question. The statute forbade the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communications,"26
and the Commission's order applied that law to the famous
George Carlin monologue on "dirty" words. As Justice Powell
recognized in his concurring opinion, it was (technically) proper
to reject the facial challenge, because the Commission's order
was limited to the facts of this case, and the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari with respect to the validity of the order, not
the validity of the statute. But Stevens went further, purporting
to bolster his refusal to address the controversy on broader
grounds by offering these words:
It is true that the Commission's order may
lead some broadcasters to censor themselves. At
most, however, the Commission's definition of indecency will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual
organs and activities. While some of those references may be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern .... Invalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical
application to situations not before the Court is
"strong medicine" to be applied "sparingly and
only as a last resort" .... We decline to administer that medicine to preserve the vigor of patently
offensive sexual and excretory speech."27

Powell, joined by Blackmun, replied that he "had not
thought that the application vel non of overbreadth analysis
should depend on the Court's judgment as to the value of the
protected speech that might be deterred."28 But to Justice Ste25. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
26. Id. at 731.
27. Id. at 743 (citations omitted). See also Stevens' similar statements in the earlier
case of Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976).
28. Id. at 761 n.4.
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vens, it apparently did.
The Court upheld the Commission's order, passing up the
opportunity to remove the chilling effect created by a statute
that actually uses such subjective and potentially sweeping
terms as "indecent" and "profane". Technically proper or not,
the decision demonstrates little commitment to the policy concerns underlying the facial overbreadth doctrine. 29
Justice Stevens has been a persistent source of creative
thinking with respect to the facial overbreadth doctrine. In New
York v. Ferber,80 the "child pornography" case of 1982, Justice
White's opinion for the majority, that the New York statute
amounted to "the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications,"81
was so reasonable a conclusion that Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in the judgment, agreed. But Stevens felt the
need to address the matter at length. Positing a hypothetical violation of the New York statute that would, in his view, constitute protected expression, he stated that he "would refuse to apply overbreadth analysis for reasons unrelated to any prediction
concerning the relative number of protected communications
that the statute may prohibit. "82 Was Stevens effectively saying
that he was refusing to join his colleagues in estimating the
"substantiality" of the perceived overbreadth of any statute? He
went on to recite, in a fashion reminiscent of the (later) RehnQuist dissent in Munson, the general policy reasons for not employing the facial overbreadth tool:
29. Yet another avoidance of facial review, this time unacknowledged, occurred in
the Court's 1986 decision in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986),
the case involving the sexually suggestive campaign speech delivered by a high school
student at an assembly. The school district suspended the student, pursuant to a school
disciplinary rule prohibiting "[clonduct which materially and substantially interferes
with the educational process... including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." [d. at 678. The District Court held that the rule was overbroad, and a Ninth
Circuit panel affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, through a majority opinion by
Chief Justice Burger that spoke very generally about the governmental interests at stake,
but which ultimately appeared to focus on the facts of Fraser's case. Not one word was
said, explicitly, about whether the disciplinary rule was or was not overbroad on its face.
Surprisingly, neither did the opinion of Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment.
Justice Marshall dissented, but he, too, limited himself to the facts of the case.
30. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
31. [d. at 773.
32. [d. at 780.
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When we follow our traditional practice of adjudicating difficult and novel constitutional questions
only in concrete factual situations, the adjudications tend to be crafted with greater wisdom. Hy~
pothetical rulings are inherently treacherous and
prone to lead us into unforeseen errors; they are
qualitatively less reliable than the products of
case-by -case adjudication. 33

Stevens then harked back to his view, expressed in Pacifica, that
certain low-value speech was deserving of less protection than
other speech, concluding that "generally marginal speech does
not warrant the extraordinary protection afforded by the overbreadth doctrine. "34
Despite these protestations, every sitting Justice has at
some point concurred in a finding of facial overbreadth. On the
same day in 1987, the Court held two municipal laws facially
overbroad. In City of Houston u. Hill,3/) only Justice Rehnquist
dissented from the invalidation of a Houston ordinance making
it unlawful "to ... in any manner oppose, ... or interrupt any
policeman in the execution of his duty... "36 Justice Brennan
wrote the majority opinion, clearly finding that the law was substantially overbroad. As in Lewis u. City of New Orleans, the
challenger could probably have been punished constitutionally
under a narrowly drawn statute. 37
The other decision, Board of Airport Comm'rs u. Jews for
Jesus, Inc.,38 was unanimous. Justice O'Connor, despite her position in Munson, wrote the relatively brief majority opinion,
33. [d. at 780-81.
34. [d. at 781. See also Stevens' opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 545-46 (1981), eschewing the use of facial overbreadth despite the absence of "low
value" speech.
35. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
36. [d. at 455.
37. Blackmun, concurring, took pains to dissociate himself from "any implication if one exists - that Gooding u. Wilson, ... and Lewis u. City of New Orleans . .. are
good law in the context of their facts .... " [d. at 472 (citations omitted). But he was not
troubled by the success of a facial challenge here. Justice Powell, joined by O'Connor,
would have certified a question to a Texas appellate court, in order to receive an authoritative state-court construction of the ordinance. Failing that, they, along with Scalia,
were willing to join the result, but apparently on grounds of vagueness rather than first
amendment overbreadth. [d. at 480-81.
38. 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
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finding an official resolution banning all "First Amendment activities" at Los Angeles International Airport to be substantially
overbroad, and "not fairly subject to a limiting construction. "S9
Interestingly, the Court ruled as it did without resolving what is
ordinarily a threshold issue in First Amendment litigation namely, whether the airport terminal was or was not a "public
forum"; O'Connor made clear that the resolution was unacceptably overbroad even if the airport were not a publi.c forum. This
law was an unusually oppressive one; as O'Connor explained,
"the resolution at issue in this case reaches the universe of expressive activity, and, by prohibiting all protected expression,
purports to create a virtual 'First Amendment Free Zone' at
LAX .... "40 It was an easy case, but, notably, no Justice argued
that the court should focus only on the plaintiffs' activity at the
airport, which was the distribution of free religious literature on
a pedestrian walkway in the Central Terminal Area. 41 O'Connor,
moreover, demonstrated considerable sensitivity to First
Amendment values in declining the petitioners' invitation to impose a narrowing construction on the resolution. She concluded:
"[I]t is difficult to imagine that the resolution could be limited
by anything less than a series of adjudications, and the chilling
effect of the resolution on protected speech in the meantime
would make such a case-by-case adjudication intolerable."42
In 1988, in Frisby v. Schultz,4S a case that could not be said
to involve "marginal" speech, Stevens joined Brennan and Marshall, in dissent, in arguing that a municipal restriction on residential picketing was facially overbroad, despite appearing to
believe that the plaintiffs' own conduct could be validly
prohibited.
Finally, the entire Court was once again unanimous (albeit
for differing reasons) in finding the St. Paul Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance facially unconstitutional, in R.A. V. v. City of
39. [d. at 577.
40. [d. at 574.

41. As the later decision in International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Jnc. v.
Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (discussed at note 318, infra) demonstrated, moreover, not all
of the Justices believe that there is a first amendment right to distribute literature in an
airport terminal.
42. 482 U.S. at 575-76.
43. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
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St. Paul"" in 1992. The case involved a criminal prosecution for
cross-burning, and $0 we might well have expected someone on
the Court to insist that an as-applied challenge would be more
appropriate; but no one did. Granted, the posture of the case as
it came to the Court - on a motion to dismiss - militated
against such a position, but the readiness of each Justice to evaluate the ordinance on its face (including Stevens, concurring
separately and emphasizing "the importance of context"4r,) is
further evidence that the anguished objections to "abstract" adjudication as intrinsically undesirable may well have been
abandoned. 46

Less sweeping doctrinal constrictions of the availability of
facial challenges have emerged, however, and it is with respect
to these that the law of overbreadth has become somewhat
unpredictable.
Stevens introduced one such limitation in 1984, as the author of the majority opinion in Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent.'" The relevant Los Angeles code section prohibited the posting of signs on public property. The plaintiffs
wished to post political campaign signs on utility poles. The
Court upheld the law, finding the city's interests in safety and
aesthetics to be sufficiently important. Given the essence of the
Court's reasoning, it could surely have addressed the plaintiff's
facial challenge by ruling that the code section, being adequately
justified, was not substantially overbroad. Instead, Stevens
wrote that
[T]his is not ... an appropriate case to entertain
a facial challenge based on overbreadth. For we
have found nothing in the record to indicate that
the ordinance will have any different impact on
any third parties' interests in free speech than it
has on [the plaintiffs] ...
44. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
45. [d. at 2566.
46. See also the recent ruling in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S.
Ct. 2395 (1992), in which the majority - Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter - held a parade permit ordinance facially invalid, over the protest of the dissenters that the case should be remanded to the lower courts for an interpretation of the
ordinance. See id. at 2404 n.12.
47. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
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. . . They have, in short, failed to identify
any significant difference between their claim that
the ordinance is invalid on overbreadth grounds
and their claim that it is unconstitutional when
applied to their political signs. Specifically, [the
plaintiffs] have not attempted to demonstrate
that the ordinance applies to any conduct more
likely to be protected by the First Amendment
than their own . . . signs . . . . Accordingly, on
this record it appears that if the ordinance may
be validly applied to [the plaintiffs], it can be validly applied to most if not all of the signs of parties not before the Court. . . . It would therefore
be inappropriate in this case to entertain an overbreadth challenge to the ordinance!S '

At first glance, Stevens' argument seems logical. But was it really necessary? If all Stevens meant was that, given the position
of the plaintiffs, their case was as strong as any that might be
hypothesized, fine. But if he meant that, even if the plaintiffs
were successful, a facial challenge would not be entertained, that
conclusion seems inappropriate and a bit odd. Why leave the ordinance standing, simply because those who challenged it had
been in the strongest position to do so? Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented, but with no separate discussion
of facial overbreadth.
Perhaps the Stevens discussion in Vincent can be properly
seen, in retrospect, as a harbinger of Justice White's majority
opinion in the 1985 decision, Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc. 49 A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had, somewhat inexplicably, invalidated a Washington obscenity statute in
its entirety because it contained a definition of the word "prurient" (incorporating an ambiguous reference to "lust") that, as
the Supreme Court agreed, swept too far. Justice White was correct in ruling that the Ninth Circuit's remedy exceeded that
which was called for, and that "the Washington law should have
been invalidated only insofar as the word 'lust' is to be understood as reaching [constitutionally] protected materials."lio But
48. Id. at 801·02.
49. 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
50. [d. at 504. Brennan and Marshall dissented in Brockett, based on the Brennan
position on obscenity generally; see Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73
(1973).
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White used language which was itself unnecessary, and which,
again, suggested a serious limitation upon the use of facial overbreadth. After describing the doctrine, with particular reference
to the situation in which the challenger can succeed only by invoking a facial challenge, he stated:
It is otherwise where the parties challenging
the statute are those who desire to engage in protected speech that the overbroad statute purports
to punish. . . . There is then no want of a proper
party to challenge the statute, no concern that an
attack on the statute will be unduly delayed or
protected speech discouraged. The statute may
forthwith be declared invalid to the extent that it
reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.

The cases before us are ones governed by the
normal rule that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course.!!l

First of all, the last-quoted sentence appears to compare an apple ("partial") to an orange ("facial"); the successful challenge in
Brockett was surely "facial", in that it had nothing to do with
the facts of a particular case, but the remedy should indeed have
been partial invalidation of the statute.
More significantly, the passage as a whole may be said to
imply that a facial challenge should not be entertained when an
"as-applied" challenge would succeed. That has not been "the
normal rule" (as decisions such as Brandenburg v. Ohio"2 and
Jews for Jesus"3 arguably demonstrate), and it should not be.
Indeed, it would be perverse to remove a "chilling" law from the
books, on facial grounds, only at the behest of one whose speech
was unprotected.
Justice Scalia appeared to address these aspects of Vincent
and Brockett, but without referring to either case, in his 1989
51. 472 U.S. at 504.
52. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
53. Compare Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc .• 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
discussed at notes 38-42. supra. with International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness. Inc.
v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). The latter ruling revealed that some of the Justices who
upheld the facial challenge in the former ruling would not have upheld an "as-applied"
challenge.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3

428

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:413

majority opinion in Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v.
Fox.r,4 Because the Court in Fox needed only to correct an error
made by a Court of Appeals pertaining to the law of commercial
speech/ill the Court ultimately remanded the case, without actually resolving any issue of overbreadth. But Scalia saw fit to hold
forth on the availability of a facial overbreadth challenge. He
saw the challengers in this case as directly affected by the allegedly overbroad applications of the statute, but he made it clear
that that fact should not deprive them of the opportunity to
raise a facial challenge. As Scalia persuasively demonstrated, a
contrary rule "would produce absurd results."116 Arguably, this is
at odds, at least in spirit, with the position put forth by Stevens
in Taxpayers for Vincent. But Scalia continued, in apparent
agreement with White's position in Brockett:
It is not the usual judicial practice, however,
nor do we consider it generally desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily - that
is, before it is determined that the statute would
be valid as applied. Such a course would convert
use of the overbreadth doctrine from a necessary
means of vindicating the plaintiff's own right not
to be bound by a statute that is unconstitutional
into a means of mounting gratuitous wholesale attacks upon state and federal laws. Moreover, the
overbreadth question is ordinarily more difficult,
to resolve than the as-applied.... Thus, for reasons relating both to the proper functioning of
courts and to their efficiency, the lawfulness of
the particular application of the law should ordinarily be decided first. &7

In dissent, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall had
no difficulty finding the regulation in question to be substan54. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
55. See the discussion at note 479, infra.
56. 492 U.S. at 484.
57. [d. at 484-85. The core of this excerpt was quoted, in a somewhat inconclusive
fashion, by Justice Kennedy for the majority in Renne v. Geary, 111 S. Ct. 2331, 2340
(1991), a case in which the first amendment challenge was deemed nonjusticiable. Marshall and Blackmun, dissenting, responded by pointing out that "the rule that a court
should consider as-applied challenges before overbreadth challenges is not absolute." [d.
at 2351.
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tially overbroad on its face. They responded to Scalia's theoretical discourse quickly, observing in a footnote that "[a]lthough at
times we have suggested that as-applied challenges should be
decided before overbreadth challenges, . . . we have often felt
free to do otherwise," citing Jews for Jesus and Houston v.
Hill.58
Three years later, Scalia's admonition in Fox was seemingly
forgotten when, in R.A. V.59 Scalia himself proceeded immediately to a finding of facial overbreadth, never considering the
constitutionality of the Minnesota "hate-speech" law as applied.
White did the same for the concurring Justices.
In 1989, the Court considered, but rejected, a very different
kind of limitation upon the availability of a· facial overbreadth
challenge. The case was Massachusetts v. Oakes,60 which involved a "child nudity" law. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court struck down the statute as overbroad under the First
Amendment, but the Supreme Court vacated that judgment and
remanded.
For four Justices - O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy - the key to their decision was the fact that the statute
had been amended, to add a "lascivious intent" requirement, after certiorari had been granted. O'Connor stated that "[b]ecause
it has been repealed, the former version of [the statute] cannot
chill protected expression in the future. Thus, . . . the overbreadth question in this case has become moot as a practical
matter, and we do not address it."6l She added:
An overbroad statute is not void ab initio, but
rather voidable. . . . Because the special concern
that animates the overbreadth doctrine is no
longer present after the amendment or repeal of
the challenged statute, we need not extend the
benefits of the doctrine to a defendant whose conduct is not protected.... We also note that the
amendment of a statute pending appeal to eliminate overbreadth is not different, in terms of ap58. Id. at 487 n.2.
59. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
60. 491 U.S. 576 (1989).
61. [d. at 583-84.
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plying the new law to past conduct from a state
appellate court adopting a limiting construction
of a statute to cure overbreadth. 62

Since the Court had taken this case only to consider the overbreadth issue, the proper resolution to this plurality was remanding to the Massachusetts courts for the purpose of deciding
whether the former version of the statute could constitutionally
be applied to Oakes.
But the other five Justices - including Brennan and Marshall, as well as Blackmun and Stevens - joined in part of a
partially dissenting opinion authored by Scalia; thus their "dissenting" opinion was in reality, in 1989, a majority opinion. In
that opinion, Scalia forthrightly disagreed that the overbreadth
defense is unavailable once the statute has been amended to
cure the defect. Scalia stated: "It seems to me strange judicial
theory that a conviction initially invalid can be resuscitated by
postconviction alteration of the statute under which it was obtained."68 Scalia, then, apparently regards a conviction under a
facially overbroad statute as invalid, even if the defendant's own
speech could constitutionally be punished. And Blackmun,
whose early dissenting opinions suggested disagreement with
such a belief, joined that opinion. Scalia continued:
The overbreadth doctrine serves to protect constitutionally legitimate speech not merely . . . after
the offending statute is enacted, but also ... when
the legislature is contemplating what sort of statute to enact. If the promulgation of overbroad
laws affecting speech was cost free, as the plurality's new doctrine would make it - that is, if no
conviction of constitutionally proscribable conduct would be lost, so long as the offending statute was narrowed before the final appeal - then
legislatures would have significantly reduced incentive to stay within constitutional bounds in
the first place. . . . [A] substantial amount of legitimate speech would be "chilled" as a
consequence .
. . . Even if one were of the view that some of
62. [d. at 584.
63. [d. at 586 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/3

18

Rohr: Freedom of Speech

1993]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

431

the uses of the overbreadth doctrine have been
excessive, this would not be a legitimate manner
in which to rein it in.s.
Although the Oakes situation seems unlikely to recur with
great frequency, and while one's position on the precise question
raised therein is not necessarily indicative of any other position,
the debate seems revealing. The Scalia position appears to reflect a heartening solicitude for freedom of expression, and an
appreciation of the importance of the overbreadth tool in facilitating that freedom. One wonders, however, whether legislators
will truly be affected by such opinions, as Scalia seems to assume, and whether legislators will even be aware of them. Perhaps the more persuasive argument for the Scalia position is
that those who' challenge facially overbroad statutes should not
be deterred, or defeated, by the prospect of belated amendment
of the challenged statute.
In Oakes itself, Scalia and Blackmun, while prepared to
consider the issue of facial overbreadth, went on to decide that
the statute (pre-amendment) was simply not substantially overbroad, estimating "that the legitimate scope [of the law] vastly
exceeds the illegitimate. "611 Brennan, on the other hand, joined
by Marshall and Stevens, would have reached the opposite conclusion, demonstrating again their lower tolerance for speechthreatening statutes. They were influenced, too, by the "severity" of the possible criminal sanctions, and by the very fact that
the statute was so easily amended to cure its defects; "[t]he
availability of such simple correctives renders the statute's overbreadth less acceptable. "66
Regrettably, no Justice has publicly opposed the well-established principle that a judicial narrowing construction can save
an otherwise facially overbroad statute from invalidation. Boos
v. B arry67 and Frisby v. Schultz,68 both decided in 1988, made
clear that such a saving construction could be imposed in the
very litigation in which the facial overbreadth challenge was
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

[d. at 586-87 (footnote omitted).
[d. at 588.
[d. at 598.
485 U.S. 312 (1988).
487 U.S. 474 (1988).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3

432

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:413

raised, and Ward v. Rock Against Racism,69 in 1989, gave support to the corollary that an administrative agency, as well as a
court, could supply the narrowing construction. Osborne v.
Ohio,70 in 1990, provided the setting for a full explication of the
rationale for allowing a contemporaneous narrowing construction to cure the problem of facial overbreadth, even in a criminal
case. Justice White stated: "Our cases have long held that a statute as construed 'may be applied to conduct occurring prior to
the construction, provided such application affords fair warning
to the defendan[t).' "71 He added: "This principle, of course, accords with the rationale underlying overbreadth challenges....
[O]nce a statute is authoritatively construed, there is no longer
any danger that protected speech will be deterred and therefore
no longer any reason to entertain the defendant's challenge to
the statute on its face."72 White, in Osborne, restated Scalia's
Oakes argument, and explained the difference: A legislature
would not be encouraged by the Osborne ruling to act without
regard to First Amendment rights, because the legislature could
not predict that a judicial narrowing construction would emerge
to save the statute. 73
The problem with the entire concept of the benevolent narrowing construction is that it is arguably at odds with the under- .
lying purposes of the facial overbreadth doctrine. In the case of
a contemporaneous narrowing construction, not only does a
broadly-worded statute remain on the books, but even the courageous and knowledgeable challenger is taken by surprise, possibly at great cost. But, again, every Justice has apparently accepted the prevailing rules.
Osborne v. Ohio, like Massachusetts v. Oakes, also reveals
differences in the Justices' readiness to reach a finding of substantial overbreadth. In Osborne, the defendant was convicted
under an Ohio child pornography statute for possessing offending photographs. The Ohio Supreme Court, in affirming the conviction, had placed a narrowing construction on the statute in
this very case. As Justice White appeared to recognize for' the
69.
70.
71.
72.
730

491 U.S. 781 (1989).
495 U.S. 103 (1990).
[do at 115.
[do at 115·16 n.12.
[do at 120·21.
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majority, Osborne's facial overbreadth argument was a credible
one; still, the majority was "skeptical" of the overbreadth claim,
in light of the statute's exemptions. White acknowledged: "It is
true that, despite the statutory exceptions, one might imagine
circumstances in which the statute, by its terms, criminalizes
constitutionally protected conduct."" But it was "far from
clear" that any such overbreadth was substantiaP6 The argu. ment failed, in any event, because of the Ohio court's narrowing
construction.
Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall and Stevens, dissented,
contending that the statute was fatally overbroad even with the
narrowing construction. The statute essentially criminalized
"material ... that shows a minor who is not the person's child or
ward in a state of nudity,"76 with some detailed exceptions. The
majority was satisfied, with brief discussion resting on references
to the Ferber case, that the Ohio Supreme Court had saved the
law by reading in the requirement that the prohibited nudity
constitute "a lewd exhibition or [involve] a graphic focus on the
genitals."" But the three dissenters were completely unconvinced, and demonstrated at length and in detail that the judicially-discovered elements of the crime "not only fail to cure the
overbreadth of the statute, but ... also create a new problem of
vagueness."78 It is a dissenting opinion that demonstrates considerable solicitude for freedom of speech.79
Finally, a facial overbreadth challenge will, on occasion, lead
a federal court to decide to abstain from hearing the case until a
74. [d. at 113 n.9.

75. [d.
76. [d. at 126.
77. [d. at 128.

78. [d.
79. See also the begrudging deflection of a facial challenge in Regan v. Time, Inc.,
468 U.S. 641 (1984), on the part of Justice White, writing for a plurality that included
Rehnquist and O'Connor. The case concerned the federal statute restricting the use of
photographic reproductions of United States currency, but permitting such use, under
limited circumstances, by publications. Time, Inc. was partially successful in its challenge to the law, but the plurality gave short shrift to its facial challenge to the "publication" requirement. Stevens, concurring in the judgment in part, seemed to join in that
disposition. In contrast, the dissenting Brennan and Marshall argued persuasively that
the requirement was substantially overbroad. Blackmun, dissenting in part on other
grounds, did not reach the issue.
See also the dissenting opinion of Brennan, joined again by Marshall, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 560-73 (1987).
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state court has had the opportunity to interpret the challenged
statute. Even with respect to this aspect of the doctrine, the Justices have shown differing propensities. A unanimous Court
adopted that approach in 1988, in Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc.,so where the scope of the statute at hand was
the subject of serious debate. But in the Brockett S1 decision of
1985, O'Connor and Rehnquist were the only Justices who
deemed abstention appropriate. Those same two Justices, along
with Powell, were also the only ones favoring certification of
questions to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in City of
Houston v. Hill s2 in 1987. Justice Brennan, for the majority, felt
simply that the ordinance - which, again, made it a crime to
"oppose" or "interrupt" a policeman, among other things - "is
not susceptible to a limiting construction because, as both courts
below agreed, its language is plain and its meaning unambiguOUS."S3 Similarly, in 1992, in Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement,S' Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas urged, in
dissent, that the challenged parade permit ordinance be remanded for interpretation by a lower court; the majority, speaking through Blackmun, felt no such need.
What, then, is the prognosis for the facial overbreadth doctrine? Surely, no one on the Court was more likely to employ it
than Brennan and Marshall. Their replacements, Souter and
Thomas, along with Kennedy, have said little on the issue thus
80. 484 U.S. 383 (1988).
81. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
82. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
83. Id. at 468. He appeared to also take into account the facts that the City had
raised the abstention issue belatedly, the city's suggested narrowing construction was
unsatisfying, state trial courts had applied the ordinance for years without giving it a
narrowing construction, and state law placed limits on the possibilities for satisfactorily
interpreting this municipal ordinance. Brennan also quoted, in passing, language from
1960's cases suggesting the inappropriateness of abstention in speech cases. Id. Justices
White and Blackmun were in the majority, and Scalia, who concurred in the judgment,
indicated agreement with the majority with respect to the inappropriateness of
certification.
But Justice Powell, joined by Rehnquist and O'Connor, felt that certification of
questions to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was appropriate, given the existence of
"a serious question as to the meaning of the ordinance." Id. at 473. Powell, joined on this
point by Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia, viewed abstention as inappropriate because of
the belated raising of this issue, "coupled with ... doubts as to whether relief could be
secured under Texas law." Id. at 478. In the process, he expressed doubt about Bren- .
nan's assertion of an established disinclination to abstain in facial overbreadth cases. Id.
at 476 n.4.
84. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
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far, but Scalia has shown himself to be somewhat sensitive to
the concerns that underlie the doctrine. Of the other five Justices, all have joined, at least once, in finding a law facially overbroad under the First Amendment, but each of these five "veterans" has also had occasion (admittedly not recently) to raise
pointed questions about the desirability of the facial approach.
In Blackmun's case, those questions were raised only during his
early years on the Court. In Stevens' case, they tended to be
raised only in cases in which he was generally unwilling to extend such protection to what he viewed as "low-value" speech.
Rehnquist has most frequently and emphatically rejected the
device, with O'Connor a distant second in that category. While
White authored the important Broadrick opinion, it seems clear
that that decision was not meant to terminate the Court's use of
the facial overbreadth doctrine, but simply to make its beneficence somewhat less freely available; White has often since
joined in striking down laws as facially invalid, but he has also
often declined to do so. Along with O'Connor and Rehnquist
(and, to a less consistent extent, Stevens and Scalia), White has
been most willing to place limits on the availability of facial
challenges; Blackmun, in recent years, has been least willing to
accept such limitations. The entire Court, in any event, has been
inconsistent in its application of announced limitations. In terms
of a propensity to readily perceive laws as substantially overbroad, only Stevens, in recent years, has matched the departed
Brennan and Marshall.
II.

PRIOR RESTRAINT

As commentators have noted,811 it is not at all clear, beyond
certain easy instances, when government action deserves the pejorative label of "prior restraint," nor is it clear what the consequence of such a designation should be. But clearly the phrase
continues to connote unconstitutionality, "invalid" prior restraints apparently far outnumbering "valid" ones. The readiness of a Supreme Court Justice to pin that label on a government practice is therefore indicative, in part, of that Justice's
intolerance for regulations posing threats to freedom of
expression.
85. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92
(1983).
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The easy prior restraint cases are legendary, but few. In the
modern era, both of the landmark prior restraint cases involved
court orders muzzling expression by particular prospective
speakers. In the Pentagon Papers case of 1971,86 Brennan, Marshall, and White were members of the six-man majority, each
writing separately to make clear that the burden the government
must meet to obtain preliminary injunctive relief against the
press is a very heavy one indeed. (Interestingly, the young Justice Blackmun was one of the dissenters, deeming the Court's
action too hasty, and seemingly more accommodating to the government. 87 ) The commitment of the present Court to that high
standard has not yet been tested. In the 1976 decision in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,88 the Court unanimously struck
down a "gag order" imposed on the press by a state trial judge
presiding over a criminal case. Justices White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens remain from the Court of 1976, and there is
no perceptible reason to fear slippage from the philosophy of
that decision.
A point of growing disagreement, however, has been the
reach and extent of the procedural requirements laid down in
the Brennan opinion in the 1965 case of Freedman v. Maryland. 89 More generally, the problem area for the law of prior restraint has been, for the most part, the realm of pornography
and alleged obscenity. The Court made clear, as early as the
Kingsley Books 90 case of 1957, that it had no problem with injunctions against the distribution of materials already adjudicated obscene. What has typically caused consternation is a licensing scheme that targets obscenity (which poses no
constitutional problems in itself), but which also threatens to
suppress non-obscene films or publications. Such was the case in
Freedman, in which a nearly unanimou!;1 Court invalidated a
Maryland film censorship statute. Brennan wrote for a majority
that included White, and the key passages of his opinion bear
repeating:
86. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
87. Id. at 759. Justice White, on the other hand, took a position strongly opposing
the use of preliminary injunctions against the press. Id. at 730-40.
88. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). Here, too, Justice White, concurring, took an especially vigilant position. [d. at 570-71.
89. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
90. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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[W]e hold that a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor
avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes
place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First,
the burden of proving that the film is unprotected
expression must rest on the censor.... Second,
while the State may require advance submission
of all films, ... because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. To this end,
the exhibitor must be assured ... that the censor
will, within a specified brief period, either issue a
license or go to court to restrain showing the film.
Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must ... be limited to preservation of the status quo for the
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution. Moreover, ... the procedure must
also assure a prompt final judicial decision. . . .91

Remarkably, a majority of the Court, ten years later, coalesced around an application of the Freedman requirements in a
very different context. The case was Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad,92 and Justice Blackmun wrote for a majority
that included Brennan and Marshall. The directors of a municipally-controlled theater denied a production company the right
to stage the musical "Hair" in that theater, because they believed that the play was, at least in part, obscene. Blackmun
called the denial a prior restraint and found it invalid under
Freedman. The majority thus believed that the directors of a
municipal theater were constitutionally obliged to go into court
- promptly - in order to give final effect to their decision to
deny a request to use that theater. As Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissenting opinion, it was unclear from the majority opinion whether its reasoning would apply to any denial of
access to a municipal theater, or only to denials predicated on
the contention that the production was obscene. 93 The Rehn91. 380 U.S. at 58-59 (citations omitted).
92. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
93. [d. at 571-73.
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quist .opini.on, m.ore.over, effectively raised questi.ons ab.out the
w.orkability .of imp.osing the Freedman pr.ocedural requirements
up.on the public-theatrical setting. Justice White dissented separately, believing, am.ong .other things, that the city "may reserve
its audit.orium f.or pr.oducti.ons suitable f.or exhibiti.on t.o all the
citizens .of the city, adults and children alike" - with.out g.oing
t.o c.ourt t.o d.o S.o.94 F.or each .of these tw.o Justices, then, there
were limits t.o the applicability .of Freedman t.o the g.overnmental "cens.orship" pr.ocess.
In 1980, Vance v. Universal Amusement Co. 9r, pr.ovided an.other .opp.ortunity f.or Justices Rehnquist and White t.o dissent.
In a per curiam .opini.on, the C.ourt invalidated a Texas public
nuisance statute directed t.oward the exhibiti.on .of .obscene films.
The District C.ourt and the Fifth Circuit C.ourt .of Appeals had
stricken the Texas law, c.onstruing it t.o auth.orize pri.or restraints, in the f.orm .of temp.orary injuncti.ons, ".of indefinite durati.on .on the exhibiti.on .of m.oti.on pictures that have n.ot been
finally adjudicated t.o be .obscene."96 Mindful .of the h.olding .of
Walker v. Birmingham 97 (a 1967 ruling in which White had
j.oined, but fr.om which Brennan had dissented), the Vance maj.ority .observed that, presumably, an exhibit.or w.ould be required
. t.o .obey any such temp.orary injuncti.on, pending review, "and
w.ould be subject t.o c.ontempt pr.oceedings even if the film is ultimately f.ound t.o be n.on.obscene."98 Thus, the fundamental principle .of Freedman was vi.olated. White and Rehnquist, dissenting, seemed in effect t.o simply disagree as t.o h.ow the Texas
statute might .operate, believing that any injuncti.on thereunder
w.ould be phrased in general terms, and, as c.onstrued, the statute was "functi.onally indistinguishable fr.om a criminal .obscenity statute."99 It is n.otable that the maj.ority; which included
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, ch.ose t.o
94. [d. at 569.
95. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
96. [d. at 316. As Chief Justice Burger observed in dissent, the majority was assuming that the Texas statute authorized temporary injunctions against named films, a point
that he contended was far from clear under the Texas statute; he therefore would have
abstained, in order to have the benefit of an interpretation by a Texas court. [d. at 31920.
97. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
98. 445 U.S. at 316.
99. [d. at 324.
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adopt the more speech-protective approach to the question at
hand.
But in 1986, in a case dealing with a very different kind of
statute, the result was not very protective of speech. Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc. 10o upheld a New York statute which authorized the closure of an "adult" bookstore for one year when a
building or place has been "used for the purpose of lewdness,
assignation, or prostitution. "101 The New York Court of Appeals
had found this provision to amount to an unconstitutional prior
restraint, but the Supreme Court reversed. The essence of Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion was his conclusion that "the
First Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement of a
public health regulation of general application against the physical premises in which respondents happen to sell books. "102 The
law did not single out bookstores, but rather "was directed at
unlawful conduct having nothing to do with books or other expressive activity."103 The penalty was analogous to closure for
fire-code violations, he said, rather than to an unconstitutional
prior restraint. The challengers, he emphasized, remained free to
sell their books at another location. Justice O'Connor, joined by
Stevens, concurred, asserting- that a contrary ruling "would lead
to the absurd result that any government action that had some
conceivable speech-inhibiting consequences, such as the arrest of
a newscaster for a traffic violation, would require analysis under
the First Amendment. mo•
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented, viewing the closure penalty as "an unnecessary burden on speech."lOI1
Responding to the majority, Blackmun wrote:
But the First Amendment ... protects against all
laws "abridging the freedom of speech" - not
just those specifically directed at expressive activity. Until today, this Court has never suggested
that a State may suppress speech as much as it
likes, without justification, so long. as it does so
100.
101.
102.
103.

478 U.S. 697 (1986).
ld. at 699.
ld. at 707.
ld.
104. ld. at 708.
105. ld. at 711.
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through generally applicable regulations that have
"nothing to do with any expressive conduct .... "

... [W]hen a State directly and substantially
impairs First Amendment activities, such as by
shutting down a bookstore, I believe that the
State must show, at a minimum, that it has chosen the least restrictive means of pursuing its legislative objectives. The closure of a bookstore can
no more be compared to a traffic arrest of a reporter . . . than the closure of a church could be
compared to the traffic arrest of a clergyman. lo6
Tying his views to the law of prior restraint, Blackmun added:
"Until today, the Court has required States to confine any book
banning to materials that are determined, through constitutionally approved procedures, to be obscene," citing Freedman and
Vance. I07 It is a powerful dissenting opinion that reflects a
highly speech-protective judicial inclination. But it was not persuasive to O'Connor, Stevens, Rehnquist, or White.
The Court was unanimous, however, in striking down a different kind of property-related penalty in Fort Wayne Books,
Inc. v. Indiana lo8 in 1989. Pursuant to Indiana's RICO statutes,
applicable to petitioners because of a pattern of obscenity violations at their bookstores, an Indiana court directed the seizure
of all of their property, real and personal, that was allegedly
"used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived
from, or realized through" their "racketeering" activities. lo9 The
court acted on the basis of a finding of "probable cause" that the
Indiana RICO law had been violated, and as a result the county
sheriff padlocked the stores and "hauled away" their contents. 110
For the majority (and on this point there was no dissent),
Justice White appeared to have no difficulty finding this procedure unconstitutional. Cases from the 1960s and 1970s had established the principle, applicable here, that a publication "may
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

[d. at 709-11 (citations omitted).
[d. at 712.
489 U.S. 46 (1989).
[d. at 51.
[d. at 52.
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not be taken out of circulation completely until there has been a
determination of obscenity after an adversary hearing."lll
White's readiness to apply that principle here was all the more
striking because, as he recognized, the "predicate crimes" - i.e.,
the obscenity convictions underlying the alleged RICO violation
- "had been adjudicated and are unchallenged."ll2 But the petition for seizure here, he observed, was "aimed at· establishing
no more than probable cause to believe that a RICO violation
had occurred, and the order for seizure recited no more than
probable cause in that respect."1l3 Equ.ally heartening was
White's rejection (in this case, at least) of the reasoning of the
Indiana Supreme Court, which had stressed that the pretrial
seizures "were not based on the . . . suspected obscenity of
the . . . items seized, but upon the neutral ground that the sequestered property represented assets used and acquired in the
course of racketeering activity."1l4 But he did not reject that rationale completely and for all time and all cases; "we assume
without deciding," he said, "that bookstores and their contents
are forfeitable ... when it is proved that these items are property actually used in, or derived from, a pattern of violations of
the State's obscenity laws."lUi Here, however, it was
incontestable that these proceedings were begun
to put an end to the sale of obscenity at the three
bookstores named in the complaint, and hence we
are quite sure that the special rules applicable to
removing First Amendment materials from circulation are relevant here. This includes specifically
the admonition that probable cause ... is insufficient . . . . 118

Not a single Justice, in 1989, grabbed the opportunity to affirm the seizure orders on the basis of either the forfeiture-of-illgotten-gains or prior-conviction rationale. But there was a hint
that some of the Justices would have affirmed, on the "forfeiture" theory, had the State presented a proper case in which to
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
question
116.

[d. at 63.
[d. at 66.
[d.
[d. at 64.
[d. at 65. In a footnote, White added that the Court was not reaching "the
of the constitutionality of post-trial forfeiture .... " [d. at 65 n.ll.
[d. at 65-66.
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do so. The notion that bookstores may be closed, and non-obscene publications seized, under any circumstances is a troubling one. Stevens, joined by Brennan and Marshall in dissent,
appeared to recognize that. "I would extend the Court's holding," he wrote, "to prohibit the seizure of these stores' inventories, even after trial, based on nothing more than a 'pattern' of
obscenity misdemeanors."ll7 There is a difference "of constitutional dimension," he explained, between a business selling publications and one that is engaged in another commercial
activity. 118
The most recent decision of this broadly-defined genre is
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,1l9 decided in 1990, in which a
seriously splintered Court addressed the applicability of the
Freedman requirements to a somewhat different contemporary
setting. The case involved a Dallas ordinance which required, in
pertinent part, that "sexually oriented businesses" (including
adult bookstores and theaters) be licensed and inspected. 120 The
problem was that the ordinance, in practical effect, set no time
limit within which the required inspection had to occur, and
thus allowed for the possibility of indefinite postponement of
the issuance of a license. Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall
and Blackmun in concurring in the judgment, would have fully.
applied Freedman to this regulatory scheme.' But Justice
O'Connor, otherwise writing for a majority but speaking only for
herself and Justices Stevens and Kennedy as to this aspect of
the Dallas ordinance, distinguished Freedman, and declined to
apply each of its three requirements. In the process of doing so,
O'Connor showed appropriate sensitivity to First Amendment
concerns:
The core policy underlying Freedman is that
the license for a First Amendment-protected business must be issued within a reasonable period of
time, because undue delay results in the unconstitutional suppression of protected speech. Thus,
the first two safeguards are essential: the licensor
must make the decision whether to issue the li117.
118.
119.
120.

[d. at 84.
[d.
493 U.S. 215 (1990).
[d. at 220-21.
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cense within a specified and reasonable time period during which. the status quo is maintained,
and there must be the possibility of prompt judicial review in the event that the license is erroneously denied.l21
Here, these requirements were not satisfied, and thus the ordinance was invalid. But the third Freedman requirement - that
the censor bear the burden of going into court in order to suppress the speech and the burden of proof once there, if a license
is to be denied - was, in the context of this regulatory scheme,
not deemed necessary by this group of Justices. The reasons
were twofold. First, Freedman, unlike the present case, involved
"direct censorship of particular expressive material," which was
"presumptively invalid."122 Second, the license applicants in this
case had "much more at stake" than the film distributor in
Freedman, and thus had a greater incentive to pursue a license
denial in court.123
Brennan protested: "The heavy presumption against prior
restraints requires no less" than the full application of Freedman to this ordinance. 124 "In distributing the burdens of initiating judicial proceedings and proof," he continued, "we are
obliged to place them such that we err, if we must, on the side of
speech, not on the side of silence. "12&
Brennan also argued that, even if this case was factually distinguishable from Freedman in the ways O'Connor suggested, it
was not meaningfully different from the Court's 1988 decision in
Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc. l2S In Riley,
Brennan wrote for a majority that invalidated a North Carolina
requirement that a professional fundraiser obtain a license
before engaging in solicitation. The Act imposed no time limit
on the licensing agency, and was therefore unconstitutional.
"[S]uch a regulation," wrote Brennan therein, "must provide
that a licensor 'will, within a specified brief period, either issue a
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

[d. at 228 (citations omitted).
[d. at 229.
[d. at 229-30.
[d. at 241.
[d. at 241-42.
487 U.S. 781 (1988).
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license or go to court,' "127 citing Freedman. Justices White,
Kennedy, and Scalia joined that opinion, along with Marshall
and Blackmun. To Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Stevens, the licensing requirement in Riley "[did] not create a sufficiently significant burden on speech by charities" to warrant First Amendment analysis. 128
In FW/PBS, White and Rehnquist viewed Freedman as
completely inapplicable, and set forth an interesting explanation
of their position:
The Dallas ordinance is in many respects analogous to regulations requiring parade or demonstration permits and imposing conditions on such
permits. Such regulations have generally been
treated as time, place, and manner restrictions
and have been upheld if they are content neutral,
serve a substantial government interest, and leave
open alternative avenues of communication. . . .
The Dallas scheme regulates who may operate
sexually oriented businesses, including those who
sell materials entitled to First Amendment protection; but the ordinance does not regulate content and thus it is unlike the content-based prior
restraints that this Court has typically scrutinized
very closely. 129

Riley (in which White had joined the majority) was distinguished on this basis. White also pointed out that "no evidence"
suggested that arbitrary or undue delays in licensing had occurred, and urged the Court not to assume such occurrences. ISO
The White-Rehnquist theory would seriously restrict Freedman's applicability. To the contrary, the O'Connor modification
of Freedman, which mayor may not turn out to be limited to
fact patterns resembling that in FW/PBS, is, in the main, faithful to Freedman, retaining its important core. Indeed, the aban127. [d. at 802.
128. [d. at 813.

129. 493 U.S. at 245-46 (citations omitted).
130. [d. at 247. Scalia, dissenting in part, would have upheld the ordinance, on completely separate grounds, see discussion at notes 417-21, infra; ·because he believed "that
Dallas could constitutionally have proscribed the commercial activities that it chose instead to license, [he did) not think the details of its licensing scheme had to comply with
First Amendment standards." [d. at 253.
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donment of Freedman's third requirement, in nearly all contexts, would be understandable, since it is strikingly burdensome
to government to require it to seek judicial approval of every
license or permit denial affecting interests in expression. lSI Reasonable or not, the adherence to this requirement by Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun was, again, reflective of their remarkably speech-protective instincts. With only one of that trio still
on the Court, however, it is fair to wonder whether even the
O'Connor position in FW/PBS would command a majority
today.
Wholly outside the realm of pornography, two other decisions of recent years are instructive. One was Ward u. Rock
Against Racism, 1~2 in which Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens saw
as an impermissible prior restraint, and would have applied the
Freedman requirements to, a New York law requiring the use of
a city sound technician in certain Central Park concerts. Kennedy, for .the majority, did not see it that way at all, remarking
that the city regulation "grants no authority to forbid speech,
but merely permits the city to regulate volume .... "lSS The three
dissenters thus perceived even governmental "distortion" of a
performer's music as a form of advance censorship.1s4
The other was the 1988 ruling in City of Lakewood u. Plain
Dealer Publishing CO.1S6 Justice Brennan wrote for only four
Justices (the others being Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia), but
that group of four constituted a majority in the case, as Rehnquist and Kennedy did not participate in the decision. For the
majority it was an easy decision, calling for the application of
long-settled law. A Lakewood ordinance gave its mayor the authority to grant or deny applications for annual news rack permits, relating to the placement of newsracks on city property.
The ordinance placed no perceptible limits on the Mayor's dis131. While the Supreme Court has never extended Freedman to the parade permit
setting, the subject of White's analogy in dissent in FW/PBS, the suggestion has been
made, and the logic of the case law would seem to lead to its fulfillment. See Central Fla.
Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d ISIS, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1985) (Henderson,
J., concurring).
132. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
133. Id. at 795 n.5.
134. Id. at 808-12. The Justices also differed as to whether the city's Guidelines
should be properly understood as granting unbridled discretion to the sound technician.
135. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
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cretion, and thus ran afoul of the long-standing principle that "a
licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a
government official or agency constitutes [an impermissible]
prior restraint."138 Such a law, furthermore, in Brennan's view,
was (and has always been) an appropriate target of a facial
challenge.
But Justice White, joined by Stevens and O'Connor, dissented. White's theory of the case was less simple. An outright
ban on newsracks on city sidewalks, he believed, would be constitutional, because the right to distribute newspapers in a public forum did not encompass the right to appropriate city property, on a virtually permanent basis, for one's own exclusive
use. 137 Furthermore, he contended, the doctrine allowing facial
challenges to discretionary licensing schemes (with no requirement that the potential licensee even apply for a license) "applies only when the specific conduct which the locality seeks to
license is protected by the First Amendment. Because the placement of newsracks on city property is not so protected ... the
exception to our usual facial challenge doctrine does not apply
here."138 Here, the Plain Dealer had not applied for a license
under the challenged ordinance; hence, White would have ruled
against it.
Brennan justified allowing a facial challenge largely on the
ground that the licensing system here "is directed narrowly and
specifically at expression or conduct commonly associated with
expression: the circulation of newspapers."139 In contrast, he
said, "laws of general application that are not aimed at conduct
commonly associated with expression ... carry with them little
danger of censorship."140 To White, Brennan's approach was
"amorphous" and "vague,"I41 and White scored a clear point
with his comparison of the newsrack ordinance to an unchallenged companion ordinance giving the City Council unlimited
discretion to grant· or deny applications for all other exclusive
uses of city property:
[d. at 757.
Brennan had no occasion to address this precise point. [d. at 762 n.7.
[d. at 774.
[d. at 760.
140. [d. at 760-61.
141. [d. at 787-88.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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But what if Lakewood ... repeals local ordi"
nance § 901.181 (the detailed newsrack permit
law) and simply left § 901.18 (the general ordinance concerning "any ... structure or device" on
city property) on the books? .... Because this
law is of "general application," it should survive
scrutiny under the Court's opinion - even as applied to newsracks. If so, the Court's opinion
takes on an odd "the-greater-but-not-the-Iesser"
quality: the more activities that are subjected to a
discretionary licensing law, the more likely that
law is to pass constitutional muster.142

But Brennan was able to point out problems with White's reasoning as well: "The key to the dissent's analysis is its 'greaterincludes-the-Iesser' syllogism. But that syllogism is blind to the
radically different constitutional harms inherent in the 'greater'
and 'lesser' restri~tions."14a Content-neutral regulations of
speech may well be upheld as valid time, place, and manner restrictions, Brennan continued:
In contrast, a law or policy permitting communication in a certain manner for some but not
for others raises the specter of content and viewpoint censorship. This danger is at its zenith
when the determination of who may speak and
who may not is left to the unbridled discretion of
a government official. . . . Therefore, even if the
government may constitutionally impose contentneutral prohibitions on a particular manner of
speech, it may not condition that speech on obtaining a license or permit from a government official in that official's boundless discretion . . . .
Fundamentally, then, the dissent's propos'al ignores the different concerns animating our test to
determine whether an expressive activity may be
banned entirely, and our test to determine
whether it may be licensed in an official's unbridled discretion. 144

The White position in Lakewood (again, joined by O'Connor
142. [d. at 790.
143. [d. at 762-63 (footnote omitted).
144. [d. at 763-64 (citations omitted).
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and Stevens) is by no means one that is seriously inhospitable to
freedom of expression, and it succeeds in pointing out weaknesses (even from a speech-protective perspective) in the Brennan opinion. Yet it comes as a mild shock that, fifty years after
the creation of the Court's nearly impregnable stand against unbridled discretion in licensing schemes, it should have been
questioned at all, however astutely. When all is said and done,
the Brennan position must be seen as the more responsive to
interests in freedom of speech; yet it is by no means clear that
his position would be the majority position, were Lakewood decided today.
The entire Court recently reaffirmed its opposition to laws
that confer unbridled discretion upon administrative officials, in
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement. w , The majority Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter -. interpreted the parade permit ordinance in question as doing just
that, with respect to the decision to require an advance payment
of funds for such a permit "in order to meet the expense incident to the administration of the Ordinance and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed. "146 For the four
dissenters, Rehnquist protested that the Court "unnecessarily
reaches out to interpret the ordinance on its own . . . even
though there are no lower court factual findings on the scope or
administration of the ordinance. "147 He' would have remanded
for an interpretation by the lower courts, but agreed "that the
Constitution does not permit a system in which the county administrator may vary fees at his pleasure .... "14S Given the ease
with which the position of the dissent might have been adopted,
the majority's action can be seen as quite protective of speech. H9
145. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
146. [d. at 2399.
147. [d. at 2407.
148. [d. at 2407.
149. The dissenters also took the majority to task for not addressing the question on
which certiorari had been granted - namely, whether the county could impose a license
fee, in the context of a demonstration, for more than a "nominal" sum, in order to
recoup the actual expenses of maintaining public order. For the dissenters - Rehnquist,
White, Scalia, and Thomas - the answer was "yes". See id. at 2405-08. How the majority felt about this remained unknown, and, possibly for that reason, the discussion by the
dissenters on this point was not developed in detail. Their willingness to impose such
potentially large expenses on speakers, however, does not bode well for future demonstrators. Compare Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515 (11th
Cir. 1985).
.
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. There has been no major theoretical campaign launched
against any part of the Court's prior restraint doctrine. But resistance to its full application has been demonstrated, notably
by Justices White and Rehnquist, and, to a lesser extent, by
O'Connor and Stevens.' As with its close cousin, the facial overbreadth doctrine, the presumption against prior restraints serves
a largely prophylactic function,' by invalidating statutes that
threaten to prevent protected speech from being heard. To the
extent that a Justice is more tolerant of such laws, he or she is,
correspondingly, apparently less wary of that potential for deterrence. Only Blackmun remains of the trio that was most concerned about that potential.
III. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, ABSENT
SPECIALIZED RULES

A.

CONTENT-BASED REGULATION

It is now hornbook law that, unless a specialized rule applies, regulation of expression based upon the content of that
expression is subject to strict judicial scrutiny, in the usual sense
of that term. Although earlier cases occasionally pointed toward
such a rule, not until 1972, in Marshall's majority opinion in Police Dep't v. Mosley/50 was it expressly articulated. At that,
Marshall's statement of the strict scrutiny formula was indirect
and somewhat weak, and was mixed with plainly misleading
statements to the effect that content-based regulations are
"never permitted".11>1 Oddly, too, Mosley framed the issue as
principally one of Equal Protection rather than as one arising
simply under the First Amendment. As late as 1980, in Carey v.
Brown,1I>2 the same theoretical approach was put forth, this time
by Brennan himself. Subsequently, the rule has been consistently deemed a First Amendment principle, the Equal Protection reference having quietly disappeared. It was, in fact, the
decade of the 1980's that produced the crystallization of First
Amendment law (to the extent that it is crystallized) that we
regard as foundational today. Thus, the period of the early
1980's marked the beginning of the relatively consistent practices, by the Supreme Court, of clearly distinguishing between
150. 408 u.S. 92 (1972).
151. Id. at 99.
152. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

37

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3

450

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:413

content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech, of categorizing public property as "public fora" or not (for purposes of
freedom of speech), and of applying fixed rules to each of these
situations. Indeed, the development of "public forum" theory notably in the 1983 decision of Perry Educ. Ass'n u. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n u3 - did much to anchor the rule of strict
scrutiny to content-based regulations of speech. None of these
foundational rules seems likely to change in the near future.
Unacknowledged inconsistency in the willingness to apply
these rules, however, may not have entirely disappeared. No
Justice pointed out, for example, that the FCC order at issue in
FCC u. Pacifica Found.,!"· in 1978, was content-based, and the
same was true in the 1986 decision in Bethel School Dist. u. Fraser,m a public school speech case upholding a content-based restriction on student expression. Neither decision expressly invoked a rule of strict scrutiny. 1"6
In Young u. American Mini Theaters, Inc.,!'" in 1976, the
majority (speaking through Justice Stevens) acknowledged that
the Detroit zoning law in question affected theaters based on the
content of the films they displayed, yet accepted the city's justification of the statute without any reference to strict ·scrutiny.
Stevens considered, at length, the misleading language by Marshall in Mosley that had suggested that content-based regulation
was never permissible. With that straw man easily knocked
down, Stevens pointed out (1) that "government's paramount
obligation" is "neutrality"I"S - an observation that tends to reduce the heaviness of the presumption against content regulation; (2) that the kind of speech being regulated by this law films featuring "Specified Sexual Activities" - was not deserving of the fullest First Amendment protection; and (3) that
"what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limitation on
153. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
154. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
155. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). Nor were the regulatory schemes designed to protect privacy interests, at issue in the line of cases beginning with Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), characterized as content-based. See the discussion at notes
369-98, infra.
156. Surprisingly, Brennan joined in that theoretical lapse in Bethel, concurring in
the judgment.
157. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
158. [d. at 70.
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the place where adult films may be exhibited, even though the
determination of whether a particular film fits that characterization turns on the nature of its content"11i9 - a comment that
tends to minimize the key distinction between content-based
and content-neutral regulations. White and Rehnquist joined in
this singularly ad hoc bit of First Amendment reasoning, while
Justice Stewart, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
accused the majority of "rid[ing] roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment law."18o (Of course, these principles
hadn't been "cardinal" for very long.)
Ultimately, the failure to apply strict scrutiny in Young was
effectively explained, ten years later, in the remarkably similar
case of City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 18l That decision blurred the fundamental distinction between content-neutrality and content-relatedness. As in Young, the ordinance
under review required the scattering of theaters exhibiting films
" 'characteri[zed] by an emphasis on ... "specified sexual activities" ... .' "182 Rehnquist, for the majority, explained why this
ordinance should be viewed as a content-neutral time, place and
manner regulation:
[T]he Renton ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films shown at "adult motion picture
theaters," but rather at the secondary effects of
such theaters on the surrounding cpmmunity. The
District Court found that the City Council's
"predominate concerns" were with the secondary
effects of adult theaters, and not with the content
of adult films themselves . . . .
The District Court's finding ... is more than
adequate to establish that the city's pursuit of its
zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The ordinance by its
terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the
159. [d. at 70-72.
160. [d. at 85-86. Justice Powell concurred separately. [d. at 73-84. White and
Rehnquist had also demonstrated a lack of concern about content discrimination the
previous year, dissenting in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). RehnQuist and Stevens displayed similar insensitivity in the later case of Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 553-55 (1981).
161. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
162. [d. at 44.
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city's retail trade, maintain property values, and
generally "protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of
[the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts,
and the quality of urban life," not to suppress the
expression of unpopular views . . . .
In short, the Renton ordinance is completely
consistent with our definition of "content-neutral" speech regulations as those that "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech." . . . . The ordinance does not
contravene the fundamental principle that underlies our concern about "content-based" speech
regulations: that "government may not grant the
use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express
less favored or more controversial views."163

It was, despite the usual attempt to make an adroit rewriting of
doctrine appear to be nothing new, a wholly unprecedented approach to the understanding of content-neutrality. The lastquoted sentence, moreover, has reference to viewpoint discrimination, which has always been treated as worse than, but distinct from, content discrimination. 164 The Court went on to uphold the ordinance.

Only Brennan and Marshall dissented. 16G Surprisingly, however, Brennan did not take aim at the questionable doctrinal underpinnings of the Rehnquist opinion, but, instead, calmly and
succinctly stated his disagreement with the majority's approach,
and then took issue, at greater length, with the majority's use of
the facts of the case. The ordinance's failure to target bars, massage parlors, and adult bookstores, he contended, "strongly suggests that Renton was interested not in controlling the 'secondary effects' associated with adult businesses, but in
discriminating against adult theaters based on the content of the
films they exhibit."166 Applying strict scrutiny, he would have
invalidated the ordinance.
Much of the opinion that Brennan might have written in
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 47-49 (citations omitted).
See id. at 56 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 55-65. Blackmun concurred in the result, saying nothing. Id. at 55.
Id. at 57.
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Renton he wrote two years later, concurring, with Marshall, in
Boos v. Barry.167 He wrote separately "to register my' continued
disagreement with the proposition that an otherwise contentbased restriction on speech can be recast as 'content-neutral' if
the restriction 'aims' at 'secondary effects' of t~e speech.... "168
"The dangers and difficulties po~ed by the Renton analysis," he asserted, "are extensive."169 The "secondary effects" rationale, he went on, offers
countless excuses for content-based suppression
of political speech. No doubt a plausible argument could be made that the political gatherings
of some parties are more likely than others to attract large crowds causing congestion, ... or that
speakers delivering a particular message are more
likely than others to attract an unruly audience.
Our traditional analysis rejects such a priori categorical judgments based on the content of speech,
. . . requiring governments to regulate based on
actual congestion, visual clutter, or violence
rather than based on predictions that speech with
a certain content will induce those effects. The
Renton analysis, however, creates a possible avenue for government censorship whenever censors
can concoct "secondary" rationalizations for regulating the content of political speechPo

The Renton approach, moreover, failed in Brennan's eyes to
provide courts with sufficient guidance:
The traditional approach sets forth a bright-line
rule: any restriction on'speech, the application of
which turns on the content of the speech, is a
content-based restriction regardless of the motivation that lies behind it.... The Renton analysis, in contrast, plunges courts into the morass of
legislative motive, a notoriously hazardous and indeterminate inquiry ....
[T]he best protection against governmental attempts to squelch opposition has never lain in our
167. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
168. [d, at 334 (citations omitted).
169. [d, at 335.
170. [d. (citations omitted).
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ability to assess the purity of legislative motive
but rather in the requirement that the government act through content-neutral means that restrict expression the government favors as well as
expression it disfavors. l71

The Renton definition of content-neutrality is not without
its appeal, given the fact that the absence of content-neutrality
subjects the challenged governmental act to strict scrutiny, a
very difficult test for the government to pass. Arguably, it is no
accident that the cases (including Young, Pacifica, and even
Bethel) in which the Court appeared to ignore the content-based
nature of the regulation (at least as "content-based" was understood, pre-Renton) were cases in which the regulation was limited by some element of time or place as well as by· content.
Thus, these cases, like Renton, may have "felt" more like "time,
place, and manner" cases (in which something more akin to ad
hoc balancing takes place)172 than "content" cases - and they
are cases in which, given the limited impact on speech,173 it is
arguable that a test of strict scrutiny demands too much. Still,
Brennan's powerful critique of Renton reveals its potential for
serious mischief, and it once again marks Brennan (along with
Marshall) as perhaps more committed to highly speech-protective rules than any Justice now sitting.
Thus far, Renton has experienced no growth. Its application
in Boos v. Barry 174 was rejected, not only by Brennan and Marshall, but also by O'Connor, writing for herself, Stevens, and
Scalia. One issue in that case was the validity of a section of the
District of Columbia Code making it unlawful to display any
sign "designed or adapted to ... bring into public odium any
foreign government, ... or to bring into public disrepute political . . . acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government"
within 500 feet of any building in the District of Columbia used
by any foreign government as an embassy or consulate.17~ A majority regarded this statute as content-based, and found that it
failed to survive strict scrutiny. The District officials argued that
171. [d. at 335-37.

172.
173.
174.
175.

See discussion at notes 240-80, infra.
See Young, 427 U.s. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
485 U.S. 312 (1988).
[d. at 316.
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the case was governed by Renton, in that "the real concern is a
secondary effect, namely, our international law obligation to
shield diploinats from speech that offends their dignitY,"176 but
O'Connor promptly rejected the contention. "Listeners' reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary effects' we referred
to in Renton," she stated. Here, unlike Renton, the regulation of
speech was justified by reference to its "potential primary impact," i.e., its "emotive impact" on its audience, and thus it was
indisputably content-based.177
Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun dissented, for the reasons
stated by Judge Bork, of the D.C. Circuit, below. 178 Bork, interestingly, adverted to Rentor- in a footnote, suggesting that, given
Renton, the "display" statute in Boos "may not in fact qualify
as a content-based statute. . . . [W]hile differentiating on the
basis of the content of the speech, [the statute] is justified by
reference to content-neutral values - the need to adhere to
principles of international law and to provide sufficient protection to foreign embassies."179 But he confessed to being "not entirely sure" that this analysis was correct180 - and, he didn't
need it, since he believed that the statute satisfied strict scrutiny
in any event. A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed, as we
have seen, but possibly one or more of the three dissenters
would have taken Renton as far as Bork suggested.
Justice Kennedy provided evidence, in his majority opinion
for the court in 1989's Ward u. Rock Against Racism,181 that the
Renton approach to the determination of content discrimination
was acceptable to him. Ward itself surely involved a contentneutral regulation. Still, Kennedy's dictum is revealing, and
questionable: "The principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys."182 He continued: "The government's purpose is the con176. [d. at 320.
177. Id. at 321. Brennan and Marshall, concurring separately, deemed it "ominous"
that O'Connor could even consider the application of Renton to "political speech." [d. at
338. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision.
178. [d. at 338.
179. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1469 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
180. [d. at 1469-70 n.15.
181. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
182. [d. at 791.
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trolling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content 'of expression is deemed neutral, even if it
has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others," citing Renton. 18s That is the Renton understanding of
content-neutrality, not the Brennan understanding. 184
The Court's most recent "expressive conduct" cases, although very different in other ways, have provided further opportunities for disagreement on the question: "Is the law content-based?" An affirmative answer to that question, by
Brennan for a bare majority, was apparently crucial to the results in the flag-burning cases of 1989 and 1990, Texas v. Johnson l811 and United States v. Eichman. 186 The dissenters maintained, in Stevens' words in Johnson, that the content of the
flag-burner's message "has no relevance whatsoever to the
case."187 It is perhaps notable that no dissenter relied on (or
even mentioned) Renton in these two cases, though doing so
would not have been inconceivable. 188 The flag desecration statutes were by no means the most obvious examples of contentbased regulation, yet Scalia and Kennedy joined Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun in finding that those laws were contentbased (and that strict scrutiny was the consequence).
It was otherwise, however, in the post-Brennan nude dancing case, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc./ 89 where a different bare
majority upheld Indiana's ban on nudity in public places, as applied to nude dancing in barrooms and "bookstores." Every Justice but Scalia assumed that expressive conduct, within the protection of the First Amendment, was involved. Beyond that
minimal area of agreement, however, lay substantial differences.

. Consider first the dissenting opinion of Justice White
183. [d.
184. In a footnote to his dissenting opinion, Marshall - joined by Brennan and
Stevens - protested the use of the Renton theory in a case unlike Renton itself, referring to the "serious threat to free expression posed by" 'that analysis. [d. at 804 n.1.
185. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
186. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
187. 491 U.S. at 438. See also id. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
188. Brennan himself came closest to mentioning Renton, taking time in Johnson to
remind his readers that the Court in Boos had rejected the "secondary effect" argument
therein. [d. at 412.
189. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
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(joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens), because his is the
presumptively correct approach, and one that deserves close
attention:
The purpose of the proscription in [the present]
contexts is to protect the viewers from what the
State believes is the harmful message that nude
dancing communicates . . . . As the State no~
tells us, ... the State's goal in applying what it
describes as its "content neutral" statute to the
nude dancing in this case is "deterrence of prostitution, sexual assaults, criminal activity, degradation of women, and other activities which break
down family structure". . . . The attainment of
these goals, however, depends on preventing an
expressive activity.

This being the case, it cannot be that the
statutory prohibition is unrelated to expressive
conduct. Since the State permits the dancers to
perform if they wear pasties and G-strings but
forbids nude dancing, it is precisely because of
the distinctive, expressive content of the nude
dancing performances at issue in this case that
the State seeks to apply the statutory prohibition.
It is only because nude dancing performances
may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism
and sensuality among the spectators that the
State seeks to regulate such expressive activity,
apparently on the assumption that creating or
emphasizing such thoughts and ideas in the
minds of the spectators may lead to increased
prostitution and the degradation of women. But
generating thoughts, ideas, and emotions is the
essence of the communication . . . .
That fact dictates the level of First Amendment protection to be accorded the performances
at issue here. leo

He then cited Texas v. Johnson (despite his having dissented
therein), stated that strict scrutiny was called for, and went on
.

190. [d. at 2473-74 (citations omitted),
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to find that test unsatisfied in this case..What is notable here, in
addition to the "Brennanesque" sensitivity to freedom of expression shown by White in this opinion, is the fact that the
content-neutrality argument which he rejected might well have
been embraced as a variant of the "secondary effects" theory of
Renton. White was in the Renton majority, and could probably
provide us with an astute basis for distinguishing Renton from
Barnes, but that distinction is far from obvious.
Also notable, perhaps, is the fact that even Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of three Justices (the others being O'Connor
and Kennedy), placed no reliance on Renton. Instead, Rehnquist, having acknowledged that expressive conduct was involved, simply shifted into an application of the four-part test
from United States u. O'Brien,t91 without first addressing the
threshold question of whether the case did or did not involve
content-based regulation of expression. Under the First Amendment regime recognized in Texas v. Johnson (in which Kennedy
joined the majority), to apply O'Brien is to have already concluded that the expression has not been targeted because of its
content. In the course of applying O'Brien, however, the plurality made its key conclusion clear: The state's interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, because "[p]ublic
nudity is the evil the state seeks to prevent, whether or not it is
combined with expressive activity."192
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, and agreed with
the majority that the O'Brien test was applicable. But whereas
Rehnquist saw the statute as furthering "a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality,"193 Souter
preferred to rely "on the State's substantial interest in combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments ... '. "19' And in this regard he invoked Renton, tying
that decision to the application of the O'Brien requirement that
the government interest must (to satisfy this particular test) be
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression."196 In so doing,
191.
192.
that key
193.
194.
195.

391 U.S. 367 (1968).
111 S. Ct. at 2463. The Scalia concurrence, while theoretically different, shared
characterization of the statute with the plurality. [d. at 2464.
[d. at 2462.
[d. at 2468-69.
391 U.S. at 377, quoted in 111 S. Ct. at 2470.
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he found it necessary to rebut the position of Justice White,
quoted above. Here is the core of Souter's response to the
dissenters:
To say that pernicious secondary effects are associated with nude dancing establishments is not
necessarily to say that such effects result from the
persuasive effect of the expression inherent in
nude dancing. It is to say, rather, only that the
effects are correlated with the existence of establishments offering such dancing, without deciding
what the precise causes of the correlation actually
are. It is possible, for example, that the higher incidence of prostitution and sexual assault in the
vicinity of adult entertainment locations results
from the concentration of crowds of men predisposed to such activities, or from the simple viewing of nude bodies regardless of whether those
bodies are engaged in expression or not. In
neither case would the chain of causation run
through the persuasive effect of the expressive
component of nude dancing.
Because the State's interest in banning nude
dancing results from a simple correlation of such
dancing with other evils, rather than from a relationship between the other evils and the expressive component of the dancing, the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Renton is again persuasive in support of this
conclusion. 186
He then briefly described Renton, correctly observing that the
Court therein made its "secondary effects" correlation "without
need to decide whether the cause of the correlation might have
been the persuasive effect of the adult films that were being
regulated. "197
While the precise issue in Barnes was by no means identical
to that in Renton, it appears safe to say that Justice Souter, unlike his predecessor, finds the Renton analysis persuasive, and
that he is therefore open to questionable arguments pointing to
a conclusion of content-neutrality in the regulation of expres1960
1970

[do
[do

at 2470-71.
at 2471.
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sion. Clearly, his was the decisive vote in Barnes itself.
There have, of course, been cases in which every Justice has
agreed that the regulation was based upon the content of speech,
and in which there was no dissent from the use of strict scrutiny
to invalidate the law. One recent example is Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC/98 decided in 1989, in which the Court
(in an opinion written by White) struck down a federal statute
barring "indecent" interstate commercial telephone messages.
Another was the 1991 decision in Simpn & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,199 which struck
down New York's so-called "Son of Sam" law. It is notable that
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals had found the
law constitutional, yet the Supreme Court (with Justice Thomas
not participating) was unanimous in reaching the opposite conclusion. In contrast to the Court of Appeals majority, Justice
O'Connor showed great solicitude for First Amendment concerns, both in defining the State's compelling interest narrowly
and in perceiving the statute as "significantly overinclusive" in
relation to its (properly-defined) goals. 20o It should be said, too,
that, as a threshold matter, O'Connor properly perceived the law
as content-based, a characterization that apparently eluded the
District Court.
The Simon & Schuster decision provided, in addition, the
occasion for a most significant (and unexpected) display of
speech-protectiveness by Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the
judgment. The core of his concurrence reads as follows:
The regulated content has the full protection of
the First Amendment and this, I 'submit, is itself
a full and sufficient reason for holding the statute
unconstitutional. In my view it is both unnecessary and incorrect to ask whether the State can
show that the statute "'is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end.'" ... . . That test . . . derives
from our equal protection jurisprudence, ... and
has no real or legitimate place when the Court
considers the straightforward question whether
198. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
199. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
200. Id. at 511.
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the State may enact a burdensome restriction of
speech based on content only . . . .201

Here, the regulation was based upon the content of speech, in a
context to which no "historic and traditional" rule was applicable. Thus, according to Kennedy, "[n]o further inquiry is necessary to reject the State's argument that the statute should be
upheld."202
One is entitled to wonder why it took Kennedy over two
years, during which time he joined in the majority opinions in
Texas v. Johnson and Sable Communications, to discover the
ostensible error of the Court's ways in this area of the law, but
one can still applaud his inclination to abandon a test which (in
his words) has "the capacity to weaken central protections of the
First Amendment."2os Yet the test of strict scrutiny has always
been considered a rigorous and highly speech-protective test,
and, when it has been applied, there are few examples of laws
abridging expression that have survived it; indeed, the problem
has been the persistent effort to bypass it. Why, moreover,
should a rigorous yet not-inflexible test yield to a rule that,
within its assigned domain, is absolute? That the Court may
never have openly discussed the adoption of strict scrutiny in
the realm of the First Amendment does not necessarily mean
that, in Kennedy's words, it was adopted without "considered
201. [d. at 512.
202. [d. at 513. Kennedy "acknowledged that the compelling interest inquiry has
found its way into our First Amendment jurisprudence of late" ("of late?"), but submitted that "the Court appears to have adopted this formulation in First Amendment cases
by accident rather than as the result of a considered judgment." [d. at 513-14. He traced
the language of strict scrutiny (in first amendment cases) back to the 1980 decision in
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), which, as he correctly observed, had approached
what was essentially a first amendment case in terms of equal protection. "Thus," he
concluded, "was a principle of equal protection transformed into one about the government's power to regulate the content of speech in a public forum .... " 112 S. Ct. at 513.
To this extent his use of precedent is acceptable, but, surprisingly, he went on to set
forth, as evidence of the true governing principle, quotations from the Mosley decision of
1972, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), and the Regan decision of 1984, 468 U.S. 641, supra note 79,
both of them misleading at the time they were uttered, to the effect that government
"has no power" to restrict expression because of its content. 468 U.S. at 648-49; 408 U.S.
at 95 (emphasis added). He regarded that principle, supplemented by "historic and
traditional categories" of speech regulation, as "preferable to the sort of ad hoc balancing
that the Court henceforth must perform in every case if the analysis here used becomes
our standard test." 112 S. Ct. at 514.
203. [d. at 515.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

49

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3

462

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:413

judgment."204 Kennedy earns plaudits for his instinct here, but,
in the short run, it seems extremely unlikely that he will be
joined in this radical point of view by any more Justices than
joined him in his initial expression of it in Simon & Schuster.
Ironically, however, Kennedy joined a plurality in upholding
a content-based restriction of speech in the very same term, in
Burson v. Freeman. 2011 Burson upheld a Tennessee statute
prohibiting the solicitation of votes and the distribution of campaign materials, on an election day, within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place. Blackmun wrote for the plurality,
which included Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy.20B Blackmun
found that the regulation was content-based, applied strict scrutiny, and, "reaffirm[ing] that it is the rare case in which we have
held that a law survives strict scrutiny,"207 found that to be so
here. The "obviously" compelling interests were twofold: protecting the right of citizens to vote freely, and protecting "the
right to vote in an election conducted with integrity and reliability."208 Blackmun underscored the special nature of the case by
saying that it called for "a particularly difficult reconciliation:
the accommodation of the right to engage in political discourse
with the right to vote - a right at the heart of our
democracy. "209
This unique confrontation of important interests appears to
explain the concurrence of Justice Kennedy, who claimed (for
reasons quite unclear) to concur not only in the judgment but in
Blackmun's opinion as well. "As I noted in Simon & Schuster,"
he wrote, "there is a narrow area in which the First Amendment
permits freedom of expression to yield to the extent necessary
for the accommodation of another constitutional right. "210 Here,
he suggested, the right to vote was involved, and, for that reason, it seems, his general rule against content-based regulation
could give way without being given up. The remainder of his
concurring opinion, embodying an attempt to modify and fur204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 513.
112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
Scalia concurred on other grounds, id. at 1859, and Thomas took no part.
112 S. Ct. at 1857.
Id. at 1851.
Id.
Id. at 1859.
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ther explain his personal content-regulation theory, was totally
elusive to this writer.
The Stevens dissenting opmlOn, joined by O'Connor and
Souter, is one of his finest, and makes mincemeat of the toodeferential Blackmun plurality opinion. The bulk of Blackmun's
opinion is devoted to a detailed description of the history of
election-day abuses and the evolution of responses thereto; the
analysis therefore appears to deserve Stevens' rebuke that "it
confuses history with necessity, and mistakes the traditional for
the indispensable."211 Blackmun upheld the 100-foot boundary
so readily that, as Stevens protested, the plurality's consideration appears "to be neither exacting nor scrutiny."212 Havi.ng decided that a restricted zone is necessary, Blackmun went on to
conclude that "the minor geographic limitation prescribed" by
the Tennessee statute did not even raise "a question of 'constitutional dimension.' "213
Compare the vigilant Stevens opmlOn, concerned about
preventing states from "unnecessarily hinder[ing] last-minute
campaigning"214 (upon which some less affiuent candidates rely
heavily), and observing "[t]hat some states have no problem
maintaining order with zones of 50 feet or less,"211! thus strongly
suggesting "that the more expansive prohibitions are not necessary to maintai~ access and order."216 He was unpersuaded, in
fact, that there was any need for regUlating speech outside the
polling place. Stevens, not Blackmun, showed the greater affinity
for traditional strict-scrutiny analysis on this occasion, pointing
out significant underinclusiveness in the statute's reach, insisting that it be logically justified, and requiring an evidentiary
showing by the state in support of that justification. It is an impreSSlve and heartening statement by Stevens, O'Connor, and
Souter.
Three members of the Burson plurality - Rehnquist,
White, and the usually-reliable Blackmun - were also together
211. Id. at 1862.
212. Id. at 1866.
213. Id. at 1857.
214. Id. at 1861.

215. Id.
216. Id.
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in dissent, with respect to the validity of a content-regulatory
statutory provision, in Boos u. Barry.217 Again, they stated
therein only that they would have upheld the law (banning certain expressive acts within 500 feet of foreign embassies) for the
reasons'stated by Judge Bork in his' opinion for the Court of
Appeals. Those reasons, stated in careful detail by Bork,218 were
wholly bound up with foreign policy concerns and aspects of international law.

Boos and Burson, then, can each be seen as providing special reasons for finding strict scrutiny satisfied. Still, the opposing positions in those cases are so persuasive (while doing no real
harm to the values underlying the government's position) that
one must tentatively regard Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun as
a bit "soft" in the application of strict scrutiny to content-based
regulation of speech.
The alignments have shifted, however, with virtually every
issue. At least in some contexts, Stevens, in particular, has been
all too ready to overlook the fact of content regulation. 219 But, in
Barnes, as we have seen, Stevens joined White and Blackmun in
finding content-based regulation, while Souter' and O'Connor
failed to do so.
In three other cases of the past two terms, the signals have
continued to be decidedly mixed.

Cohen u. Cowles Media CO.,220 in 1991, joins the list of cases
involving content-based regulation that the Court has inexplicably failed to recognize and address as such. Justice White wrote
the majority opinion upholding a cause of action for promissory
estoppel against a newspaper, based upon publication of facts in
breach of a promise of confidentiality. Blackmun, joined in dissent by Souter, O'Connor, and Marshall, came closest to calling
217. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
218. See the discussion at notes 179-80, supra.
219. $ee the discussion at notes 154-60, supra. See also Stevens' partial dissent,
accepting a content-based regulation that the White plurality rejected, in Metromedia,
Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 553-55 (1981). Rehnquist essentially agreed. [d. at 56970. See also the Stevens dissenting opinion in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364, 418-19 (1984).
220. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
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the restriction content-based.221
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement 222 offered a ray of .
sunshine in 1992. Blackmun's majority decision, invalidating a

parade-permit fee provision because it gave unbridled discretion
to a county administrator in setting the fee, might have been
unremarkable, after one accepted his interpretation of the ordinance (as the dissenters were unprepared to do). But Blackmun
went on to observe, as further reason to find the law invalid,
that "the ordinance often requires that the fee be based on the
content of the speech. "223 He explained:
In order to assess accurately the cost of security
for parade participants, the administrator" 'must
necessarily examine the content of the message
that is conveyed,''' . . . estimate the response of
others to that content, and judge the number of
police necessary to meet that response. The fee
assessed will depend on the administrator's measure of the amount of hostility likely to be created
by the speech based on its content. 224

This he would not permit. Furthermore, he rejected, as the
Court had done in Boos v. Barry, the argument that the ordinance was content-neutral because it was directed only at a
"secondary effect" of speech; "[l]isteners' reaction to speech is
not a content-neutral basis for ·regulation."22& Blackmun was
joined in this highly speech-sensitive opinion by Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
Finally, there was R.A. V. v. St. Paul,226 the 1992 head-spinner that invalidated St. Paul's "hate-speech" ordinance, in
which both the majority and the dissenters displayed encouraging instincts, even while disagreeing vehemently among them221. Of course, the whole line of cases, culminating in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524 (1989), involving privacy-based restrictions on truthful publication, has proceeded without explicit recognition of the fact that they involved content-based regulation. But it seems that a rule of strict scrutiny has effectively been applied nonetheless.
See the discussion at notes 369-98, infra.
222. 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
223. Id. at 2403.
224. Id. (citations omitted). The dissenters did not expressly disagree with the language quoted above. See the discussion at .notes 145-49, supra.
225. Id.
226. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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selves. Scalia, writing for himself, Rehnquist and all three of the
"new kids" (Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas), essentially extended the presumptive invalidity of content discrimination into
the previously-irredeemable realm of "unprotected" expression
- here, the venerable category of "fighting words". Accepting
for purposes of decision the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the ordinance as prohibiting only "fighting words,"
Scalia found impermissible content discrimination because the
particular "fighting words" banned were only those (according to
the ordinance) "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know [arouse] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender."227 Even with regard to
"fighting words," he asserted, "government may not regulate use·
based on hostility - or favoritism - towards the underlying
message expressed."228 To the argument that bias-motivated
speech causes injuries that are "qualitatively different" from
other injuries, he responded:
What makes the anger, fear, sense of dishonor,
etc. produced by violation of this ordinance distinct from the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc.
produced by other fighting words is nothing other
than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive
idea, conveyed by a distinctive message. The First
Amendment cannot be evaded that easily.220

Considering the city's justification for this discrimination,
he found it insufficient, because it was not "necessary" to serve
the compelling interests in ensuring "the basic human rights" of
members of historically persecuted minority groups.280 It was
not necessary, it seemed, because "adequate content-neutral alternatives" existed,231 which apparently meant the simple prohibition of "fighting words" generally - which was slightly odd,
because even that is not content-neutral in the usual sense of
the term. But it seems that every Justice would find a wholesale
prohibition of such "unprotected" words to be acceptable.
227. [d. at 2541.
228. [d. at 2545.
229. [d. at 2548. Somewhat less convincingly, he even saw viewpoint discrimination
at work here. [d. at 2547-48.
230. [d. at 2549.
231. [d. at 2550.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/3

54

Rohr: Freedom of Speech

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

1993]

467

Justice White, joined by Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens,
concurred in the judgment, because he found that the Minnesota Supreme Court had failed to properly narrow the ordinance
to embody a correct understanding of the "fighting words" concept; thus, it was facially overbroad. But he disagreed sharply
with the key premise of the Scalia opinion:
It is inconsistent to hold that the government
may proscribe an entire category of speech because the content of that speech is evil ... ; but
that the government may not treat a subset of
that category differently without violating the
First Amendment; the content of the subset is by
definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection. 232

That belief, on the part of the Court's veteran centrists - and
remaining "liberals" - is understandable, but in fact it is less
speech-protective than the Scalia position, quite regardless of
what logic might suggest. It is particularly difficult, moreover, to
understand' why White characterized the majority opinion as
embracing "a general renunciation of strict scrutiny review;"233
or why Blackmun asserted that "the Court seems ... inevitably
to relax the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based
laws . . . thereby weaken[ing] the traditional protections of
speech."23.. Blackmun seemed to believe that, by granting some
protection to hitherto-unprotected speech, the Court will ultimately dilute its protection of other speech. Why that result will
surely follow, however, is far from clear. In protesting as they
did, White and Blackmun sounded like the true champions of
freedom of speech, but the majority - based simply on this decision - has at least as good a claim to that halo.
Where Scalia seems vulnerable is with respect to his complex scheme of exceptions to his newly-discovered rule; thus, not
all content discrimination within a category of "unprotected"
speech is presumptively invalid. 2311 White may be right in con232. [d. at 2553 (citations omitted).
233. [d. at 2554.
234. [d. at 2560. Nor is it clear why Stevens took Scalia to task for establishing "a
near-absolute ban on content-based regulations of expression." [d. at 2562.
235. [d. at 2545-47. One such exception, it should be noted, represents the Renton
"secondary-effects" phenomenon - but, as in Boos v. Barry, it was not deemed applicable here. [d. at 2549.
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cluding that Scalia's theory, in its full-blown form, "does not
work and will do nothing more than confuse the law."238
In the part of his separate concurring opinion in which he
spoke only for himself, Stevens made clear - probably to the
surprise of no one - his profound lack of enthusiasm for decision-making according to categories and general rules. "[I]t is
just too simple," he said, "to declare expression 'protected' or
. 'unprotected' or to proclaim a regulation 'content-based' or 'content-neutral.' "237 He explained at length why he would uphold
the ordinance, but for its overbreadth. A revealing part of that
discussion shows Stevens' ingenious ability to avoid the contentdiscrimination problem:
Significantly, the St. Paul ordinance regulates
speech not on the basis of its subject matter ...
but rather on the basis of the harm the speech
causes . . . . Contrary to the Court's suggestion,
the ordinance regulates only a subcategory of expression that causes injuries based on "race,
color, creed, religion or gender," not a subcategory
that involves discussions that concern those
characteristics. 288

Scalia called this "word-play."239 It is more than that, but it is
not a characterization that adds to the protection of speech.
The Justices have truly taken turns in rejecting or accepting
content-based regulations of speech. In this branch of the law of
freedom of speech, none of them appears to be heir to the mantle of vigilance worn consistently by Brennan and Marshall.
B.

TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER REGULATIONS

Justice Marshall, dissenting with Brennan in Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence uo in 1984, said it all:
[I)n this case, as in some others involving time,
place, and manner restrictions, the Court has dra236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 2558.
[d. at 2569.
[d. at 2570 (footnote omitted).
[d. at 2548.
468 U.S. 288 (1984).
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matically lowered its scrutiny of governmental
regulations once it has determined that such regulations are content-n~utral. The result has been
the creation of a two-tiered approach to First
Amendment cases: while regulations that turn on
the content of the expression are subjected to a
strict form of judicial review, regulations that are
aimed at matters other than expression receive
only a minimal level of scrutiny. The minimal
scrutiny prong of this two-tiered approach has led
to an unfortunate diminution of First Amendment protection. By narrowly limiting its concern
to whether a given regulation creates a contentbased distinction, the Court has seemingly overlooked the" fact that content-neutral restrictions
are also capable of unnecessarily restricting protected expressive activity ....
[T]he disposition of this case reveals a mistaken
assumption regarding the motives and behavior of
Government officials who create and administer
content-neutral regulations. The Court's salutary
skepticism of governmental decision making in
First Amendment matters suddenly dissipates
once it determines that a restriction is not content-based.... What the Court fails to recognize
is that public officials have strong incentives to
overregulate even in the absence of an intent to
censor particular views.241
Both before and after Marshall wrote those words, the decade of
the 1980s was a period in which the fact that a regulation of
speech was content-neutral almost always meant that the government would prevail against "a First Amendment challenge. 242
Prominent examples, prior to the Clark case, were Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,243 in 1981, and Los
Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent 244 in 1984. They
were followed by Renton246 in 1986, Frisby v. Schultz 246 in 1988,
241. [d. at 312-15 (footnotes omitted).
242. But see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983), and Schad v. Borough of
Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
243. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
244. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
245. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
246. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
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and Ward v. Rock Against Racism 247 in 1989. Brennan and Marshall dissented in everyone of those cases, sometimes joined by
Stevens and/or Blackmun. Rehnquist and White were in the majority in each case, joined by O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy
once those Justices were on the Court.
It was in dictum in the Perry Educ. Ass'n 248 case, in 1983,
that White first articulated the version of the standard that has
apparently taken firm root: "The State may ... enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication."249 Overt doctrinal differences have been few in
this area.

The primary theoretical battle took place in a 1989 decision,
Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 2 &O The Court in Ward upheld a
New York City law requiring performers in a certain bandshell
in Central Park to utilize sound amplification equipment and a
sound technician provided by the city. The overriding objective,
simply put, was volume control. The Court of Appeals, insisting
that a valid time, place, and manner regulation be "the least intrusive means" of accomplishing a significant goal, found that it
was not, given the alternatives, and struck down the regulation. 2&1 The Supreme Court reversed, with Kennedy writing for
247. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
248. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
249. [d. at 45. Earlier formulations, particularly in Heffron, supra note 243, omitted
the "narrowly tailored" language, which did appear in the early statement of the governing principle, in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), and which Brennan used in his Heffron dissent. 452 U.S. at 658. Justice White reverted to the less protective Heffron language in Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984), and stated, in
applying the test to the "color" limitation of the federal ban on reproduction of illustrations of currency, "It is enough that the color restriction substantially serves the Government's legitimate ends." [d. at 657. (White, for a plurality of four that included Rehnquist and O'Connor, treated this color li~itation as a time, place, and manner regulation,
and upheld it. Stevens concurred in that part of the judgment. Blackmun did not reach
the issue. Brennan and Marshall stated that they need not reach the issue, but called the
plurality's reasoning into question. [d. at 688-90 n.27.) Rehnquist put forth an apparently unique verbal formulation of the standard in Renton, in 1986, requiring such regulations to be, inter alia, "designed to serve a substantial governmental interest," City of
Renton v: Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (emphasis added), thus not
only omitting the usual "narrow tailoring" requirement, but seeming as well, ironically,
to elevate the level of the required governmental justification.
250. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
251. [d. at 789.
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the five-person majority.m
Quoting White's plurality opinion in Regan v. Time, Inc.,26a
Kennedy restated a pronouncement that had engendered no debate at the time of that 1984 opinion, or at any time since: "This
'less-restrictive-alternative analysis ... has never been a part of
the inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and manner regulation.' "264 He elaborated:
Lest any confusion on the point remain, we
reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place,
or manner of protected speech must be narrowly
tailored to serve the government's legitimate
content-neutral interests but that it need not
be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means
of doing so. Rather, the requirement of narrow
tailoring is satisfied "so long as the ... regulation
promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation." . . . To be sure, this standard does
not mean that a time, place or manner regulation
may burden substantially more speech than is
'necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests. Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion
of the burden on speech does not serve to advance
its goals.... So long as the means chosen are not
substantially broader than necessary to achieve
the government's interest, however, the regulation
will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive
alternative. 266

Marshall wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Brennan
and Stevens, and he reacted to the majority opinion with alarm.
"Our cases have not," he wrote, " 'clearly' rejected a less restrictive alternative test."266 In practice, Marshall contended, "the
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

[d. at 784. Blackmun concurred in the result, saying nothing more. [d. at 803.
468 U.S. 641 (1984).
491 U.S. at 797.
[d. at 798-800 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
[d. at 804.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

59

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3

472

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:413

Court has interpreted the narrow tailoring requirement to mandate an examination of alternative methods of serving the asserted governmental interest and a determination whether the
greater efficacy of the challenged regulation outweighs the increased burden it places on protected speech."2li7 But, tellingly,
he could cite only two cases,2Ci8 each nearly fifty years old, for
that proposition. He went on to predict the worst results flowing
from Kennedy's formulation:
The majority requires only that government show
that its interest cannot be served as effectively
without the challenged restriction.... It will be
enough, therefore, that the challenged regulation
advances the government's interest only in the
slightest, for any differential burden on speech
that results does not enter the calculus. Despite
its protestations to the contrary, the majority
thus has abandoned the requirement that restrictions on speech be narrowly tailored in any ordinary use of the phrase. 2 &9

While Marshall probably overreacted to Kennedy's words, it
does seem fair to suggest that those words took too big a step
toward inviting judges to demand less in the way of justification
for content-neutral restrictions on expression. The debate between Kennedy and Marshall in Ward may well provide the best
example in First Amendment law of the difficulty of capturing in
a verbal formulation just exactly how a particular kind of determination is to be made. At the heart of this analysis, arguably,
has always been a sensitive balancing, blending a serious solicitude for freedom of speech with the recognition that contentneutral regulations that burden speech are both inescapable and
relatively non-threatening to core First Amendment values;
thus, a lesser justification is demanded than would otherwise be
the case. To insist on the "least restrictive alternative," in this
context, is arguably to have gravitated into the realm of maximum judicial scrutiny, which is not quite what anyone had in
mind. Still, the very act of balancing (much less a requirement
of "narrow tailoring," as Marshall properly said) implies a con257. [d. at 805.
258. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147
(1939).
259. 491 U.S. at 806 (footnote omitted).
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sideration of necessity, and therefore of less restrictive
alternatives.
The fact that Marshall had to reach back nearly fifty years
to find cases to support his vision of the proper analysis, however, reflects the fact that cases of more recent years had, in actuality, been decided in accordance with the approach now being
espoused by Kennedy. Indeed, Marshall and Brennan had regularly, as dissenters, complained that challenged time, place and
manner regulations were more restrictive of speech than was
necessary.
Frisby v. Schultz,260 decided in 1988, is an example. The
majority upheld an ordinance banning picketing directed at a
residence, finding it narrowly tailored to achieve the important
goal of protecting the tranquility and privacy of the home. Brennan, joined by Marshall, protested that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored, pointing out that:
[F]or example, the government could constitutionally regulate the number of residential picketers, the hours during which a residential picket
may take place, or the noise level of such a picket.
In short, substantial regulation is permitted to
neutralize the intrusive or unduly coercive aspects
of picketing around the home. But to say that
picketing may be substantially regulated is not to
. say that it may be prohibited in its entirety.2el

Such differences in approach, along with the intrinsic openendedness of the governing standard - what is required under
the heading of "narrow tailoring," and when are there "ample
alternative channels of communication?" - suggest that this is,
in truth, the most unguided area of First Amendment law, and
thus the one in which Justices most clearly balance interests according to their own proclivities. In performing this balancing,
only Brennan and Marshall consistently favored the interests of
speech.
Thus, in Renton,262 only Brennan and Marshall felt that the
260. 487

u.s.

474 (1988).

261. [d. at 494. Stevens dissented separately. [d. at 496·99.

262. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 64·65 (1986). Compare
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Detroit zoning ordinance left the regulated theaters with less
than adequate available geographic opportunities for engaging in
business. In Heffron 263 and Clark,264 Brennan and Marshall
(joined by Stevens in Heffron) would have required evidence in
support of the state's interests, decrying the majority's indulgence of "speculative" problems raised by the government.26lI
The demand for factual support is, of course, a key component
of a genuinely demanding level of review, and has not, at least in
recent times, been in any way associated with the review of time,
place, and manner regulations.
In Clark and Taxpayers for Vincent,266 Brennan and Marshall (joined by Blackmun in Vincent), as if to emphasize that
the analysis truly embodied ,a process of balancing, took time to
emphasize the nature and significance of the speech interests involved, facts either assumed or cursorily acknowledged by the
majority. Thus, in Vincent, a decision upholding a municipal
ban on the posting of signs on utility poles, Brennan stressed
"the critical importance of the posting of signs as a means of
communication," recognizing such signs as "doubtless 'essential
to the poorly financed causes of little people.' "267 With respect
to the availability of alternative channels of communication,
Brennan responded to the majority's treatment of this element
by pointing to the absence of any "showing" that the suggested
alternatives would serve as well. 268 In this case, as well, he displayed an overt skepticism about the city's alleged interest in
aesthetics, warning that "the inherent subjectivity of aesthetic
judgments makes it all too easy for the government to fashion its
justification for a law in a manner that impairs the ability of a
reviewing court meaningfully to" evaluate such claims. 269 Thus,
while the majority (speaking through Stevens) accepted the
city's aesthetic interest as sufficient, Brennan would, again, have
the less sympathetic remark by Rehnquist, commenting upon the same facts: "That respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market ... does not give rise to a
First Amendment violation." [d. at 54.
263. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981).
264. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
265. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 661-62; Clark, 468 U.S. at 308-09.
266. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
267. [d. at 819·20.
268. [d. at 820.
269. [d. at 822.
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required "tangible proof of the legitimacy and substantiality of
its aesthetic objective," by insisting upon a showing that the city
was pursuing its purported objective "comprehensively."270
Whatever one may think of the Court's disposition of each
of the time, place, and manner cases of the 1980's, it is clear that
Justices Brennan and Marshall, on occasion joined by Blackmun
or Stevens, took an approach to these cases that was markedly
less deferential to government than the rest of the Court. Since
then, the signals have been mixed.
In a case in which no other Justice addressed the precise
point, Justice Kennedy showed himself ready to uphold {what
270. [d. at 828. An oddity of the Taxpayers for Vincent case is the fact that, despite
the fact that the ordinance in question clearly fits the description of a content-neutral
time, place and manner regulation, Stevens, writing for the Court, chose (without real
explanation) to apply the test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), rather
than the standard generally used to evaluate the validity of time, place and manner regulations; as it turned out, that theoretical departure probably made no difference to the
outcome of the case. O'Brien was the first Supreme Court case to confront the issue of
"symbolic speech," and Chief Justice Warren resolved the precise issue before the Court
by subjecting the government's regulation of what was assumed to be expressive conduct
to a brand new four-part test, the thrust of which was to allow such regulation when the
government had a sufficiently important interest unrelated to the suppression of speech.
Several weeks after Vincent, the Court decided Clark, supra note 264, a symbolic
speech case which might naturally have been resolved under O'Brien. In a triumph of
good sense, however, Justice White, after stating both tests, resolved the case under the
well-established time, place and manner analysis, and then remarked that "the foregoing
analysis demonstrates that the Park Service regulation is sustainable under the fourfactor standard of United States v. O'Brien, ... for validating a regulation of expressive
conduct, which, in the last analysis, is little, if any, different from the standard applied
to time, place, and manner restrictions." 468 U.S. at 298. In a footnote, he added: "ReasQnable time, place, and manner restrictions are valid even though they directly limit
oral or written expression. It would be odd to insist on a higher standard for limitations
aimed at regulable conduct and having only an incidental impact on speech." [d. at n.8.
Some of us felt, on the basis of that prescient observation, that the arguably gratuitous
O'Brien test could, and should, have been laid to rest.
But it was not to be. Justice Brennan, of all people, invoked O'Brien, understandably, as the presumptive alternative to the rule of strict scrutiny actually applied in the
flag-burning case, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and a plurality of the Court has
since shown, in the Barnes case, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), that the O'Brien test is alive and
applicable to cases involving conduct (such as nude dancing) possibly, but not inevitably,
having expressive value. In Barnes, Rehnquist (writing for himself, O'Connor, and Kennedy) alluded to the time, place and manner concept, recalled that "[i]n Clark we observed that this test has been interpreted to embody much the same standards as those
set forth in U.S. v. O'Brien," and concluded, with no further explanation, that the
O'Brien test would be applied. [d. at 2460. (Scalia, concurring in the judgment, characterized the O'Brien test as "an intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny," which
he contended was inappropriate. [d. at 2467.)
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he saw as) a time, place and manner regulation, in the case of
United States v. Kokinda in 1990.271 In voting to uphold the
federal ban on soliciting on postal premises, he perceived the
government's interest (in facilitating postal transactions) as significant, and stated, with no elaboration, that the regulation was
"narrowly drawn." The dissenters, Brennan and Marshall,
joined by Stevens, did not see the regulation as content-neutral,
and argued, characteristically, that the total ban was not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in preventing disruption of
postal business.
The Barnes 272 case of 1991 is also instructive, despite the
fact that Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, analyzed the Indiana public indecency statute under the test of United States v.
O'Brien,278 rather than characterizing it as a time, place, and
manner regulation. Because the O'Brien test has been analogized
to time, place and manner analysis,274 the application of O'Brien
is a further indication of a Justice's approach to the evaluation
of content-neutral regulations of speech. Rehnquist found, in
Barnes, that the Indiana statute (as applied to nude barroom
dancing) "furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality,"27& and (with minimal discussion) that it
was narrowly-tailored to achieve that purpose. Justice Souter,
concurring in the judgment, essentially agreed. 276 The dissenters
(White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens) disagreed that the
statute was narrowly tailored, but that conclusion mayor may
not have been tied to the fact that they were applying strict
scrutiny to a regulation that they perceived as content-based.277
Finally, in 1992, in Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness ("ISKCON"),278 four Justices (Kennedy, Souter,
Blackmun, and Stevens) applied time, place, and manner analy271. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
272. Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
273. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
274. See note 270.
275. 111 S. Ct. at 2462.
276. [d. at 2468-71. He relied illstead on "the State's substantial interest in combating the secondary effects" - apparently prostitution, sexual assault, and other crimes "of adult entertainment establishments of the sort typified by respondents' establishments." [d. at 2468-69. Scalia, concurring in the judgment, apparently rejects the
O'Brien test, and saw no "speech" implicated here. [d. at 2465-67.
277. See the discussion at notes 190-91, supra.
278. 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992).
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sis to a prohibition of the distribution of literature in public airport terminals, and found it wanting. With respect to the ban on
the solicitation and receipt of funds in those terminals, however,
Kennedy voted to uphold it as a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction, while Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens emphatically disagreed. 279 The other five Justices, finding the absence of a "public forum," did not need to even apply time,
place, and manner analysis,280 but O'Connor joined in striking
down the distribution ban.
While the result in Lee v. ISKCON offers hope, it is too
soon to conclude that Marshall's observations are any less accurate today than they were, in Clark, in 1984.

C.

THE "PUBLIC FORUM" LIMITATION

In the course of determining which public properties or governmentally-controlled media of communication are or are not
"public fora" presumptively available for expressive activity, the
Court has, virtually from the beginning, been consistently reluctant to resolve the issue against the .government, once its focus is
beyond the "traditional" realm of streets, sidewalks, and parks.
Brennan and Marshall were perpetual dissenters in this area of
First Amendment law.
The first decision explicitly based on the Court's view that a
particular piece of public property could reasonably and validly
be withdrawn from First Amendment activity was Adderly v.
Florida,281 in 1966. Not until 1974, in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights,282 was the term "public forum" used in' an opinion so
holding, and not until the Perry Educ. Ass'n 283 decision of 1983
did the Court clarify the legal consequences of the designations
"public forum," "limited public forum," and "non-public forum."284 In each of these cases, the Court held that the govern279. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701,
27l5, 2724 (1992).
280. See the discussion at note 318, infra.
281. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
282. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The term "public forum" had appeared, in a different context, as early as Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
283. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
284. Id. at 45-46.
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mental situs in question was not a "public forum." After Perry,
it was clear that such a finding had the effect of reducing the
standard of judicial review to a very low level. The Court ruled
similarly in Greer v. Spock 28& in 1976, Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union 286 in 1977, Postal Servo v.· Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns 287 in 1981, Cornelius V. NAACP Legal Defense and
Educ. Fund 288 in 1985, Hazelwood School Dist. V. Kuhlmeier 289
in 1988, United States V. Kokinda 290 in 1990, and International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness V. Lee 291 in 1992.
One early case in which the question was nqt raised, but
surely might have been, with the likely effect of changing the
result, was Cohen V. California 292 in 1971, a landmark decision
on "offensive" speech, which happened to occur in a courthouse
corridor. Another such instance, also pre-dating the emergence
of recognized doctrine in this area, was the pioneering students'rights decision in Tinker V. Des Moines School Dist.,293 which
proclaimed, in 1969, that public high school students did not
"shed their constitutional rights of freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."294 The later-developed "public forum" inquiry was not raised in that decision, in which White
joined, and, probably because of the Tinker precedent, was not
raised in the 1986 high school speech decision, Bethel School
Dist. V. Fraser 29& (whose result would not have been changed
even if it had). By 1988, however, the Court was ready to apply
the doctrine to the public school setting, in the Kuhlmeier
case. 296 On occasion, notably the Taxpayers for Vincent 297 decision of 1984, the "public forum" question, while apparently pertinent (there, in connection with public utility poles), has been
acknowledged but given inexplicably little weight. 298
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

424 U.S. 828 (1976). See also United States V. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
433 U.S. 119 (1977).
453 U.S. 114 (1981).
473 U.S. 788 (1985).
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
497 U.S. 720 (1990).
112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 506.
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
Justice Stevens, for the majority, appeared to believe, in Vincent, that a utility
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In only a few cases was a public property not traditionally
open for expression held, by a majority of the Court, to be a
"public forum" (more properly, a "limited public forum," postPerry),299 most notably the "Hair" case 300 of 1975 and Widmar
v. Vincent 301 in 1981. Widmar involved state university facilities
that were "routinely" made available to student organizations;
no one dissented on the public forum issue. The "Hair" case,
Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, involved a municipallymanaged auditorium "designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities."302 Blackmun wrote for the majority, and White and
Rehnquist dissented, the latter believing that a public auditorium could not properly be analogized to a public park.
Those cases aside, Brennan and Marshall disagreed with the
majority in virtually everyone of the other decisions in which
the public forum question was considered. 303 Stevens joined
. their dissenting opinions in Perry and Kokinda (and dissented
on other grounds in Cornelius), while Blackmun did so in Cornelius, Kuhlmeier, and Kokinda. Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor, in contrast, have rejected every non-traditional "public forum" argument which they have considered, and nearly the
same thing can be said of White. 304
pole (on which the plaintiffs sought to post their campaign signs) was not a public forum,
a conclusion which, in theory, ought to have been virtually dispositive, on an issue that
should have been a threshold one. In the process, he appeared, for the most part, to be in
tune with the prevailing doctrine. [d. at 813-15. Yet he declined, in effect, to rest the
decision on that point, and, in a footnote, cryptically opined that "it is ... of limited
utility in the context of this case to focus on whether the tangible property itself should
be deemed a public forum." [d. at 815 n.32.
299. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-48 (1983).
300. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
301. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Another such holding was Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm., 429 U.S. 167 (1976). (See the Brennan concurrence,
at 178-79).
302. 420 U.S. at 555.
303. An exception for Marshall was the Cornelius case, supra note 288, in which he
did not participate. Brennan's position almost invariably led him to dissent, the exception being his concurrence in the judgment, on other grounds, in the Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns case, 453 U.S. 114, 134. At times, moreover, their dissenting positions were purely
on other grounds. See Jones, supra note 286; United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675
(1985).
304. The exception for White is his concurrence in the judgment in Postal Servo V.
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 141-42 (1981), in which he called the postal system "open" to all protected written expression, but went on, uncharacteristically, to suggest that the inquiry was not a useful one.
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As opinion writers, the primary architects of the public forum doctrine have been White (in Perry) and O'Connor (in Cornelius and Kokinda). The doctrine they have fostered, which
looks first to tradition and then to governmental intent, has
been accepted by a majority of the Court. In terms of doctrinal
disagreement (as opposed to mere differences in application),30I1
Brennan and Marshall initially stood alone, essentially resting
their positions, in Greer and Greenburgh, on a competing notion
of "compatibility"308 - i.e., the forum is presumptively open to
all First Amendment activity not incompatible therewith - that
is ultimately at odds with the underlying premise of the prevailing public-forum theory. That premise is that, subject to minimal constitutional restrictions, government simply does not have
to allow expression in non-traditional public settings when it has
chosen not to do so.
It was in the Cornelius 307 case that the theoretical debate
took on an added dimension, and one that has survived the departure of Brennan and Marshall. Here, O'Connor, for a plurality of four Justices, set forth the highly limiting principle that
the existence of a "limited public forum" (in which the usual
rules of freedom of speech apply) is to be ascertained entirely by
reference to "the government's intent."308 Blackmun stepped
forward, joined by Brennan, to write an outstanding critique of
"the Court's circular reasoning."309 In the process (despite their
differing positions in Lehman, Greer, and Perry), he aligned
himself with the Brennan view that the proper approach to this
aspect of First Amendment analysis should embody an evaluation of "compatibility":
305. In some cases, such as Lehman, supra note 282, the dissenting opinion rested
on the contention that the municipal transit system's advertising space had become a
public forum. In Perry, supra note 283, the dissenters argued that the government had
engaged in viewpoint discrimination, concededly impermissible even in a non-public forum; they suggested, but found unnecessary to pursue, the argument that the school mail
system was indeed a public forum. In Kuhlmeier, supra note 289, too, the dissenters
declined to take the public forum issue head-on, resting instead on a collection of arguments, embracing viewpoint discrimination, the Tinker precedent, and the absence of
sufficient governmental justification.
306. Greer, 424 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., concurring), 149-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
307. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
308. Id. at 802-04.
309. Id. at 813.
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Thus, the public forum, limited-public-forum, and nonpublic forum categories are but analytical shorthand for the principles that have
guided the Court's decisions regarding claims of
access to public property for expressive activity.
The interests served by the expressive activity
must be balanced against the interests served by
the uses for which the property was intended....
Where an examination of all the relevant interests
indicates that certain expressive activity is not
compatible with the normal uses of the property,
the First Amendment does not require the Government to allow that activity.
The Court's analysis ... turns these principles on end . . . . [T]he Court simply labels the
property and dispenses with the balancing . . . .
. . . The Court offers no explanation why attaching the label "nonpublic forum" to particular
property frees the Government of the more stringent constraints imposed by the First Amendment ....

The Court's analysis empties the limitedpublic-forum concept of meaning..... The Court
makes it virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted to a particular class of speakers is
a limited public forum. If the Government does
not create a limited public forum unless it intends
to provide an "open forum" for expressive activity, and if the exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the Government did not intend to create such a forum, . . . no speaker challenging
denial of access will ever be able to prove that the
forum is a limited public forum. 310

Justice Stevens, dissenting separately, essentially sidestepped
the "scholarly debate" between Blackmun and O'Connor, remarking that he was "somewhat skeptical about the value of this
analytical approach in the actual decisional process."311 By
310. [d. at 820-21, 825.
311. [d. at 833. Recall his opinion for the Court in Taxpayers for Vincent, discussed
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standing outside the debate, however, he surely gave evidence
that he would not subject himself to the limitations of the plurality's rigid approach.
The majority opinion in Kuhlmeier 312 three years later,
written by White and joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,
and Stevens, seemed to adopt the Cornelius approach, but almost certainly the finding of a non-public-forum in Kuhlmeier
did not depend on that approach, since the student newspaper
in Kuhlmeier had never truly been "opened" as a forum for uncensored expression.
O'Connor wrote again for a plurality in Kokinda 313 in 1990,
refusing to treat a postal sidewalk as the equivalent of a traditional, ordinary public sidewalk, and utilizing her Cornelius approach to conclude that the government had not intended to
open postal premises for expressive activity of the sort in which
the defendants had engaged (i.e., "soliciting"). Significantly,
Scalia joined the opinion, along with Rehnquist and White. Just
as significantly, Kennedy did not, although he concurred in the
result. While Kennedy ultimately declined to decide the public
forum question in Kokinda, deeming the ban on solicitation on
postal premises to be a valid time, place, and manner regulation,
he indicated clearly that he could not embrace O'Connor's pure
reliance on tradition and governmental intent:
While it is legitimate for the Postal Service to ensure convenient and unimpeded access for postal
patrons, the public's use of postal property for
communicative purposes means that the surrounding walkways may be an appropriate place
for the exercise of vital rights of expression. As
society becomes more insular in character, it becomes essential to protect public places where
traditional modes of speech and forms of expression can take place. It is true that the uses of the
adjacent public buildings and the needs of its patrons are an important part of a balance, but
there remains a powerful argument that, because
of the wide range of activities that the Governat notes 297-98, supra.
312. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
313. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
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ment permits to take place on this posted sidewalk, it is more than a non public forum.
This is so even though the Government may
intend to impose some limitations on the forum's
use. If our public forum jurisprudence is to retain
vitality, we must recognize that certain objective
characteristics of Government property and its
customary use by the public may control the case.
See, e.g., Cornelius . .. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
While it is proper to weigh the need to maintain
the dignity and purpose of a public building, ...
or to impose special security requirements, see
Adderly ... , other factors may point to the conclusion that the Government must permit wider
access to the forum than it has otherwise
intended. S14

Stevens and Blackmun, as well as Marshall, joined the dissenting opinion by Brennan which contended that the postal
sidewalk was a traditional public forum, and picked up where
Blackmun had left off in Cornelius in castigating the plurality's
overall approach to the public forum question. One line from
this dissenting opinion merits particular attention here:
Whatever the proper application of public forum
doctrine to novel situations like fund-raising
drives in the federal workplace ... or the internal
mail systems of public schools, . . . we ought not
unrefiectively transfer principles of analysis developed in those specialized and difficult contexts
to traditional forums such as streets, sidewalks,
and parks.SiG

The members of the plurality, of course, did not act "unreflectively," nor would they agree that the matter is as simple as
Brennan suggested. But his comment underscores the difference
between cases in which the "no-public-forum" holding arguably
makes sense, and cases in which the rigid application of doctrine, with hairs cleverly split, appears to be little more than
that. Not only does a distinction among sidewalks create the
likelihood of unnecessary future line-drawing, but the refusal to
314. [d. at 737-38 (citations omitted).
315. [d. at 746-47.
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call that sidewalk even a "limited public forum" (when doing so
would have been easy, given all the expressive activity permitted
thereon) seems reflective of a commitment to maximum feasible
resistance to finding open forums for expression.
Justice Scalia recently demonstrated the importance, to
him, of the public forum limitation, by arguing, all alone, that
the area directly surrounding a polling place is not, by tradition,
a "public forum" for speech, even to the extent that such an
area encompasses streets and sidewalks. He thus concurred in
the judgment in Burson v. Freeman,S16 in which Tennessee's ban
on electioneering within 100 feet of polling places was upheld.
But the plurality, which included Blackmun, Rehnquist, White,
and Kennedy, thought that the regulation touched upon speech
in "quintessential public forums."317 That Scalia was unable to
attract the support of any other Justice for his point of view
suggests just how singular his approach to the "public forum"
concept may be.
The division of the Justices in this area of First Amendment
law was clearly displayed, once again, in the most recent decision turning on the public forum inquiry, International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (HISKCON") v. Lee.318 Five
Justices - Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas held that a publicly operated airport terminal was not a public
forum, either by tradition or designation. Again, the possibility
that a non-traditional public forum had been created by designation was tied to the government's intent. (Thomas, then, has
aligned himself with this important limitation.) But the four
Justices who dissented on this point included Kennedy and Souter, along with the more dependable Blackmun and Stevens.
Speaking for those four, Kennedy, building on his Kokinda concurrence, placed himself solidly in the tradition of Justice Brennan in this ongoing doctrinal debate. Displaying admirable resistance to rote acceptance of prevailing dogma, he wrote:
Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective of ex316. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
317. [d. at 1850. As previously noted, however, they found strict scrutiny satisfied.
See the discussion at notes 206-10, supra.
318. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
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pression into one which grants the government
authority to restrict speech by fiat. I believe that
the Court's public forum analysis in this case is
inconsistent with the values underlying the
speech and press clauses of the First
Amendment. 319

And:
In a country where most citizens travel by automobile, and parks all too often become locales for
crime rather than social intercourse, our failure to
recognize the possibility that new types of government property may be appropriate forums for
speech will lead . to a serious. curtailment of our
expressive activity.320

Sounding a great deal like Blackmun in his Cornelius dissent, Kennedy criticized the majority's analysis as one that
"leaves the government with almost unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property by doing nothing more than articulating a non-speech-related purpose for the area, and it leaves
almost no scope for the development of new public forums absent the rare approval of the government."321 The requirements
for inclusion in the designated-forum category, he asserted, "are
so stringent that I cannot be certain whether the category has
any 'content left at a11."322 In terms highly reminiscent of the departed Brennan, he set forth a promising alternative to the majority's approach:
If the objective, physical characteristics' of the

property at issue and the actual public access and
uses which have been permitted by the government indicate that expressive activity would be
appropriate and compatible with those uses, the
property is a public forum. The most important
considerations in this analysis are whether the
property shares physical similarities with more
traditional public forums, whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in broad public
access to the property, and whether expressive ac319. [d. at
320. [d. at
321. [d. at
322. [d. at

2715.
2717.
2716.
2717.
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tivity would tend to interfere in a significant way
with the uses to which the government has ...
dedicated the property.323

Strikingly, Kennedy added the corollary that courts should consider the availability of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in undertaking this "compatibility" analysis. Possible
inconsistencies between expressive activities and the property's
uses should not defeat a public-forum finding, he argued, "if
those inconsistencies can be avoided through simple and permitted regulations."3u In the present case, involving "the airport
corridors and shopping areas outside of the passenger security
zones,"3211 he found all of those elements satisfied.
Writing separately, Justice Souter - who was addressing
the issue for the first time - indicated his full agreement with
Kennedy.326 Thus, two of the youngest Justices have essentially
adopted the positions previously held by Brennan and Marshall
with respect to this oft-arising threshold question. Because of
their relative youth, the highly speech-protective approach
which they espouse has, now, a greater chance of someday becoming law than it has had at any time in the past two decades.
Once the decision is made that a particular public venue is
in no way a public forum, the government is, of course, held to a
very low standard of review; only if the regulation is "unreasonable," or amounts to viewpoint discrimination, will it be found
unconstitutional. Even at this stage, the Justices have somewhat
predictably disagreed. In Perry,327 the majority (speaking
through White, and including Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Blackmun) saw the school board's policy of selective access to teachers' mailboxes (allowing access to the teachers' union that had
been elected the exclusive bargaining representative but denying
access to a rival union) as reasonable and as a policy "based on
the status of the respective unions rather than their views. "328
Brennan, however, joined by Marshall and Stevens in dissent,
saw the exclusive access policy as viewpoint-discriminatory, with
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

[d. at
[d.
[d. at
[d. at
Perry
[d. at

2718.
2715.
2724.
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
49.
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"no discernible state interest" being furthered thereby.329
In Kuhlmeier,330 the majority (again speaking through
White) found the principal's censorship of the school newspaper
to be quite reasonable, while the dissenters (Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun) thought it "served no legitimate pedagogical
purpose. "331
The Kokinda case provides another good example of a setting in which these differing reactions were manifest. Having decided that the postal sidewalk was not a public forum, the plurality went on to rule that the ban on solicitation of money at
that location was reasonable, "because solicitation is inherently
disruptive of the Postal Service's business."332 "[C]onfrontation
by a person asking for money," wrote O'Connor, "disrupts passage and is more intrusive and intimidating than an encounter
with a person giving out information."333 She added that the
regulation did not discriminate on the basis of content or
viewpoint. 334
For the four dissenters, however, Brennan did not see the
regulation as content-neutral, demonstrating greater sensitivity
concerning that distinction once again. 3311 "If a person on postal
premises says to members of the public, 'Please support my political advocacy group,' " Brennan explained, "he cannot be punished. If he says, 'Please contribute $10,' he is subject to criminal prosecution. His punishment depends entirely on what he
says."336 That contention was significant, again, only if the postal sidewalk were viewed as a public forum. Even if it were not,
however, Brennan - now joined only by Marshall and Stevens
- could not regard the solicitation ban as "reasonable," for the
primary reason that other forms of expression, which he saw as
equivalent in their capacity for disruption, were permitted on
postal premises. He also felt that restrictions short of a total ban
329. [d. at 68.
330. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
331. [d. at 289.
332. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990).
333. [d. at 734.
334. Content discrimination, of course, would not have been impermissible in a nonpublic forum.
335. [d. at 753. See generally the discussion at notes 166-85, supra.
336. [d.
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on solicitation were possible, and that, while the least restrictive
alternative was not required in a non-public-forum, '~these other
approaches to the problem of disruption are so obvious that the
no-solicitation regulation can scarcely be considered ... reasonable .... " 837 Once again, the Brennan position was maximally
speech -protective.
The plurality responded to the dissent, in part, in a way
that seems revealing. Purporting to address the "reasonableness" question, but perhaps having in mind the threshold public
forum question, O'Connor said:
[I]t is anomalous that the [Postal] Service's allowance of some avenues of speech would be relied
upon as evidence that it is impermissibly suppressing other speech. If anything, the Service's
generous accommodation of some types of speech
testifies to its willingness to provide as broad a
forum as possible, consistent with its postal mission. The dissent would create, in the name of the
First Amendment, a disincentive for the Government to dedicate its property to any speech activities at all. 888

O'Connor responded further to Brennan by stating: "Even if
more narrowly tailored regulations could be promulgated, . . .
the Postal Service is only required to adopt reasonable regulations, not 'the most reasonable or the only reasonable' regulation
possible."339 O'Connor, fairly clearly, would invest the "reasonableness" requirement with less meaning than would the Kokinda
dissenters.
But in ISKCON, O'Connor demonstrated that she did not
regard the "reasonableness" requirement as toothless. The disp~te in ISKCON involved a New York Port Authority prohibition of distribution of written material and "[s]olicitation and
receipt of funds" in the interior areas of air terminals. 8'0 The
majority, which found no public forum present, had little
trouble concluding that, as in Kokinda, the solicitation ban was
reasonable. Justice Kennedy - who, again, did. view the termi337.
338.
339.
340.

[d. at 763.
[d. at 733.
[d. at 735-36.
112 S. Ct. 2701, 2704 (1992).
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nal as a public forum -joined the majority in this result, seeing
the ban on "[s]olicitation and receipt of funds" as a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction. a41
But O'Connor joined Kennedy and the three dissenters to
form a different majority, in what was technically a' companion
case arising from the very same dispute. a42 That majority held,
in a brief per curiam ruling, that the ban on distribution of literature in the airport terminals was unconstitutional. O'Connor
deemed the prohibition unreasonable, emphasizing the failure of
the Port Authority to provide any independent justification for
this restriction; moreover, she could not "see how peaceful pamphleteering is incompatible with the multipurpose environment" .
of the airports. a4a Kennedy, joined by the Souter group, applied
time, place, and manner analysis to this prohibition, and found
it wanting. Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas dissented; invoking concerns about congestion, passenger delays, and safety
hazards, they found even the distribution ban reasonable.
The Justices remain deeply divided over the concept of the
public forum, and the longstanding trend in favor of governmental restrictiveness has yet to be reversed. But, because of Kennedy and Souter, there is now hope for the future in this area of
First Amendment law.
IV. INDIVIDUAL CONTENT-BASED CATEGORIES
A.

DEFAMATION

There has been no indication that anyone on the Court other than Justice White - wishes to repudiate the general rule
of New York Times v. Sullivan,a44 imposing the "actual malice"
requirement on defamation lawsuits brought by "public officials" (and, by virtue of later case law,a4G "public figures" as
well). Further developments in this field, however, have been accompanied by constant disagreement. Might any of the detailed
341.
342.
(1992).
343.
344.
345.

[d. at 2715.
Lee v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709

112 S. Ct. at 2714. .
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butta, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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rules of the present First Amendment law of defamation be in
imminent danger of modification?
After New York Times, the most important Supreme Court
libel case was Gertz u. Robert Welch, Inc.,346 decided in 1974. Of
the five Justices who joined the majority opinion (authored by
Powell), only Blackmun and Rehnquist remain. Marshall joined
that majority as well, but Brennan did not. The case held, first,
that private-figure plaintiffs in defamation cases must demonstrate fault (presumably negligence), but not "malice," in order
to prevail, and, second, that such plaintiffs cannot receive presumed or punitive damages unless they show "malice." Justice
White dissented at length, taking the position that the Court
had no sound basis for rejecting the approach of the common
law (allowing liability and presumed damages upon a showing of
mere falsity) in the case of a private-figure plaintiff. He was concerned about the impact of the Court's ruling on private citizens;
he was not worried that preserving the common law to this extent would likely pose any serious threat to the vitality of the
press.
That White has not abandoned his opposition to Gertz was
demonstrated eleven years later, in his separate concurrence in
Dun & Bradstreet u. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. S47 Powell wrote
the plurality opinion, joined only by Rehnquist and O'Connor,
holding that, in private-figure defamation suits in which the
false statement is not on a matter of "public concern," presumed
and punitive damages are available even without a showing of
"actual malice."348 (The plurality said nothing regarding the
Gertz standard for proof of liability in a private-figure defamation case; White asserted that that rule must also be inapplicable in a no-public-concern case, but the dissenters maintained
that the liability requirement had not been questioned. 349 ) The
fourth and fifth votes for affirmance in Dun & Bradstreet came
from White and Chief Justice Burger, who would have simply
overruled Gertz, thus permitting awards of presumed and punitive damages on no special showing.
346.
347.
348.
349.

418 U.S. 323 (1974).
472 U.S. 749 (1985).
[d. at 761.
[d. at 781.
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Not only did White urge that Gertz be overruled, he now
felt that the basic ruling of New York Times was unwarranted:
In New York Times, instead of escalating the
plaintiff's burden of proof to an almost impossible
level, we could have achieved our stated goal by
limiting the recoverable damages to a level that
would not unduly threaten the press. Punitive
damages might have been scrutinized . . . or perhaps even entirely forbidden. Presumed damages
to reputation might have been prohibited, or limited, as in Gertz. Had that course been taken and
the common-law standard of liability been retained, the defamed public official, upon proving
falsity, could at least have had a judgment to that
effect. His reputation would then be vindicated;
and to the extent possible, the misinformation
circulated would have been countered. He might
also have recovered a modest amount, enough
perhaps to pay his litigation expenses. 3GO

It must be emphasized that he stood alone in these views. Brennan, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented, objecting both to the plurality's general rule and to its application
here. Remaining from that decision, then, are two Justices
(Rehnquist and O'Connor) from the plurality; one (White) who
concurred, on radical grounds; and two (Blackmun and Stevens)
who dissented, urging no deviation from Gertz. The question
could thus be decided wholly afresh.
Another aspect of Dun & Bradstreet is important to note.
Although the Vermont Supreme Court had based its ruling in
the case on a distinction between "media" and "non-media" defendants,3lU the plurality totally sidestepped that point. White
and Brennan agreed that the law of defamation should embody
no such distinction.
The only other decision that speaks to fundamental rules, in
this area of the law, is the 1986 decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.362 O'Connor wrote the majority opinion,
350. [d. at 771.
351. [d. at 752-53.
352. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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holding that a private-figure plaintiff in a defamation suit must,
like a public-figure plaintiff, bear the burden of proving that the
allegedly defamatory statement was false, at least when the
speech is on a matter of public concern and when the suit is
brought against a "media" defendant. Why O'Connor chose to
speak in such narrow terms is not clear, but it is true that she
adhered to the precise situation before the Court, adding in a
footnote: "Nor need we consider what standards would apply if
the plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant . . . ."363 By doing so,
however, she quickly revived the debate over whether the identity of the defendant should matter, for any purpose, in the First
Amendment law of libel. Brennan, briefly concurring with
Blackmun, wrote separately only to try to dispel, once again, any
suggestion that it should. Only O'Connor and Blackmun remain
from the Hepps majority.
Stevens dissented, joined by White and Rehnquist. In sharp
contrast to O'Connor - who showed impressive sensitivity to
the deterrent effect of the common law rule placing on the defendant the burden of proving the truth of a defamatory statement - Stevens, tapping heavily into the Gertz rationale, would
have given much heavier weight to the interest in protecting the
reputation of a private citizen. 364 Emphasizing the fact that a
private-figure plaintiff was already obliged to prove "fault" on
the part of a defendant, he remarked that libels "contribute little to the marketplace of ideas,"366 and that "the public's interest in an uninhibited press is at its nadir when the publisher is
at fault .... "366 He expressed concern about "[t]he danger of
deliberate defamation by reference to unprovable facts,"367 and
captured perfectly the difference between his approach and
O'Connor's with this pronouncement:
The· Court's result is plausible . . . only because it grossly undervalues the strong state interest in redressing injuries to private reputations.
353. [d. at 779 n.4.
354. Indeed, while he limited his comments to the interests of private-figure plain-

tiffs, he indicated, in a footnote, that he "would be inclined to the view that public
figures should not bear the burden of disproving the veracity of accusations made against
them with 'actual malice'... " [d. at 788 n.lO.
355. [d. at 782.
356. [d. at 784.
357. [d. at 785.
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The error lies in its initial premise, with its mistaken belief that doubt regarding the veracity of a
defamatory statement must invariably be resolved
in favor of constitutional protection of the statement .... 338

The O'Connor position, in Hepps, is thus clearly the more
speech-protective one.
On fairly slim evidence, then, with respect to the rules of
defamation law post-Gertz, these observations can be made:
White would favor a radical rewriting, Rehnquist is prepared to
maximize the position of private plaintiffs (short of rewriting
Gertz), O'Connor and Stevens have staked out "mixed" positions, and Blackmun has taken the most consistently speechprotective position.
Cases since Hepps have not really yielded any further clues.
In 1989, in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,36e a unanimous Court upheld a libel judgment in
favor of a public figure plaintiff against a media defendant; thus,
no basic rules ~ere called into question.
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal CO.,360 decided in 1990, all
but Brennan and Marsha:ll joined in a Rehnquist majority opinion that declined to recognize, in the law of defamation, "an' additional separate constitutional privilege for 'opinion'."361 But,
using the Hepps decision to bolster his conclusion, Rehnquist
gave assurance that "Hepps stands for the proposition that a
statement on matters of public concern" - including an "opinion" - "must be provable as false before there can be liability
under state defamation law, at least in situations, like the present, where a media defendant is involved. "362 Concerning his
reference to a "media defendant," he added,in a footnote, that
"[i]n Hepps the Court reserved judgment on cases involving
nonmedia defendants, . . . and accordingly we do the same. "363
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

[d. at 787.
491 U.S. 657 (1989).
497 U.S. 1 (1990).
[d. at 21.
[d. at 19-20.
[d. at 20 n.6.
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- No subsequent case has involved a nonmedia defendant.
The Court remanded Milkovich because the Ohio courts
had erroneously recognized an "opinion" exception under the
First Amendment. It may be worth noting, however, that the
Ohio Supreme Court had also decided that Milkovich was a private figure, yet no Supreme Court Justice reached out, in this
case, to suggest rewriting any of the rules (from Gertz to Hepps)
applying to private-figure defamation suits. Admittedly, however, this appeal was by no means the most appropriate context
in which to do so.
In the most recent Supreme Court decision in the libel field,
1991's Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,s64 White and
Scalia showed themselves to be more inclined than their colleagues to impose liability, albeit in a special setting. The plaintiff, a public figure, accused the media defendants of knowingly
misquoting him. The District Court granted summary judgment
to the defendants, finding that the alleged inaccuracies did not
raise a jury question concerning the required "actual malice,"
but the Supreme Court reversed. For the majority, Justice Kennedy "reject[ed] any special test of falsity for quotations," concluding "that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a
plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity ... unless the
alteration results iJ) a material change in the meaning conveyed
by the statement."S6G The Court reversed the grant of summary
judgment with respect to all except one of the quoted passages
at issue; that one, said Kennedy, "did not materially alter the
meaning of [Masson's] statement."S66 But White, joined by
.Scalia, was less tolerant of knowing misquotations, believing
that the mere fact that the reporter wrote things that she knew
Masson had not said amounted to "knowing falsehood,"367 and,
therefore, "actual malice" within the meaning of the rule of New
York Times.
.
The four most junior members of the Court have thus revealed little in terms of their thinking on the large, general issues in the First Amendment law of defamation. With their el364.
365.
366.
367.

111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
[d. at 2432-33.
[d. at 2436.
[d. at 2437-38.
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ders in disagreement, almost anything could happen.
B.

PUBLICATION OF TRUTHFUL INFORMATION

Although the Court has not singled out, as a special category, the power of government to penalize the publication (typically, but not necessarily, by the press) of truthful information,
in a non-commercial setting raising no other well-established basis for suppression,366 it is arguably appropriate to do so. Over
the past two decades, the Court has decided a line of cases generally upholding the right of the press to publish facts, over the
objection~ of public and private parties asserting interests in privacy or confidentiality. That nearly unbroken string of press victories entitles one to ask: Will the press always enjoy the right to
print the truth? A few cases that do not fit the prevailing pattern may shed some light on this issue as well .
. In 1975, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 369 initiated the
core pattern of cases in which the press has consistently prevailed. Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court, avoiding
broader-than-necessary pronouncements, but asserting that the
First Amendment commands "that the States may not impose
sanctions for the publication of truthful information contained
in official court records open to public inspection."37o Three
more cases of the late 1970's essentially followed Cox, in situations involving somewhat varied facts. 371 None involved unlawful
acquisition of the published information, but in one, Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, it did not appear that the
confidential information was in any way available to the public.
By the last of these decisions, Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., in 1979, it appeared that strict scrutiny was being applied to
these laws. No Justice dissented, on the merits, in any of these
four cases,372 but, in the Daily Mail case, Rehnquist showed that
368. Compare, e.g., cases in which the government interest in national security was
invoked as a basis for suppressing the publication of truthful information. E.g., New
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
369. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
370. [d. at 495.
371. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,
430 U.S. 308 (1977).
372. Rehnquist dissented on jurisdictional grounds in Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at
501.
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he was not truly in accord with his colleagues. In Daily Mail, the
Court held unconstitutional a West Virginia statute prohibiting
publication by newspapers of the names of minors subject to juvenile court proceedings, finding that the law did not appear to
achieve its purposes. Only Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment, made clear that he considered the state's interest in preserving the anonymity of such juveniles to be compelling, and
that, absent the limitation to newspapers, he would have upheld
the statute. 373
Ten years later, the fundamental issue pervading these
cases returned to the Court, in Florida Star v. B.J.F.374 Justice
Marshall wrote the opinion, upholding the right of a newspaper
to publish the name of a rape victim which it had obtained from
a publicly released police report. Significantly, White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor would have allowed the State to prohibit
such a publication.37CI In keeping with the earlier precedents,
Marshall eschewed sweeping propositions, expressly declining
"appellant's invitation to hold broadly that truthful publication
may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment."376 His approach, however, was not ad hoc; rather, he
adopted this governing principle from the Daily Mail case: "[I]f
a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to
further a State interest of the highest order."377 Again, this
sounds like strict scrutiny, which should be the standard applicable to the content-based regulations involved in cases of this
kind. Note, however, the three potential limitations upon the
applicability of strict scrutiny that are suggested by the Daily
Mail formulation: (1) the defendant must be a "newspaper" or, more sensibly, a representative of the communications media;
(2) the published fact must be "about a matter of public significance"; and (3) the information must have been lawfully obtained. 378 Treating each of these elements as though it might be
373. 443 U.S. at 106·10.
374. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
375. The proceeding in question was actually a civil suit, by the rape victim, alleging
negligent violation of a Florida statute. The majority stopped short of striking down the
statute, despite producing an opinion that seemed to lead to doing just that.
376. Id. at 532.
377. Id. at 533.
378. Only the last point was recognized specifically by Marshall as an issue that did
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a condition precedent to a First Amendment victory, Marshall
found each of them satisfied in this case, including, most notably, the conclusion that the news article concerned "a matter of
public significance." "That is," he wrote, "the article generally,
as opposed to the specific identity contained within it, involved
a matter of paramount public import: the commission, and investigation, of a violent crime .... "379 His apparent lack of concern about whether the victim's name itself was "a matter of
public significance" can be seen as seriously weakening whatever
limiting force this element of the analysis might have, and must
therefore be seen as reflective of a speech-protective approach.
Marshall went on to find that the state's interests were
"highly significant," but that the statute was not necessary to
the achievement of those privacy interests. 38o The state had
more limited means of maintaining the confidentiality of the information, the negligence per,se standard swept too broadly (apparently in contrast to the typical common law cause of action
for invasion of privacy), and the statute was fatally underinclusive in applying its prohibition only to "instrument[s] of mass
communications."3s1 Given the majority's premises, finding these
flaws in the Florida law required no departure from standard
judicial analysis. In addition to Brennan, the majority included
Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy.
White, dissenting with Rehnquist and O'Connor, distinguished all prior cases, and took issue with each of the majority's
bases for finding the Florida law insufficiently tailored to achieve
its goals. Perhaps most significantly, the dissenters, unlike the
majority, felt that the state had done virtually all it could to
keep the victim's name confidential, notwithstanding the fact
that the government itself had inadvertently provided the name
to the newspaper. Although the dissenters quibbled with the authoritativeness of the Daily Mail formulation adopted by Marshall, they put forth no competing standard of review. Apparently they would have performed a balancing of sorts, and they
showed themselves ready, for the first time in a case of this kind,
not require resolution in this case, Id, at 535 n.B.
379. Id. at 536-37.
3BO. Id. at 537.
3B1. Id. at 539-40. Justice Scalia concurred on the basis of the majority's third
ground for invalidation. Id. at 541.
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to rule against a publisher of truthful information, at least under
certain circumstances.
The following year. the Court reverted to form with a unanimous decision in an easy case, Butterworth v. Smith,382 striking
down a Florida statute banning a grand jury witness from ever
disclosing testimony he gave before that body. Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reiterated the Daily Mail standard. But the
opinion resolved the dispute narrowly, finding an insufficient
state interest to justify "a permanent ban" on disclosure, even
after the grand jury has been discharged - but taking no express position on the validity of the ban prior to that discharge.
Perhaps it is significant that not even Brennan or Marshall
wrote separately to reject such an implicit distinction. 383
It is true, of course, that no contemporary Justice has insisted that there is an absolute right to publish truthful information. In 1984, in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,38. a unanimous
Court upheld a trial court's protective order, granted in connection with an order compelling extensive pre-trial discovery implicating privacy interests, which had the effect of barring the
publication of facts. As Justice Powell's majority opinion seemed
to recognize, however, the setting was "unique."3811
Two other cases that depart from the basic pattern may also
be instructive. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
CO.,386 in 1977, a majority of the Court, speaking through White,
held that a circus performer could bring a "right of publicity"
claim against a television station which had broadcast in a news
program a film of his "entire act."387 White likened the suit to
those involving claims of copyright infringement, which had
382. 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
383. The Court also seemed to assume the validity of another part of the statute,
which bars a witness from disclosing the testimony of another witness before the grand
jury - a point admittedly not before the Court. And Scalia, concurring, took an even
narrower view of precisely what the state was prohibiting, suggesting a commensurately
greater willingness than his colleagues to uphold a prohibition on the disclosure of truthful information. [d. at 636-37.
384. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
385. [d. at 34. Brennan and Marshall, concurring, wrote separately to emphasize the
importance of the competing interests - "in privacy and religious freedom" - involved.
[d. at 38.
386. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
387. [d. at 575.
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. never been thought to create First Amendment problems. 888 But
Brennan and Marshall joined the dissenting opinion of Justice
Powell, who demonstrated a strong commitment to the protection of the broadcasting of "newsworthy" information:
"[H]aving made the matter public - having chosen, in essence,
to make it newsworthy - [the performer] cannot, consistent
with the First Amendment, complain of routine news
reportage. "389

Hustler Magazine, Inc. u. Falwell 390 is not, of course, a case
that truly involves the publication of factual information. But,
in a sense, the Court's disposition of the case, unanimously disallowing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
proceeds on the effective assumption that Hustler's statements
about Falwell were not false, the jury's rejection of Falwell's defamation claim having taken out of the case any basis for recovery based upon falsity. Perhaps more importantly, the Court articulated a standard that would disallow such claims generally
(at least where "public figures" were concerned), unless the
claim arose from a provably false statement satisfying the "malice" requirement of New York Times. 391 As such, this case
should also be counted among the decisions upholding the right
of "truthful" publication against tort-based claims.
Against this background, the Court's 1991 opinion in Cohen
u. Cowles Media CO.892 is not encouraging. Granted, Cohen was
not a tort case, nor did it concern interests in privacy or confidentiality. It did, however, by permitting a claim against a newspaper based on a theory of promissory estoppel, allow for the
possibility of civil liability on the part of the press based upon
the publication of truthful information. Cohen claimed that the
newspaper had published information about him, in breach of a
promise of confidentiality, that caused him to lose his job. The
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment
388. [d. at 576-77. With respect to the interaction of copyright law and the first
amendment, see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539
(1985).
389. 433 U.S. at 582.
390. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
391. [d. at 56.
392. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

87

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3

500

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:413

barred such a claim, but the United States Supreme Court
reversed.
Justice White, for the majority, began by stating that the
case was not controlled by the Daily Mail-Florida Star line of
cases, "but rather by the equally well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the
First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news."393 This was arguably the key to the majority's ruling, because, for them, it took strict scrutiny out of the case. But, as
Blackmun pointed out in dissent, the First Amendment argument in this case was "premised, not on the identity of the
speaker, but on the speech itself."s94 The "laws-of-general-application" cases cited by White, he observed, were inapposite because "these cases did not involve the imposition of liability .
based upon the content of speech."s911
To the suggestion of content discrimination, White responded by saying that, in cases like Daily Mail and Florida
Star:
[T]he State itself defined the content of publications that would trigger liability. Here, by contrast, Minnesota law simply requires those making promises to' keep them. The parties
themselves . . . determine the scope of their legal
obligations and any restrictions which may be
placed on the publication of truthful information
are self-imposed.se8

This rationale for the decision is a bit more satisfying, and
should make the case highly distinguishab~e from any case lacking the "self-imposed" limitation made actionable here. Still,
was there no need for a consideration of the strength of the
State interest in imposing liability on a newspaper in these cir393. Id. at 2518.
394. Id. at 2520.
395. Id. at 2521. He conceded that Zacchini was the "only arguable exception," but
. properly di~tinguished that case, too. Id., n. 1. Blackmun also wondered how this holding
could be squared with Hustler, which involved a tort of general applicability. Id. at 252122.
396. Id. at 2519. White added, most unhelpfully, a suggestion that the information
might not even have been "lawfully" obtained, since it was obtained "only by making a
promise which [the newspaper] did not honor." Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/3

88

Rohr: Freedom of Speech

1993]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

501

cumstances? Apparently, the majority thought not. Rehnquist,
Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy joined the White majority opinion.
Justice Souter, joined in dissent by Marshall and O'Connor
as well as Blackmun, did feel the need to evaluate the strength
of the state interest at hand. Rejecting the "self-imposed"-loss
theory of the majority, Souter reminded them that First Amendment rights are not limited to "the speaker alone," but are
shared by the reading public as well. 397 In this case, he found a
strong public interest in receiving the information (which was
relevant to a gubernatorial election), and the state interest in
enforcing the newspaper's promise insufficient to outweigh that
interest in publication. He added that he could conceive of striking the balance differently, where, for example, "the injured
pa!ty is a private individual, whose identity is of less public concern than that of the petitioner."39s
After Cohen, the Court is farther than ever from a position
of protecting all truthful publication from governmentally-imposed sanctions. An absolutist position was probably never realistic or appropriate, but Cohen (along with the dissent in Florida Star) suggests that the Court's collective instinct in this area
is presently less than ideal. Individually, on the basis of admittedly slim evidence, Blackmun is the most speech-protective in
this respect, with Souter making a promising debut. White and
Rehnquist have been the least protective, with O'Connor, Stevens, Kennedy, and Scalia splitting their votes in the tw~ major
cases.

C.

OBSCENITY

There is no reason to think that the Court is likely to
change its basic direction with respect to obscenity. Three Justices -.White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist - were in the majority
that adopted the Miller v. California 399 formulation, and none
has since shown any inclination to disavow fealty to that approach. 40o O'Connor has consistently joined in decisions for
397. [d. at 2523.
398. [d.
399. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
400. See the pertinent Miller-based opinions by Rehnquist in Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Blackmun in Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); and
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which Miller provides the clear foundation, such as Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades",ol in 1985 and Pope v. Illinois 402 in 1987. Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined opinions in Fort Wayne Books,
Inc. v. Indiana 403 and Sable Communications v. FCC,",o4 both in
1989, which were also (although less directly) premised on
Miller.
In Pope, however, Scalia, while concurring, indicated "the
need for reexamination of Miller,""'ol'> observing that the Court
was not asked to reconsider Miller at that time. Unlike the majority, he correctly perceived problems with the adoption of an
objective approach to Miller's "value" prong, but deemed that
resolution "the most faithful assessment of what Miller intended.,,",o6 Scalia could thus be expected to take the initiative in
modifying the Miller standard, but it seems quite unlikely that
he would seek to alter its essence.
Now that Brennan and Marshall are gone, Justice Stevens
remains the only Justice who is known to oppose the Court's
basic approach to the issue of obscenity. Beginning with his partial dissent in Marks v. United States",07 in 1977, he has been a
consistent dissenter in cases involving obscenity.",o8 His basic position, set forth at length in his dissenting opinion in Smith v.
United States' 09 in 1977, is that criminal sanctions (as opposed
to civil remedies) represent a constitutiol)ally unacceptable response to obscenity. He was particularly troubled by the uncertainty and illusoriness of "community standards," and he
concluded:
White in Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S.
497 (1987), Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), and Ward v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 767 (1977).
401. 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
402. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
403. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
404. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
405. 481 U.S. at 504-05.
406. Id.
407. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
408. See Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 70 (1989); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 507 (1987); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 777 (1977); Splawn v. ,California, 431 U.S. 595,602 (1977); but see Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 ,
(1985); Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 305 (1978). See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495
U.S. 103, 126 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
409. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
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In the final analysis, the guilt or innocence of a
criminal defendant in an obscenity trial is determined primarily by individual jurors' subjective
reactions to the materials in question rather than
by predictable application of rules of law .
. . . In my judgment, the line between communications which "offend" and those which do
not is too blurred to identify criminal conduct. It
is also too blurred to delimit the protections of
the First Amendment. 410

He restated those objections, ten years later, in dissent (with
Marshall) in Pope v. Illinois, continuing to object to the
criminalization of "mere possession or sale of obscene literature,
absent some connection to minors, or obtrusive display to unconsenting adults."411. This was, of course, the Brennan position
as well, from 1973 onward. 412 Stevens seems no more likely to
move a majority of the Court toward acceptance of his views
than was Brennan during the period from 1973 to 1990, when
three or four Justices stood ready to revoh,}tionize the law of obscenity.413 Now, Stevens probably stands alone.
At least the Court has shown itself unwilling to expand the
concept of obscenity, by summarily affirming, in 1986, the decision in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut 414 which invalidated a sweeping ordinance embodying a radical expansion of
pros crib able sexually explicit expression.
The only other recent development of note in this area.
again involves Scalia - and the venerable concept of "pandering." This alternative basis for a finding of obscenity was first
recognized in 1966, in Ginzburg v. United States,OIl and was endorsed by the Court, post-Miller, in 1977 in Splawn v. California. oe In Splawn, Stevens, along with Brennan and Marshall,
410. [d. at 316.
411. 481 U.S. at 513. In a footnote, he reiterated his distinction of "civil regulation
of sexually explicit material, an area in which the States retain substantial leeway." [d.
at 516-17 n.11.
412. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-74 (1973).
413. Justice Stewart joined the Brennan dissent in Paris, id., and Douglas (Stevens'
predecessor) dissented as well.
414. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986) .
.415. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
416. 431 U.S. 595 (1977). See also Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978).
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protested. The point emerged anew (albeit in the shadow world
of partially dissenting opinions) in 1990 in FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas. 417 That decision, again, struck down a city licensing scheme
pertaining to "sexually oriented businesses" because the law did
not contain the requisite procedural safeguards.
On this point, Scalia dissented, and in the process he put
forth an expansive and surprising theory of "the business of obscenity."418 Taking note of the spate of recent governmental attempts to deal with pornography through creative means (e.g.,
zoning laws), he asserted:
It does not seem to me desirable to perpetuate such a regime of prohibition by indirection. I
think the means of rendering it unnecessary is
available under our precedents.... That means
consists of recognizing that a business devoted to
the sale of highly explicit sexual material can be
found to be engaged in the marketing of obscenity, even though each book or film it sells might,
in isolation, be considered merely pornographic
and not obscene.

[A] merchant who concentrates upon the sale
of such works is engaged in the business of obscenity, which may be entirely prohibited and
hence (a fortiori) licensed as required here. 419

The inspiration for this theory, clearly, was Ginzburg - but
Ginzburg dealt with the obscenity of individual works, and not
the potential illegality of entire businesses. "Ginzburg, read together with Miller," continued Scalia, "establishes at least the
following: The Constitution does not require a State or municipality to permit a business that intentionally specializes in, and
holds itself forth to the public as specializing in, performance or
portrayal of sex acts, sexual organs in a state of arousal, or live
human nudity."42o That his theory was addressed to businesses,
rather than individual works, he saw as a virtue:
417. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
418. [d. at 256.
419. [d. at 253, 256.

420. [d. at 258. He then went on, somewhat questionably, to read the Dallas ordinance in question as capable of fitting his "pandering" theory. [d. at 259.
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The basis of decision I have described ... entails
no risk of suppressing even a single work of science, literature, or art - or, for that matter, even
a single work of pornography. Indeed, I fully believe that in the long run it will expand rather
thap constrict the scope of permitted expression,
because it will eliminate the incentive to use, as a
means of preventing commercial activity patently
objectionable to large segments of our society,
methods that constrict unobjectionable activity as
well!21

Only Stevens responded to him on this point. Ginzburg, he
said, "was decided before the Court extended First Amendment
protection to commercial speech," and thus cannot survive,,22
"If conduct or communication is protected by the First Amend-'
ment, it cannot lose its protected status by being advertised in a
truthful and inoffensive manner."423 Given the evolution of the
Court's commercial speech doctrine, the conclusion that such
advertising cannot be banned is in fact far from clear,, 24 But the
notion that a bookstore or theater could be shut down simply
because it holds itself out as offering sexually provocative material is a major departure from fundamental First Amendment
principles - and, judging from Scalia's aloneness in putting
forth such a suggestion, one may presume that the other Justices
thought so, too.

D.

NON-OBSCENE SPEECH THAT OFFENDS

Speech is often regulated because of its capacity to offend,
for a variety of reasons. It is - or at least, has been - hornbook
law that the fact that particular expression may give offense, or
cause anger, is not a sufficient ground for its suppression."211 The
commitment of the Justices to that proposition, however, does
not appear to be universal or absolute. In exploring the present
status of that commitment, it may prove useful to proceed according to categories of cases, each involving (in ways that are
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

[d. at 264.
[d. at 249.
[d.
See the discussion at notes 468-79. infra.
Terminiello v. Chicago. 337 U.S. 1. 5 (1949).
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roughly related within each category) a different reason why a
listener or viewer might be offended.
1.

Pornography, Nudity, and Sex

Although there are no special rules applicable to regulations
bearing upon non-obscene expression involving nudity or sexual
explicitness, regulation in this realm has generally been upheld,
in the absence of facial overbreadth428 or the omission of crucial
procedural safeguards. 427 The major problem has been the failure, on several occasions, to recognize or treat such regulations
as content-based (and, accordingly, to apply strict scrutiny). The
cases exemplifying this failure are Young428 (1976), Renton429
(1986), and Barnes 430 (1991), each of which has already been discussed in the section on ~ontent discrimination. 431 Thus, zoning
restrictions of "adult" theaters and bookstores were upheld, as
was a ban on nude dancing in similar establishments. (As has
already been noted, White, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented,
along with Marshall, in Barnes, the most recent such case.)
When content discrimination has been recognized (explicitly
or implicitly), as in Sable Communications u. Fccm (1989) (involving "indecent" "dial-a-porn" telephonic -messages), and
Erznoznik u. City of Jacksonuille 433 (involving nudity on drivein theater screens), the results have been different. Justice Powell's majority opinion in the 1975 Erznoznik case seemed, too, to
reject the contention that a public display of nudity could be
prohibited on the ground that unwilling spectators might be offended; but Rehnquist and White, in dissent, appeared to
disagree. 434

Young, decided a year after Erznoznik, deserves further
mention because Stevens, writing for a plurality that included
Rehnquist and White, asserted therein that society's interest in
426. E.g., Schad V,. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
427. E.g., FWIPBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).

428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
'433.
434.

Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
See the discussion at notes 157-66 and 189-97, supra.
492 U.S. 115 (1989).
422 U.S. 205 (1975).
[d. at 209-12, 220-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 224 (White, J., dissenting).
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protecting "erotic materials that have some arguably artistic
value ... is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the
interest in untrammeled political debate . . . . "4311
But a mere focus on matters sexual, in and of itself, has not
sufficed to sustain regulation of non-pornographic literature on
the ground that recipients may be offended. Thus, in Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp.,436 in 1983, the entire Court struck
down a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives, even while applying the less demanding level of scrutiny applicable to commercial speech. As in
Erznoznik, the majority (which included White, Blackmun, and
Stevens) rejected the "offensiveness" rationale as insufficient to
justify suppression of speech; Rehnquist and O'Connor, however,
while concurring in the judgment, would not have dismissed that
justification out of hand. 437
2.

Profanity

But for stare decisis, would Cohen v. California,438 the
landmark free speech decision of 1971, be decided the same way
today? Consider that neither of the two remaining Justices from
that Court - White and Blackmun - joined the majority in
Cohen. Of course, White did not reach the merits of the case,
and it was a very different Justice Blackmun that dissented
more than twenty years ago; would he vote today as he did
then? As much as he has evolved over the years, nothing that
Blackmun has said or done in later decisions provides a clear
basis for concluding otherwise.
Dissenting in 1972's Gooding v. Wilson,439 a case decided on
facial overbreadth grounds but involving a. man who cursed at
435. 427 U.S. at 70. Souter quoted this language with approval, 15 years later, in his
Barnes concurrence, 111 S. Ct. at 2470.
436. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). The Court distinguished the 1970 decision in Rowan u.
United States Post Office Dep't - also unanimous - upholding a federal statute which
allowed a householder to insulate himself from the receipt of certain mail which the
householder deemed "erotically arousing or sexually provocative." 397 U.S. 728, 730
(1970).
437. 463 U.S. at 71-72,77-78. Accord, Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
701 (1977) (but see Stevens' separate opinion, id. at 716-17).
438. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
439. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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police officers during an altercation, Blackmun invoked Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire"o (the quintessential "fighting words"
case), and stated: "For me, Chaplinsky . .. was good law when it
was decided and deserves to remain as good law now.... But I
feel that by decisions such as this one and, indeed, Cohen v. California ... the Court, despite its protestations to the contrary, is
merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky."441
Later that same year, Blackmun dissented again, along with
Rehnquist, when the Court summarily vacated and remanded a
trio of decisions for reconsideration in light of Cohen and Gooding. In one of those cases, Rosenfeld v. New JerseY, .. 2 the appellant had used profanity while addressing a public school board
meeting attended by children as well as adults. Blackmun joined
a dissenting opinion by Justice Powell, who would have upheld
the conviction. That opinion contained these significant
passages:
But the exception to First Amendment protection
recognized in Chaplinsky is not limited to words
whose mere utterance entails a high probability of
an outbreak of physical violence. It also extends
to the willful use of scurrilous language calculated
to offend the sensibilities of an unwilling
audience.

[C]ertainly the State has an interest - perhaps a compelling one - in protecting nonassenting citizens from vulgar and offensive verbal
assaults.4 43

Rehnquist added a dissenting opinion, with respect to all
three cases, which Blackmun also joined, in which he indicated
displeasure with Cohen and basic agreement with the Powell
view of Chaplinsky.'"
440. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
441. 405 U.S. at 536-37 (citations omitted).
442. 408 U.S. 901 (1972). The others were Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972),
and Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
443. 408 U.S. at 905, 907.
444. [d. at 912.
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The following year, in Papish u. Board of Curators,H" the
Court upheld the right of a graduate student at a state university to use profane and vulgar material in a newspaper distributed on campus. Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented. They dissented again, in 1974, when Lewis u. New Orleans·H6 returned to
the Court, this time meeting with outright reversal on facial
overbreadth grounds. The dissenters viewed the appellant's profane outburst (directed at a police officer) as a species of punishable "fighting words."
In 1978, those two Justices were, along· with Stevens, part of
the majority that upheld the famous FCC order in the "George
Carlin case," FCC u. Pacifica Foundation. H7 As he had done'
earlier in Young, Stevens (joined in this part of his opinion by
Rehnquist) relied in part on a characterization of the speech at
issue (here, Carlin's vulgar monologue) as speech of relatively
low value. H8 Blackmun joined Powell's concurrence, largely distinguished by its refusal "to decide on the basis of its content
which speech protected by the First Amendment is most 'valuable' and hence deserving of the most protection, and which is
less 'valuable' and hence deserving of less protection."449 They
relied instead on the combination of the intrusion of radio into
the home and the consequent potential effect upon children. 4"o
No subsequent Supreme Court case has involved restriction
of speech on similar grounds, with the highly distinguishable exception, in 1986, of Bethel School Dist. u. Fraser,461 a case involving a sexually suggestive campaign speech by a public highschool student at an assembly. Only Marshall and Stevens dissented, and the latter did so on due process grounds. The fact
that even Brennan concurred in the judgment, howeverl suggests
445. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
446. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
447. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
448. [d. at 744-48.
449. [d. at 761.
450. [d. at 755-62. Brennan and Marshall dissented on first amendment grounds.
White dissented on statutory grounds. In 1987, the Court summarily affirmed a Court of
Appeals decision reaching a different result with respect to "indecent" material shown on
cable television. Wilkinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987), aff'g Jones v. Wilkinson, 800
F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986). Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented.
451. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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how relatively weak a case it was for protection of the student's
speech.
At present, four members of the Court (and O'Connor as
well if one puts Bethel aside) have had no meaningful occasion
to either apply the "fighting words" concept4112 or to address the
question of how profane or vulgar (but non-obscene) speech
should be treated under the First Amendment. This is an area,
in any event, in which even the "liberals" (Blackmun and Stevens) have not been liberal.

3. Beyond Pornography and Profanity
Here is where the modern Court has protected speech to the
greatest extent. Beyond the realm of the profane or the pornographic, the Court has, in recent years, consistently rejected governmental attempts to justify restrictions of expression on the
grounds that some listeners or viewers may be offended by what
they see or hear.
The flag-burning cases of 1989 and 1990, Texas u. Johnson4&3 and United States u. Eichman,454 stand in part for that
proposition. The majority in those cases, of course, refused to
uphold the flag desecration laws on that basis. It will, of course,
surprise no one to point out that, with Brennan and Marshall
gone, the 5-4 majorities of those decisions might not be replicated, should the precise issue resurface. But it is appropriate to
quote from Stevens' dissent in Eichman, speaking for himself,
Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor: "Of course 'the Government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds that idea itself offensive or disagreeable.' ... None of
us disagrees with that prohibition."455 Rehnquist said much the
same thing in his dissent in Johnson. 45e The dissenters urged
that it was the flag-burner's "use of this particular symbol, and
452. In Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the majority easily and quickly rejected the suggestion that the burning of an American flag could fit the longstanding
definition of "fighting words" as "a direct personal insult." [d. at 409. None of the dissenters suggested otherwise.
453. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
454. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
455. [d. at 319.
456. 491 U.S. at 432.
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not the idea that he sought to convey by it" for which he was
punished. u7 Their position, in these presumably unique cases,
did not seem to rest on the likelihood of offensiveness to witnesses, but that element was not entirely missing from the
Rehnquist dissent in Johnson. Speaking for himself, White, and
O'Connor, he said, analogizing to Chaplinsky: "Here it may
equally be said that the public burning of the American flag by
Johnson was no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and at
the same time it had a tendency to incite a breach of the
peace."4IIS Laudably resisting such a characterization, in addition
to Brennan and Marshall, were Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,4I!J9 decided without dissent in 1988, is another case which demonstrates the Court's refusal to let the offensiveness of non-profane, non-obscene speech
serve as adequate justification for its suppression. Granted, the
holding of Hustler can be quite narrowly stated. Given an obviously fictitious printed parody of a public figure (suggesting incest, no less), as to which a defamation claim had been rejected
by a jury, the Court essentially ruled that a claim for damages
under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress was
constitutionally impermissible. That the plaintiff was a public
figure may well have been crucial to the result. It was, moreover,
a situation in which a violent response was virtually inconceivable. Nonetheless, the decision reflects a high degree of protectiveness of expression on the part of the Court. For the majority,
Rehnquist quoted Stevens, from the Pacifica case: " '[T]he fact
that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason
for suppressing it' ".'60 If that pronouncement, and the Court's
unanimity in making it, seems unremarkable, that simply shows
how deeply embedded certain fundamental principles of freedom of expression have become.

The 1992 decision in R.A. V. v. St. Paul 461 reaffirmed this
commitment to the protection of highly offensive speech. Consider first the position of the four concurring Justices, speaking
through Justice White, finding the St. Paul "hate-speech" ordi457.
458.
459.
460.
461.

[d.
[d. at 430.
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
[d. at 55.
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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nance facially overbroad. Focusing on the Minnesota Supreme
Court's interpretation of the law as limited to a subset of "fighting words," White understood that court to say
that St. Paul may constitutionally prohibit expression that "by its very utterance" causes "anger, alarm or resentment."
Our fighting words cases have made clear,
however, that such generalized reactions are not
sufficient to strip expression of its constitutional
protection. The mere fact that expressive activity
causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does
not render the expression unprotected. 462
White was joined by Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor in applying that reasoning to the St. Paul Ordinance, despite its limitation to speech inflicting emotional harm on the basis of race,
religion, or gender.
A question that will undoubtedly be explored by many is:
What would this group of Justices allow? In the section of his
opinion rejecting the theory of the majority, White made reference to "the social evil of hate speech,"463 and criticized the majority for "legitimat[ing] hate speech as a form of public discussion."464 But White's logic and language point strongly to the
conclusion that only "fighting words" (traditionally, a direct personal insult likely to produce an immediate violent response'6!!)
which provoke "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender" can validly be punished as a means of deterring "hate
speech. "466
The majority in R.A. V., speaking through Scalia, probably
surprised nearly everyone by stating that "fighting words," de462. [d. at 2559.
463. [d. at 2553.
464. [d. at 2553-54.
465. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
466. 112 S. Ct. at 2553. The majority opinion, said White (speaking now only for
three), "signals that expressions of violence, such as the message of intimidation and
racial hatred conveyed by burning a cross on someone's lawn, are of sufficient value to
outweigh the social interest in order and morality that has traditionally placed such
fighting words outside the First Amendment." [d. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
It must be acknowledged, however, that a more focused statute, divorced from the
"fig)tting words" concept, might possibly be accepted by these Justices.
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spite their "unprotected" status, have some expressive value after all, and that content discrimination within that category was
presumptively invalid. 467 The city's attempt to justify the distinction met with no encouragement by this group of five Justices. Does that mean that they would look favorably upon no
regulation of this kind other than a "fighting words" statute of
general applicability? It may well mean that.
The·Court has thus been vigilant in rejecting the contention
that an offending idea may justify suppression of speech. The
Justices have largely been far less vigilant when non-obscene
material of a sexually suggestive nature has been involved, and
it is far from clear that the Court would adhere to the protection
afforded profane speech more than twenty years ago in Cohen v.
California.
E.

COMMERCIAL SPEECH

1.

Generally

The Court has not decided a commercial speech case
(outside the rather specialized area of attorney advertising) since
1989, prior to the arrival of Justices Souter and Thomas. The
Court did not, of course, extend First Amendment protection to
commercial advertising until 1976, in the Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy468 case. Justice Rehnquist seemed quite troubled by that
extension from the beginning, as his dissenting opinion in .Virginia Pharmacy demonstrated,469 and he made his opposition
plain in his dissent in the first attorney advertising decision,
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.'70 No one else has taken that position, however, and Rehnquist has not publicly adhered to it. 471
467. [d. at 2547-49. Note, too, that none of these Justices raised any question as to
the continuing viability of the half-century-old "fighting words" concept, which is premised on the notions that, first, a speaker may be held responsible for the anticipated
violence of a listener, and, second, that "an average addressee" can be expected to react
to certain insults with violence.
468. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
469. [d. at 781. Rehnquist had also dissented, with White, in Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975), the decision that presaged the doctrinal breakthrough of Virginia
Pharmacy. He dissented again in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),
which struck down a ban on contraceptive advertising.
470. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
471. Compare his dissent in Central Hudson to his majority opinion in Posadas de
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But what the Court gave in Virginia Pharmacy it has, in
significant part, taken away in its decisions of the 1980s. Powell's opinion for the Court, in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Servo Comm'n· 72 in 1980, was justifiably challenged by
Blackmun (joined by Brennan) in his concurring opinion. Powell, of course, set forth a four-part test for evaluating restrictions
on commercial advertising, and found the New York regulation
wanting only with respect to the fourth part of the test; the
state's interest in minimizing demand for electricity was an acceptably "substantial" reason for barring advertising promoting
the use of electricity. Blackmun, the author of the groundbreaking Virginia Pharmacy opinion, saw the implications:
I do not agree ... that the Court's four-part test
is the proper one to be applied when a State seeks
to suppress information about a product in order
to manipulate a private economic decision that
the State cannot or has not regulated or outlawed
directly .
. . . [T]he Court ... leaves open the possibility that the State may suppress advertising of
electricity in order to lessen demand for electricity. I, of course, agree with the Court that ... energy' conservation is a goal of paramount ... importance. I disagree with the Court, however,
when it says that suppression of speech may be a
permissible means to achieve that goal. 473

He continued:
I seriously doubt whether suppression of information concerning the availability and price of
a legally offered product is ever a permissible way
for the State to "dampen" demand for or use of
the product. Even though "commercial" speech is
involved, such a regulatory measure strikes at the
heart of the First Amendment. This is because it
is a covert attempt by the State to manipulate the
choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct
Puerto Rico, infra at note 476. But he has nearly always voted to uphold regulations of
commercial speech, the unusual exception being Bolger V. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 75 (1983).
472. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
473. Id. at 573-74.
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regulation, but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice. 474

Concurring separately, Stevens indicated a similar reaction:m
The theoretical division of Central Hudson became genuine'
disagreement as to result in the 1986 decision, Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.·76 Rehnquist
wrote for the .majority in upholding a Puerto Rico restriction on
advertising of casino gambling. Observing that Puerto Rico
could have prohibited casino gambling by residents of Puerto
Rico altogether, he asserted: "In our view, the greater p'ower to
completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser
power to ban advertising of casino gambling."·77
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. Writing for himself, Marshall, and Blackmun, Brennan restated the
philosophical basis of the Blackmun concurrence in Central
Hudson, and asserted that "where the government seeks to suppress the dissemination of nonmisleading commercial speech relating to legal activities, for fear that recipients will act on the
information provided, such regulation should be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny. ".76 In keeping with that high degree of suggested protection for commercial speech, he went on to criticize
the majority for not requiring Puerto Rico to prove the substantiality of its purported interests and the absence of less restrictive means for the accomplishment thereof. The. differences in
approach between the Justices were thus quite sharp. Of the dissenters, only Blackmun and Stevens remain. From the majority,
Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor remain.
In the Court's most recent commercial speech case, Board of
474. [d. at 574-75.
475. [d. at 579-83. "But if the perceived harm ... is not sufficiently serious to justify
direct regulation, surely it does not constitute the kind of clear and present danger that
can justify the suppression of speech." [d. at 581.
476. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
477. [d. at 345-46.
478. [d. at 351. See also the unusual case of San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Iftc. v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987), in which only Brennan and Marshall· would
have stricken a statute which the majority upheld as a permissible regulation of commercial speech. [d. at 560-73. Only they perceived an effect upon non-commercial speech a position more likely,' in prior cases, to have been raised by Stevens. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557,579 (1980); Bolger, 463 U.S. 60, 80 (1983).
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Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox,·&79 Scalia wrote for a majority which included Kennedy and Stevens, as well as Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor. The majority held that it was not
part of the test for the validity of regulation of commercial
speech to require that the government utilize the "least restrictive means" of achieving its goal. That decision reveals little or
nothing about how Scalia or Kennedy would have voted in, for
instance, the Posadas case, but it is certainly inconsistent with
Brennan's invocation of strict scrutiny (at least some of the
time) in commercial speech cases. Although they did not emphasize their apparent disagreement with the majority on the
"least-restrictive-means" issue, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented, once again, in Fox.
2.

Attorney Advertising

With respect to the constitutionality of state bar rules regulating advertising by attorneys, the battle lines have been clearly
drawn - and the future of most such advertising depends upon
the views of Justices Souter and Thomas. Rehnquist, O'Connor,
and Scalia stand ready to change the rules in this area. Kennedy
and White, along with Blackmun and Stevens, do not.
Rehnquist, of course, dissented at his first opportunity, in
the seminal Bates case of 1977. He, as well as O'Connor, joined
in the unanimous decision in 1982's In re R.M.J.,4BO but by 1985
those two Justices had registered the first of three significant
dissents to rulings invalidating restrictions of attorney advertising. That 1985 decision was Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel,'f81 in which Justice White, for the majority, struck
down an Ohio rule forbidding attorney ads containing advice regarding a specific legal problem. Everyone had agreed, in the
Ohralik"B2 case of 1978, that case-specific in-person solicitation
could be banned, but the Court in Zauderer felt that a newspaper advertisement was quite distinguishable. O'Connor's dissent
suggested far-reaching disagreement with the majority's approach, and that suggestion blossomed into a major pronounce479.
480.
481.
482.

492 U.S. 469 (1989).
455 U.S. 191 (1982).
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/3

104

Rohr: Freedom of Speech

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

1993]

517

ment three years later.
In 1988, the Court held, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n,483 that the use of direct mail by an attorney, even when
addressed to a potential client known to be facing a particular
legal problem, was protected commercial speech. The majority,
speaking through Brennan and including Kennedy, saw neither
the letter nor the comparable newspaper advertisement as inherently misleading or overreaching. O'Connor, joined now by
Scalia as well as Rehnquist, disagreed:
Applying [the Central Hudson] test to attorney
advertising, it is clear to me that ,the States
should have considerable latitude to ban advertising that is "potentially or demonstrably misleading," ... as well as truthful advertising that undermines the substantial governmental interest in
promoting the high ethical standards that are
necessary in the legal profession. 484
Advertising the price of an initial consultation might be acceptable, she continued, but:
As soon as one steps into the realm of prices
for "routine" legal services ... however, it is quite
clear to me that the States may ban such advertising completely. The contrary decision in Bates
was in my view inconsistent with the standard
test that is now applied in commercial speech
cases. 481i

Bates was wrong, she explained, because of the impossibility of
knowing in advance of consultation whether a legal problem is or
is not truly "routine"; hence, such price advertising is inherently
misleading. 48B Solicitation practices are even worse, because they
are misleading and have "a tendency to corrupt the solicitor's
professional judgment."487 The Court's decision in Shapero, she
concluded, "confirmed the need to reconsider Bates . ... "488
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.

486 U.S. 466 (1988).
[d, at 485 (citations omitted),
[d.
[d,
[d,

at 486..
[d. at 487.
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In 1990, those three Justices dissented once more, this time
accompanied by White, in Peel v. Attorney Regist. and Disc.
Comm'n,489 from a ruling upholding an attorney's right to hold
himself out as "certified" by a national organization. Stevens,
writing for a plurality that included Brennan, Blackmun, and
Kennedy, rejected the argument that Peel's letterhead was misleading by virtue of the certification announcement, but the
O'Connor group of dissenters disagreed. Marshall and White
each thought the letterhead announcement to be "potentially
misleading" and thus subject to regulation, but were led in different directions as to the disposition of Peel's particular case;
Marshall concurred in the judgment, while White dissented. 490
Thus, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia not only want to
overrule Bates, but have also been most apt to perceive advertising and promotional devices employed by attorneys as inherently misleading. Stevens, Blackmun, and Kennedy, on the other
hand, have been least inclined to think so.
F.

THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

1.

Freedom of Speech

The setback in this area has already occurred, in the form of
the highly deferential 1983 decision in Connick v. Myers. 491 Justice White wrote that opinion, which changed the law in this
area by imposing a threshold requirement that, in order for the
employee's job-related speech to be protected, it must bear upon
"a matter of public concern."492 The majority (which included
Rehnquist and O'Connor) then displayed great deference to the
government in deciding both that most of Ms. Myers' operative
speech was not on a matter of public concern (even though it
involved the operation of a district attorney's office) and that
the subsequent balancing of interests favored the government
employer. Said White, most candidly and significantly:
When close working relationships are essential to
fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of
deference to the employer's judgment is appropri489.
490.
491.
492.

496 U.S. 91 (1990).
[d. at 111-17 (Marshall, J., concurring), 118-19 (White, J., dissenting).
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Id. at 146.
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ate. Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for
an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction . of working relationships is manifest
before taking action. 493

The actual effect of Ms. Myers' speech upon the agency was
minimal, as Brennan observed in dissent. He was joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Steven~.
The. Court considered only one other case of this kind after
Connick, that being .the unusual matter of Rankin v. McPherson"94 in 1987. By virtue of Justice Powell's vote in favor of the
public employee, the Connick. dissenters were able to form a
bare majority in Rankin, applying Connick in a way that was
highly protective of speech. Although her speech was fairly outrageous, the plaintiff was a low-level employee who had minimal
contact with either the public or the official who presided over
the office, and the speech at issue occurred in a private conversation with a co-worker. To Powell, who concurred with the Marshall majority opinion, this last fact was apparently the key.
Nonetheless, Scalia dissented, joined by Rehnquist, White, and
O'Connor. Those Justices felt that the right of the public employee (a deputy sheriff of sorts) to privately express the hope
that the President be assassinated was outweighed by "Constable Rankin's interest in maintaining both an esprit de corps and
a public image consistent with his office's law enforcement duties."4911 They also rejected the conclusion that her statement addressed a matter of public concern.
While the Scalia position in Rankin, had it prevailed, would
not in itself have threatened a great deal of speech by public
employees, it is a position less protective of speech than that of
the Rankin majority. How Justices Kennedy, Souter, or Thomas
would rule in such a case is unknown.
2. Freedom of Association
It is questionable whether the Court's jurisprudence in the
493. [d. at 151-52 (footnote omitted).
494. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
495. [d. at 401.
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realm of public employees' rights of political affiliation will survive the departures of Brennan and Marshall. In a trilogy of
cases extending from 1976 to 1990 - Elrod v. Burns,"96 Branti
v. Finkel;1.97 and Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill."98 - those
two Justices, joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens, voted
consistently to apply First Amendment principles to the venerable patronage practices of hiring and firing public employees
according to political party membership. In Branti in 1980, Stevens put forth the governing principle: "The question is whether
the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement· for the effective performance of the
public office involved.""99 In the case of an assistant public defender, the majority's answer was negative. Justice Rehnquist
joined the dissent of Justice Powell, whose disagreement with
the majority was fundamental; the Court erred, in their view, by
ignoring "the substantial governmental interests served by
patronage. "1100
In Rutan in 1990, Brennan extended the reasoning of Elrod
and Branti, which dealt with dismissals, to patronage hiring and
promotions, toughening the rhetoric of these decisions, in fact,
by stating that only "vital government interests" could justify
these practices. llol
This time Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion, in which he
made it clear, on behalf of himself, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and
Kennedy, that he would overrule Elrod and Branti as well. The
use of strict scrutiny, he asserted, was unprecedented and uncalled for in this area. Assuming for purposes of discussion the
propriety of some sort of balancing test, these four Justices
would strike the balance in favor of governmental power to utilize a patronage system, not even seeing the restrictive effect on
public employees (or potential public employees) as "a significant impairment of free speech or free association."1I02 Elrod and
Branti should, at a minimum, be distinguished and not ex496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.

427 U.S. 347 (1976).
445 U.S. 507 (1980).
497 U.S. 62 (1990).
445 U.S. at 518.
[d. at 523.
497 U.S. at 74.
[d. at 110.
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tended, Scalia argued, but in, fact they should be overruled:
Even in the field of constitutional adjudication,
where the pull of stare decisis is at its weakest,
... one is reluctant to depart from precedent. But
when that precedent is not only wrong, not only
recent, not only contradicted by a long prior tradition, but also has proved unworkable in practice, then all reluctance ought to disappear. In my
view that is the situation here. lIoa

Scalia then proceeded to demonstrate the conflicting results (in
the lower courts) and consequent uncertainty that have flowed
from Branti.
Scalia's referenc,e to tradition provided the basis for a
wholly independent rationale for opposing the Court's handiwork in this area, but in this he was joined only by Rehnquist
and Kennedy. The provisions of the Bill of Rights, he wrote:
did not create by implication novel individual
rights overturning accepted political norms. Thus,
when a practice not expressly prohibited by the
text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement
of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of
the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking
it down .

. . . Given that unbroken tradition ... , there
was in my view no basis for holding that patronage-based dismissals violated the First
Amendment ....1104

If either Justice Souter or Justice Thomas were to agree
with these dissenting Justices, the reign of Rutan could be short,
and the Court could seize the opportunity to overrule this entire
line of cases.
503. [d. at 110-11 (citations omitted).
504. [d. at 95, 97 (footnote omitted).
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THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS

Again, a major blow has already been struck, this time in
the 1988 case of Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier.r.or. A majority consisting of Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Scalia upheld the power of a public high school
principal to effectively censor the content of a student newspaper linked to a journalism class. For the first time in a public
school case, the Court invoked the "public. forum" doctrine, and
found that the newspaper was not a public forum. Of the three
dissenters, only Blackmun remains. (Kennedy was not yet
aboard.)
Kuhlmeier arguably did nothing to undermine the power of
the classic Tinker decision of 1969,r.06 which upheld the right of
students to engage in non-school-sponsored speech on school
grounds, as long' as that speech does not substantially interfere
with the operation of the school or the rights of others. Only
White, the author of the Kuhlmeier majority opinion, remains
from the Tinker Court, where he also joined the majority. But
Tinker predated the development of the "public forum" doctrine, which, if applied to public schools in accordance with its
most recent use generally,r.07 could wholly eviscerate the force of
Tinker.

Even without applying "public forum" analysis, the Court
in 1986, in Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser,"08 rejected a student's
right to be free from discipline for making a sexually suggestive
campaign speech at a high school assembly. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, adverted to the Tinker standard,
but really relied on a new (and unstructured) rationale, namely
that government had the power, through the schools, to inculcate values of civility in students. Only Marshall dissented on
First Amendment grounds, while Stevens' dissent rested, essentially, on due process grounds. Blackmun silently concurred in
the result. Brennan, somewhat surprisingly, concurred separately, coming close to sharing in Burger's reasoning while mak505.
506.
507.
508.

484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See the discussion at notes 307-13, supra.
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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ing more pointed references to the student's "disruptive" language,1I09 and cautioning that "[t]he authority school officials
have to regulate such speech by high school students is not limitless. "1110 The Fraser decision surely modified Tinker to a significant extent.
In Kuhlmeier, White expressly distinguished the Tinker
situation:
The question whether the First Amendment
requires a school to tolerate particular student
speech - the question that we addressed in
Tinker - is different from the question whether
the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The
former question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The latter
question concerns educators' authority' over
school-sponsored publications; theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school .... li11

Accordingly, we conclude that the standard
articulated in Tinker for determining when a
school may punish student expression need not
also be the standard for determining when a
school may refuse to lend its name and resources
to the dissemination of student expression. Instead, we hold that educators ~o not offend the
First Amendment by exercising editorial control
over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.1I12
509.
510.
511.
512.

[d. at 687-90.
[d. at 689.
484 U.S. at 270-71.
[d. at 272-73 (footnotes omitted).
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This appears to be a highly deferential standard, within its appointed realm. Blackmun, with Marshall, joined the far less deferential dissenting opinion by Brennan.

In 1982, the Court flirted, inconclusively, with the related
issue of removal of controversial books from school libraries, in
Board of Educ. v. Pico. m A plurality, including Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, joined Brennan in finding "that the First
Amendment rights of students may be directly and sharply implicated by" such acts on the part of a school board.li14 The
Brennan opinion went on to suggest some difficult and questionable distinctions that, in his view, guided analysis in this troublesome area. White provided the necessary fifth vote for affirming the Court of Appeals' reversal of summary judgment for
the school board, while not committing himself to any approach
to the merits of the dispute. Among the four dissenters, Rehnquist and O'Connor saw no First Amendment rights at issue,
and spoke, along with Chief Justice Burger (in a fashion that
presaged the Fraser decision) of the "inculcative" role of the
public schools. iiI Ii
In light of both the Fraser and Kuhlmeier decisions (recalling, once more, that the latter decision brought "public forum"
analysis to bear upon the public school setting), it seems quite
hard to believe that the Brennan position in Pico - finding
even a potential violation of First Amendment rights when
schools make book selections - would prevail today. White and
Scalia, in particular, seem most unlikely to embrace any such
approach.
The Court has occasionally addressed the First Amendment
rights of university students, each time favorably. Most notably,
the Court's per curiam decision in Pap ish v. Board of Curators,1i18 in 1973, upheld the rights of a student at a state university who distributed an independent newspaper thought to be
"indecent" by virtue of its vulgarity. Rehnquist and (the early)
Blackmun dissented. Presumably, but by no means certainly,
this decision survives Fraser and Kuhlmeier, given the factual
513.
514.
515.
516.

457 U.S. 853 (1982).
[d. at 866.
[d. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 913-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
410 U.S. 667 (1973).
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distinctions, especially the ages of the students. But if Blackmun
maintained his original position in Papish, this suggestion would
be considerably more questionable. m
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas have yet to rule in a
case involving freedom of speech in the public school setting.
V. BURDENS ON SPEECH
Finally, the Justices have differed with respect to their
readiness to perceive certain governmental actions as significantly burdening the exercise of freedom of speech. It is, of
course, the rare case in which this threshold issue has arisen,
most often in connection with the attachment of strings to the
receipt of government funding. The entire Court agreed "that a
legislative decision not to subsidize the exercise of [First
Amendment rights] does not infringe the right" in Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Wash., in 1983,IH8 a decision
upholding the denial of tax-exempt status to an organization engaged in substantial lobbying activities. The next year, in FCC v.
League of Women Voters,1H9 however, the majority found that
freedom of speech was denied by the federal prohibition on "editorializing" by noncommercial educational broadcasters receiving federal funds. Brennan, for the majority, rejected the government's argument analogizing the case to Regan,&20 but
Rehnquist and White, dissenting, embraced it; in their eyes, the
government was "simply exercising its power to allocate its own
public funds,"&21 and was entitled to do so. Stevens dissented on
other grounds. From the majority, only Blackmun and O'Connor
remain.
In 1991, Rehnquist and White' had their way, joined by
Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, in the celebrated case of Rust, v.
517. In the far easier case of Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the Court
struck down a content-based discrimination by a state university against religious speakers, the school's Establishment Clause-based defense being found misguided. See also
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), upholding a freedom of association claim by a campus political group. The concurring opinion by Rehnquist, at 201-03, however, was less
encouraging.
518. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
519. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
520. [d. at 399-401.
521. [d. at 407.
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Sullivan,m which rejected a First Amendment challenge to the
federal ban on abortion counseling by family planning projects
receiving federal funding. Rehnquist, for the majority, distinguished the League of Women Voters case, rejected the suggestion of viewpoint discrimination, and found, once more, that
"the government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized. "1128 Blackmun, joined by
Marshall and Stevens in dissent, saw the restriction as an "unconstitutional condition" and as viewpoint-discriminatory. 1124
O'Connor dissented on purely statutory grounds.
With Brennan and Marshall gone, Blackmun appears to be
the Justice least likely to dismiss an argument that government
has impermissibly burdened speech, with Stevens and O'Connor
somewhat less dependable in this regard. 1I211 While the harmful
precedent - the Rust decision - is limited and potentially distinguishable, it appears to mark a turning point, and to bode ill
for future challenges to speech-limiting conditions upon the receipt of government funds.
VI. CONCLUSION

A.

THE JUSTICES, INDIVIDUALLY

With respect to the First Amendment issues addressed in
this Article, the following summations regarding the propensities
of each of the Justices now on the Court (listed in order of seniority) can be fairly made:
1. Byron White

Justice White is 75 years old and has been on the Court
since 1962. He is protective of attorney advertising, and of public employees' rights of association. From the standpoint· of
speech-protectiveness, however, his weak points are as follows:
522. 111 s. Ct. 1759 (1991).
523. [d. at 1774.
524. [d. at 1780-82.
525. See also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987), in which the Stevens majority
opinion concluded that the Foreign Agents Registration Act's "political propaganda"
provision placed no burden on speech; Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall disagreed.
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He has always upheld time, place, and manner regulations, and
virtually always refuses to find the existence of a public forum;
he would radically revise the First Amendment law of defamation, altering the principle of New York Times u. Sulliuan r.26 and
. overruling Gertz u. Robert Welch, Inc.;f>27 he has not been receptive to extending the procedural requirements of Freedman u.
Marylandl:>28 in the area of prior restraint; he often favors placing limits upon the availability of facial overbreadth challenges;
he has not been consistently protective of the right of the press
to publish truthful information; and he has often been weak in
responding to content discrimination, as in the flag-burning
cases (but see his impressive dissenting opinion in Barnes u.
Glen Theatres, Inc. 1:>29). Low points include his opinions for the
Court in Connick u. Myers,530 reducing protection for public employees, and in Hazelwood School Dist. u. Kuhlmeier,531 reducing protection for public high school students.
2.

Harry Blackmun

Justice Blackmun is 84 years old, and has been on the Court
since 1970. He has been extremely critical of the Court's public
forum doctrine, and highly protective of commercial speech, the
rights of public employees, and the right of the press to publish
truthful information. He has been vigilant with respect to eliminating prior restraints (but see his early dissent in the Pentagon
Papers532 case), intolerant of "unconstitutional conditions," and
fairly resistant (in recent years) to placing limits on the availability of facial overbreadth challenges. He has voted to strike
down some time, place, and manner regulations, and has been
fairly protective of speech in the defamation area. Highlights include his opinions for the Court in the Virginia PharmacylJ33
and Forsyth County534 cases, along with his dissenting opinions
in Cornelius lS31S and Rust u. Sulliuan.1:>36
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.

376
418
380
111
461
484
403
425
112
473

U.S. 254 (1964).
U.S. 323 (1974).
U.S. 51 (1965).
S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
U.S. 138 (1983).
U.S. 260 (1988).
U.S. 713 (1971).
U.S. 748 (1976).
S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
U.S. 788 (1985).
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Any assessment of Justice Blackmun's First Amendment jurisprudence must take into account the dramatic difference between his early years on the Court (extending roughly into the
mid-1970s) and the more extensive period of time since then.
Blackmun's first five years on the Court were marked, persistently, by an apparent hostility to the facial overbreadth doctrine
and a clear tolerance of government suppression of profane
speech. Since 1975, there has been virtually no evidence that
Blackmun has adhered to those views. In recent years, he can be
faulted only for intermittent "softness" with respect to content
discrimination; despite his positions in the flag-burning cases
and Barnes v. Glen Theatres, he approved of content discrimination in Burson v. Freeman,m probably his least persuasive
majority opinion in the realm of freedom of expression.
3.

William Rehnquist

Justice Rehnquist is 68 years old, and has been on the Court
since late in the year 1971. His opinion for the Court in Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell"'38 stands alone as a highly speech-protective majority opinion authored by him. In all other respects,
Rehnquist's positions on the matters addressed by this Article
stamp him clearly as the Justice most likely to uphold a governmental regulation of speech. He has always rejected challengers'
attempts to portray public property as public forums, and he
has virtually always upheld time, place, and manner regulations
and regulations of commercial speech. More than any other Justice, he has resisted the use of the facial overbreadth device, and
favored imposing limitations on its use. He has often resisted
the application of the Freedman requirements in the prior restraint area, and has been soft on content discrimination. He has
consistently opposed placing limits on defamation claims, and
has been quite tolerant of regulation of profanity. He would
overrule the cases protecting attorney advertising and public
employees' rights of association, and has not been very protective of the right of the press to publish truthful information.
Low points include his majority opinions in Renton,"'39 Rust, and
536.
537.
538.
539.

III
111
485
475

S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
U.S. 46 (1988).
U.S. 41 (1986).
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Posadas de Puerto Rico,1I40 along with his dissenting opinion in
Texas v. Johnson. lI41
4.

John Paul Stevens

Justice Stevens is 72 years old, and has been on the Court
since late in the year 1975. He has been extremely critical of the
Court's approach to obscenity, and has generally rejected its
public forum doctrine as well. He has been highly protective of
commercial speech, and of the rights of public employees. Of the
present Justices, he seems most likely to find substantial facial
overbreadth, unless the case involves what he views as "low
value" speech. He has opposed "unconstitutional conditions," at
least where he perceives viewpoint discrimination, and has
shown some sensitivity concerning prior restraints (but with less
than total consistency). He has voted against some time, place,
and manner regulations, and shown some strength (although not
dependably) in the area of content discrimination. Highlights include his dissent in Burson and his partially dissenting opinion
in Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana. 1I42 His willingness to brand
some speech "low value," on the other hand, is a weakness, and,
as noted, it has led hini both to an acceptance of content discrimination and a rejection of facial overbreadth challenges in
such cases. He has, quite characteristically, displayed a clear indifference at times to the "theory" of content discrimination. Finally, he has demonstrated a solicitude for the interests of defamation plaintiffs that has led him to reject some First
Amendment limitations on such claims. Low points for Stevens
include hi~ opinions in Young v. American Mini Theatres ll43 and
FCC v. Pacifica Found.,M4 as well as his dissent in Philadelphia
Newspapers v. Hepps.1I411

5. Sandra Day O'Connor
Justice O'Connor is 62 years old, and has been on the Court
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.

478
491
489
427
438
475

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
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since 1981. She has displayed some sensitivity with respect to
the facial overbreadth doctrine (but see Massachusetts v.
Oak es r.46), the requirements of Freedman v. Maryland in the
realm of prior restraint, the need for limits on defamation
claims, and, at times, content discrimination (but see the flagburning cases and Renton). She has also shown herself willing,
despite the absence of a public forum, to pronounce a regulation
"unreasonable." High points include her opinions for the Court
in Jews for Jesus M7 , Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, and
the Simon & Schuster r.48 case. On the other hand, she has always rejected challengers' public forum arguments, and virtually
always upheld time, place, and manner regulations. She would
overrule the cases protecting attorney advertising and public
employees' rights of association. She has often favored limitations on the availability of facial overbreadth challenges. Her
lowest points were her majority or plurality opinions on the public forum issue, Cornelius and Kokinda. M9
6.

Antonin Scalia

Justice Scalia is 56 years old, and has been on the Court
since 1986. He has demonstrated some sensitivity to the appropriateness of facial overbreadth challenges, and some vigilance
in striking down content-based regulations. He joined the Brennan majority in the flag-burning cases. He also joined Brennan's
solid rejection of "unbridled discretion" in City of Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer,m rejecting the doctrinal tinkering of Justice
White's dissenting opinion. Scalia's high points have included
his majority opinion in' R.A. V. r.r.l and his concurring opinion in
Massachusetts v. Oakes. On the other hand, he has always rejected challengers' public forum arguments (even reaching out
alone to do so in Burson), and would overrule the cases protecting attorney advertising and public employees' rights of association. He has favored the placing of limits on facial overbreadth
challenges. He joined the majority in Hazelwood School Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier. His absolute low point was his partially dissenting
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.

491
482
112
497
486
112

U.S. 576 (1989).
U.S. 569 (1987).
S. Ct. 501 (1991).
U.S. 720 (1990).
U.S. 750 (1988).
S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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opinion in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,552 in which he put
forth a theory of "pandering" of pornography which would be
truly dangerous if it attracted any support.
7.

Anthony Kennedy

Justice Kennedy is 56 years old, and has been on the Court
since early 1988. He has rejected the Court's public forum doctrine, and has taken a unique position that is highly intolerant
of content discrimination (but see his concurrence in Burson v.
Freeman); he joined the Brennan majority in the flag-burning
cases and the Scalia majority opinion in R.A. V. (but seemed to
accept the questionable theory of the Renton case, in his opinion
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism 553 ). H~ also joined the majority
opinions in the Forsyth County case and Florida Star v.
B.J.F.,554 and has been protective of attorney advertising. He
has also shown himself (in International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. ("ISKCON") v. Lee 555 ) to be willing to shike
down a time, place, imd manner regulation. High points for him
surely include his two opinions on the public forum issue, concurring in Kokinda and partly dissenting in ISKCON. On the
other hand, he would overrule the cases protecting public employees' rights of association, and he authored the majority
opinion in Ward, which unhelpfully modified the analysis of
time, place, and manner regulations. 556
8.

David Souter

Justice Souter is 53 years old, and has been on the Court
since 1990. He has rejected the Court's public forum analysis,
and shown strength in rejecting content-based regulations in
R.A. V. and Burson v. Freeman (but see his concurrence in
552. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
553. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
554. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
555. 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992).
556. Kennedy also authored a highly speech-protective plurality opinion in Gentile
v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991), a case that involved first amendment
issues not addressed in this article, namely the right of an attorney to make extra-judicial comments concerning pending cases. Along with O'Connor and Souter, he has also
demonstrated, outside the first amendment context, a reluctance to overrule prior decisions. See their joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791 (1992).
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Barnes v. Glen Theatre, in which he accepted the Renton approach to this issue). He also joined the majority in the Forsyth
County case. His dissenting opinions in ISKCON v. Lee (in
which he not only repudiated prevailing public forum doctrine
but also showed his readiness to strike down a time, place, and
manner regulation) and Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.lm (in which
he would have upheld the right of the press to publish truthful
information) are promising high points. Only his concurrence in
the Barnes case, which upheld a content-based regulation of expression, is cause for serious concern thus far.1I118
9.

Clarence Thomas

Justice Thomas is 44 years old, and has been on the Court
since 1991. He has participated in only three of the decisions
discussed in this Article. Of those three decisions, the only one
in which Thomas took a speech-protective position was R.A. V. v.
St. Paul, in which he joined the Scalia majority opinion. In doing so, he presumably demonstrated a heartening intolerance of
content discrimination (in a factual setting, it is worth adding,
in which he might well have been expected to rule 'otherwise) as
well as a willingness (along with every other member of the
Court, in this case) to embrace the facial overbreadth concept
without apparent reservation. On the other hand, Thomas also
joined the majority in ISKCON v. Lee, thereby presumably signing on to the Court's rigid and restrictive approach to the definition of a public forum (and joining in upholding the challenged
regulations as "reasonable"). Finally, he joined Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in the Forsyth County case, a position from
which no negative inferences can clearly be drawn. (Joining the
Blackmun majority in that case, on the other hand, would have
been a positive sign.)
B.

THE COURT OVERALL

Freedom of expression remains vibrant and strong in
America, and there is little reason to fear that the present Court
is likely to retreat from what has been, during the past three
557. 111 s. Ct. 2513 (1991).
558. But see Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, supra note 556, in which Souter joined
an opinion by Rehnquist that was less than maximally protective of attorneys' speech.
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decades, a largely speech-protective position. Admittedly, the
Court has not had occasion, since formulating the "test" of
Brandenburg v. Ohior>r>9 in 1969, to revisit the core First Amendment question of the extent to which one is constitutionally entitled to advocate crime or revolution; assumptions that the
Court remains (or, indeed, has ever been) fully committed to
that "test" may therefore not be warranted.r>6O Obscenity remains an unprotected category of speech, but that is nothing
new. These areas aside, the differences among the Justices, while
i~portant, should not lead anyone to overlook their apparently
shared commitment to a system of fundamental and presumptive freedom of expression. Nonetheless, some changes may
await us in the post-Brennan era.
Some very positive aspects of the law of freedom of speech
appear to be quite stable. Sharing the top of this list are the key
principles that content discrimination is presumptively invalid
and that government cannot prohibit speech on the ground that
its message is potentially offensive to listeners. Safe and settled,
too, is the axiom that administrative officials cannot be given
unfettered discretion to decide who shall speak and who shall
not. There is little evidence to suggest that the First Amendment rules of defamation law are about to be altered. Despite all
of the complaining and ostensible tinkering that have accompanied its use, the facial overbreadth doctrine also appears to be in
good health.
Some other, less positive aspects of the law appear to be
stable as well. As has been noted, the law of obscenity does not
appear to be about to change. Time, place, and manner regulations are almost always upheld, and the line between contentneutrality and content-discrimination has been blurred by the
theory of the Renton case, a theory that no sitting Justice has
opposed. Protection of commercial speech has already been
weakened, as has protection of public employees' freedom of
speech. While a single decision may be too slender a reed on
which to base a generalization, Rust v. Sullivan appears to have
substantially undermined the longstanding judicial resistance to
559. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
560. See generally Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1,97-104 (1991).
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"unconstitutional conditions" upon the receipt of government
funds.
In some other areas of First Amendment law, the prospect
of diminished judicial protection, while uncertain, is real. Four
Justices have gone on record as ready to overturn the Court's
precedents protecting public employees' rights of political association, and three Justices have announced their desire to reverse the Court's protection of attorney advertising. The logic of
the Kuhlmeier decision would seem to point toward even further
erosion of the First Amendment rights of public high school students. The Court's commitment to uphold the freedom to publish truthful information, in the face of competing interests in
privacy or confidentiality, may well be about to weaken dramatically. So, too, may its adherence to the procedural requirements
of Freedman v. Maryland, stubbornly applied to so many "prior
restraints" by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Finally, it is by
no means clear that the present Court, if given the opportunity,
will maintain the view of suppression of profanity embodied in
the classic case of Cohen v. California/'S} In only one of the areas discussed in this Article is the Court visibly poised to possibly broaden its protection of freedom of expression, that being
the issue of what government property constitutes a "public forum" in which speech is presumptively free. Thanks to Justices
Kennedy and Souter, this is the one aspect of the law of freedom
of speech in which liberalization looms as a distinct possibility in
the future.
In the meantime, those of us who care deeply about freedom
of expression will never cease to be grateful to Justices Brennan
and Marshall. Like their forebears Black, Douglas, Brandeis,
and Holmes, their commitment was truly extraordinary. They
need not be the last ones about whom that can be said.

561. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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